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ABSTRACT
A MOORING FOR ETHICAL LIFE:
 ASSESSING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY
Chris Melenovsky
Samuel Freeman
In order to articulate a political philosophy that applies beyond state action, John Rawls 
took the “the basic structure of society” as the first subject of justice. In this dissertation, I 
explain both what the basic structure of society is and why it is an appropriate subject in 
moral theory. As the set of institutions that specify our valid claims as members of 
society, the basic structure has a profound influence on the content of ethical life; shaping 
our values, virtues, relationships, and obligations. In order to adequately assess this 
influential set of institutions, we should treat the the basic structure as a fundamental 
moral concern.
iii
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Introduction 
Even once we accept that morality has a universal foundation, we should still recognize 
that the particular values, virtues, relationships and obligations that guide our decisions 
are often contingent. We should respect one another, advance happiness, live flourishing 
lives and advance justice, but the way in which we should do these things will always be 
specific to our social context. In recognizing that much of our form of ethical life is 
relative to our social world, we do not need to think that all of ethics is relative. The 
ultimate moral ends or principles that ground our pursuits and restrict our actions will 
only have meaning and substance through the particularities of the form of life we live. 
To ignore these particularities will only obscure what the ultimate ground for ethics and 
morality truly is.
 The particular way in which we live together determines much of our particular 
form of ethical life. In living together, we organize, coordinate and understand our actions 
in accordance with social practices. These practices set our expectations of others and 
give meaning to our activities. When our interactions are complex and when we live with 
large groups, we organize our interaction more and more, and our practices become more 
and more structured. What we identify  as our social institutions are particularly ordered 
practices that  structure our life together. In ordering our lives, these institutions have 
profound and pervasive effects on the content of ethical life. These institutions not only 
determine the material conditions in our society and the distribution of advantages, they 
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also influence the shape of ethical life. Our social practices establish new obligations, 
define our rights, shape our values, and set the terms of our relationships. 
 These social institutions are a concern of ethics and morality because the 
institutions that structure our conduct could have been otherwise and we can change them 
now. Since these institutions have profound effects on our form of ethical life, which 
institutions we choose to have can have a broad impact on the values, virtues, 
relationships and obligations that define our particular ethical life. This makes the 
question of which institutions we should have a distinct and weighty ethical concern.
 Of course, there is the view that our real obligations, values, and virtues are 
everywhere and always the same. To some extent, this must be true if we recognize a 
universal foundation for our moral and ethical claims. Yet, we should not take this view 
too far. We live particular lives with particular concerns and particular ways of 
interacting. If ethics is to properly treat us as particular persons, it  needs to be sensitive to 
the differences in our ways of living. What ends we set, what makes us happy, and what 
we rely on others to do will also be specific to our social context, and a complete 
identification of our values, virtues, relationships and obligations should be sensitive to 
these particular features of our lives. 
 This dissertation is about how moral and political philosophy should proceed after 
recognizing the profound influence of our social institutions on the content of ethical life. 
I argue  that there is a distinct and unified set of institutions that have a kind of moral 
primacy. The institutions establish moral rights, obligations and powers for individuals as 
members of society. They establish a background for living our life together. The central 
2 
role that these institutions play in determining that which is particular to our form of 
ethical life makes these institutions of primary  moral importance. These institutions are 
those that constitute the basic structure of society, and I will argue that  they  have primacy 
in a proper order of evaluation amongst those moral issues that we need address. 
0.1 The Basic Structure and Justice
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls made the claim that “the primary  subject of justice is 
the basic structure of society.”1  By the “basic structure,” Rawls meant the way our basic 
social institutions-- which include a property scheme, economic system and political 
constitution--come together as a single system of social cooperation.2 I take this choice of 
subject to be one of the many contributions that Rawls made to the fields of moral and 
political philosophy, and I take it to be a contribution that is separable from his others. A 
reader could agree with Rawls in taking the basic structure as primary subject even when 
they  do not accept his two principles of justice, contractualism, constructivism, or his 
conception of the person. In this dissertation, I mean to show, not only that a reader 
could, but that she should appreciate the Rawlsian choice of subject even when she 
disagrees with Rawls on these other core issues. 
 What turns many recent theorists away from the Rawlsian focus on the basic 
structure is linked to what turned theorists towards Theory of Justice when it was first 
published. As the title states, the book was offered as a theory  of justice and the 
3 
1 Rawls, Theory of Justice (Revised), 6.
2 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 10.
importance of justice immediately grabs us.3  The fact that Rawls seemed to offer a 
renewed account of justice made it more attractive as a major work in philosophy. The 
fact that this renewed account was appealing, rigorous and deep made it one of the most 
significant works in 20th century philosophy. However, if we think of Theory of Justice 
as a theory  of justice, we are tempted to read the phrase “the primary subject of justice is 
the basic structure of society” as a claim about the nature of justice. We think of it as a 
thesis about justice; that justice has some unique relationship to the Rawlsian artifice that 
is the basic structure. At this point, many  come to doubt the Rawlsian choice of subject. 
Should we think that justice is really about the basic structure in some primary  way? Isn’t 
justice something broader than that? Our pre-theoretic understanding of justice seems to 
cut against  the claim that justice is somehow uniquely related to the specific subject of 
the basic structure. So, being about justice makes Theory of Justice appealing, but being 
about justice makes the Rawlsian choice of subject seem unappealing. 
 G.A. Cohen, Liam Murphy and Aresh Abizadeh have used this intuition against 
the Rawlsian choice of subject in each of their more focused arguments. First, Cohen 
argued that justice is a unified moral demand whether we are assessing institutions, states 
of the world or individual actions.4 If we are to identify the basic structure--or anything--
as “just,” then we must be claiming that the unified and fully  general demand of justice is 
instantiated in the basic structure. Given that justice is general in this way, Cohen argues 
4 
3 G.A. Cohen motivates his criticism with this claim, “It was because it was thought to offer a new and 
comprehensive theory of justice that the book A Theory of Justice was welcomed with such excitement: the 
excitement was not that Rawls had proved a theory of something, well, sort of like justice.” Rescuing 
Justice and Equality, 304.
4 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, Ch. 7 (especially p. 291).
that we cannot  rightly identify justice with a principle that  applies only to the basic 
structure. A principle of justice is general across subjects by its very  nature, so it cannot 
apply  only to the basic structure. Second, Murphy argued that if we think of justice as 
primarily  a concern of our basic institutions, then this only  frustrates our ability  to 
promote justice in an unjust world. For Murphy, identifying justice as an institutional 
virtue means that we can only advance justice through institutions, but this would mean 
we cannot always do that which would directly  advance justice. Here again, Murphy uses 
a common intuition about the nature of justice to challenge the Rawlsian focus on the 
basic structure. Third, Abizadeh has focused on distributive justice specifically and 
challenged the idea that the basic structure of society would limit the scope of distributive 
justice. Once we recognize that distributive justice has demands beyond the basic 
structure, this recognition seems to pull us away  from the basic structure’s importance as 
a primary subject. In these arguments again, Abizadeh uses a pre-theoretical idea of 
distributive justice to challenge the Rawlsian choice of subject. 
 My response to these arguments is to distance the claim that “we should take the 
basic structure as subject” from any claim about the nature of justice. Accordingly, I do 
not claim that  the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, but instead 
claim that the basic structure has primacy as a distinct moral subject.  I will claim that the 
basic structure of society is a kind of mooring for ethical life. Regardless of what we 
think about justice as an ideal, we should treat the evaluation of the basic structure as 
amongst the most important ethical concerns. 
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 Before explaining why the basic structure is such an important subject, I first want 
to make clear how my approach differs from typical responses to Cohen, Murphy and 
Abizadeh. Their arguments appeal to a pre-theoretical understanding of justice and show 
the problems with taking the basic structure as primary subject given that understanding 
of justice. The obvious response to their arguments would be to develop or defend an 
alternative understanding of justice, and then to show why  we should take the basic 
structure as primary subject given that  understanding of justice. Thomas Nagel and 
Samuel Scheffler seem to make such an argument with their appeal to the division of 
moral labor, each offering an understanding of justice that uniquely applies to 
institutions.5  Andrew Williams argues for an understanding of justice that is uniquely 
related to publicity.6  Kok-Chor Tan shows that core social institutions are the site of a 
suitably defined idea of distributive justice.7  In each case, theorists defend the Rawlsian 
view by articulating a view of justice such that institutions are uniquely related to it. 
 By contrast, my argument does not appeal to any understanding of justice. I do 
not claim that the basic structure is the primary  subject of justice but that the basic 
structure is a centrally  important subject for ethics. I claim that the reasons for taking the 
basic structure as subject are independent of the nature of justice. Instead, the reasons 
come from the ways in which the basic structure affects the content of ethical life.
6 
5 Nagel, “The Moral Division of Labor,” Equality and Partiality; Scheffler, “The Moral Division of Labor: 
Egalitarian Liberalism as Moral Pluralism,” Equality and Tradition. 
6 Williams, “Incentives, Inequality and Publicity” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1998).
7 Tan, “Justice and Personal Pursuits” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 101, No. 7 (2004); Justice, 
Institutions and Luck, Ch. 3. 
 There is an important difference between what I believe about justice and what I 
need to claim for my argument. I have a certain belief about how we should understand 
justice, but my arguments do not require that belief. Specifically, I believe that the 
demands of justice are not general across all subjects. What makes for a just society, just 
relations between societies, just agreements, and a just character is not  a single and 
unified moral demand instantiated in all these things. Such a view towards justice is well-
suited for those concerned with a single moral good, like equality  or happiness, but it not 
well-suited for those who focus on the complexities and conflicts of ethics. Instead, I treat 
justice in the way that  deontologists treat rightness. For deontologists, what is “right” is 
determined by a principle that applies in that circumstance and not by a single principle 
that applies across all circumstances. Likewise, I believe that what is “just” is determined 
by a principle that applies to that subject and not by  a single principle that applies across 
all subjects. When it comes to justice, I am a “non-generalist”. With this understanding of 
justice, I can explain why the principles that apply to the basic structure are principles “of 
justice” even when they are not derived from any more fundamental principles of justice. 
I will return to this issue in Chapter 5 in order to articulate a response to Cohen’s 
argument.
 For now, the key is to recognize that I do not need this understanding of justice to 
make my point. I do not need to make any argument about the nature of justice in order to 
show the ethical importance of the basic structure. We can appreciate the Rawlsian choice 
of subject  most easily when we distinguish the argument for this choice of subject from 
any claim about the nature of justice.
7 
0.2 Profound and Pervasive Effects
So, why is the basic structure such a centrally important ethical subject? In short, because 
the basic structure determines the rights, obligations and powers that we have as members 
of society, and these moral demands and claims form a background for our social 
interaction and thereby for the various practice-dependent aspects of ethical life. The 
whole complex of values, virtues, relationships and obligations that  specify our ethical 
life is not explained solely by  the particularities of the basic structure, but  the basic 
structure has both profound direct effects and wide indirect effects. It directly  establishes 
core obligations, has far-ranging effects on our material conditions, and determines much 
of the distribution of social advantages. It  also indirectly affects what associations and 
relationships persons build and the ways we think of ourselves. It is this kind of profound 
and pervasive effect on ethical life that makes the basic structure so centrally important 
for ethics. Think of all the ways in which a feudal society  differs from a democratic 
market society. Think of both the direct  effects that  has in individual rights and 
obligations, and think of the indirect effects in has on our relationships and ends. That is 
the kind of deep significance the basic structure has. 
 In making this claim, I am bound to perk the ears of those familiar with recent 
criticisms of Rawls. Rawls claimed that the basic structure was the primary subject of 
justice because its effects are so “profound and pervasive” from the start of life.8  Yet, 
G.A. Cohen’s argued against such a justification for the focus on the basic structure in his 
8 
8 Rawls, Theory of Justice (Original Edition), 96.
popular essay  “Where the Action is: On the Site of Distributive Justice.”9  The criterion, 
“having profound and pervasive effects,” cannot justify a unique concern for the basic 
structure of society  because things beyond the basic structure also have profound and 
pervasive effects. For example, suppose we live in a society in which a majority  of 
persons greatly value poetry. Perhaps a majority see poetry as the highest form of human 
accomplishment. It is likely that this appreciation would have profound and pervasive 
effects on education, leisure time, career choices, and much else. We would not, however, 
think that  this appreciation for poetry is part of the basic structure. Accordingly, we could 
not justify an exclusive concern for the basic structure by appeal to profound and 
pervasive effects because it would not rule out our concern for the appreciation of poetry. 
It is because of such an argument--and his subsequent  support for this argument--that 
Cohen will be the primary interlocutor for much of my  argument. I need to explain why 
my appeal to the profound effects of the basic structure does not make me liable to 
Cohen’s objection.
 In response to Cohen’s argument, I want to make two points. The first point does 
not address his objection, but  is nonetheless important. I sense that  persons read the 
phrase “profound and pervasive effects” as if it refers solely to material effects. At least, 
this is how Cohen uses the ideas when the effect he is concerned with is material equality. 
He makes the point that an egalitarian ethos could have profound and pervasive effects on 
equality  in the same way that economic institutions can.10 It is important for my response 
9 
9 Cohen, “Where the Action is: On the Site of Distributive Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 26, 
No. 1 (1997), 3-30. 
10 ibid, 13-14.
however, that profound and pervasive effects are not only material effects but also effects 
on the content of ethical life. The profound and pervasive effects are on our values, 
virtues, relationships, obligations and self-conception. My concern is with the effects on 
our relationships with one another, our pursuits in life and what our responsibilities are. 
 Even once we are concerned with profound and pervasive effects on ethical life, 
however, Cohen’s objection still stands. The above poetry  case is an example of how. I 
move then to a second point, which directly  addresses Cohen’s objection. The profound 
and pervasive effects criterion is not meant to distinguish the basic structure from other 
moral concerns. It  is, instead, meant to show why  the basic structure--otherwise 
distinguished as an ethical concern--is so important. In short, the appeal to profound and 
pervasive effects is not meant to answer the question "what distinguishes the basic 
structure from other ethical concerns?" but instead to answer "why is the concern with the 
basic structure primary amongst ethical concerns?" The organization of the basic 
structure has profound effects, so it  is ethically  important that we address it. It is also true 
that the informal structure of society has profound effects, so it  is ethically  important that 
we address it as well. Yet, the fact that  both the informal structure and the basic structure 
are ethically important is no problem for taking one as subject over another.
 In short, I want to claim that the basic structure is so important because it has 
profound and pervasive effects on ethical life, Cohen objects that other aspects of social 
life also have such effects. I agree. Those other aspects of social life are also important to 
assess. This fact takes nothing away from the importance of the basic structure. 
10 
 The question inevitably raised at this point is “if other aspects of social life are 
also important, then why direct our attention to the basic structure specifically?” I still 
need to explain why the basic structure, specifically, deserves attention. I recognize that 
an appeal to profound and pervasive effects on ethical life will not do that by itself. 
0.3 Three Issues
At this point, I have said what I will not do. I will neither argue for a focus on the basic 
structure by arguing for a particular conception of justice nor claim that the basic 
structure is unique in having profound and pervasive effects. To explain what I will do, I 
need to distinguish three issues. In his criticism of Rawls, Cohen mixes these three 
different issues together, and I mean to separate them again. 
 The first issue is the need to offer an adequate account of what the basic structure 
of society is. What differentiates the basic structure from the entire system of law or from 
all norms of conduct? What unifies the major social institutions into the basic structure? 
Rawls does not give any  such full articulation of what the basic structure is, and he does 
not do so purposively.11  However, given recent challenges, we need a more precise 
account of what the basic structure is. Call this issue a concern with the identity of the 
basic structure. 
 The second issue is explaining why we would need to assess the basic structure 
specifically, once it is identified. Why is the basic structure--given what it  is--an object  of 
11 
11 Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 12, 57. The way that Rawls purposively uses an intuitive understanding of 
the basic structure is brought out in Samuel Freeman, "The Basic Structure as First Subject of Justice," in 
Jon Mandle and David A. Reidy (eds.), A Companion to Rawls (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, forthcoming).
moral concern? Why wouldn’t our concerns with it be addressed by other moral 
principles? Even if we recognize that certain problems of political philosophy need to be 
addressed, it is not clear why we should address them with principles that apply to the 
basic structure rather than, say, justifying the use of coercion or justifying our social 
institutions individuality. What would require that arguments in political philosophy be 
about the basic structure specifically?  Call this issue a concern with the moral 
indispensability of the basic structure. 
 The third issue is offering a justification of why we would treat the principles that 
applies to the basic structure as distinct from other moral principles. Even if we should 
morally assess the basic structure, why would we think that the moral demand on it 
would be any different from the moral demands on other subjects? Why wouldn’t we 
merely apply a more general principle to the basic structure as we do other subjects? 
After all, Rawls starts out developing principles for this subject rather than developing 
first principles to be applied to it. What could warrant  detaching the basic structure from 
broader moral commitments in this way? Call this issue a concern with the moral 
distinctiveness of the basic structure. 
 Cohen wrongly supposes that the identity, moral indispensability and moral 
distinctiveness of the basic structure are all addressed by a single account. He offers two 
options that would explain the identity of the basic structure, and then shows either option 
to be inadequate as an explanation for its moral distinctiveness. In the 2009 version of his 
12 
argument,12  Cohen claims that  we cannot identify the basic structure as the coercive 
structure because it does not explain why  we are concerned with the coercive structure 
rather than the other features of social life that have profound and pervasive effects. 
Likewise, he argues that we cannot identify the basic structure as certain norms of 
conduct because it does not explain why we are not likewise concerned with other norms 
that have profound and pervasive effects. In this way, he claims that no explanation of the 
identity  of the basic structure is adequate because it does not explain its moral 
distinctiveness. 
 A single explanation does not need to resolve these three issues. Why  would we 
think that a single account would explain the identity, moral indispensability and moral 
distinctiveness of the basic structure? The three issues are fundamentally  different. First, 
identity  is a descriptive problem. It addresses what part of the world is picked out by the 
idea of the basic structure. One could articulate a view about what the basic structure is 
and think it has no moral significance whatsoever.13  Second, the moral indispensability 
issue turns on claims about the aims of moral theory. It depends on a view about what our 
moral principles need to do such that we would need principles that apply to the basic 
structure. Third, the moral distinctiveness depends on broader views about how our moral 
commitments hang together--or don’t. Whether we can detach the basic structure as an 
ethical subject  and develop principles for it depends on views about what makes 
13 
12 In §5.1.1, I will point out that Cohen slightly changes his argument from the 1997 article to the 2009 
book.
13 I have no idea why one would do this, but that is not the point. 
appropriate principles. For example, are all appropriate principles derived from first 
principles or can they be generated by a constructive procedure?
 I suspect that the reason why  Cohen mixes these three issues together, despite 
their apparent differences, is because of the role that “justice” plays in our moral 
reasoning. Justice seems to be both morally indispensable and morally distinctive. First, 
we intuitively think that the demands of justice are a centrally important aspect of 
morality  and ethics. Second, the ideal of justice seems distinct from other moral ideals, 
like rightness or goodness. If “the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of 
society” our views about the indispensability  and distinctiveness of justice would 
seemingly make the basic structure both morally indispensable and morally distinct. 
Those who argue for a conception of justice that is uniquely tied to the basic structure, 
thereby get the moral indispensability and moral distinctiveness of the basic structure for 
free through its ties to justice. For Cohen, justice is indispensable and distinct, but it is 
broader and more fundamental then our judgements about the basic structure. It is for this 
reason that the focus on the basic structure seems misplaced to him.
 In my core arguments, I do not make any claim about the nature of justice. 
Instead, I claim that the basic structure is a centrally important subject for ethics. To make 
this claim, I need to explain the identity, moral indispensability and moral distinctiveness 
of the basic structure. If I am right that its association with the ideal of justice previously 
made the basic structure seem indispensable and distinct, then my challenge will be to 
explain these two features of the basic structure without appeal to the nature of justice. 
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0.4 Addressing the Three Issues
The first three chapters of this dissertation address the identity, moral indispensability  and 
moral distinctiveness of the basic structure respectively.  In the fourth chapter, I review 
the significance of these arguments for moral theory  more broadly. The final two 
chapters, address objections to my arguments. 
 The first chapter identifies the basic structure as a specific set of social practices. 
It begins by defining the general idea of a social practice and then progressively  defines 
subclasses of social practices until we reach the idea of “major social institution.” I then 
claim that the basic structure is the way these major social institutions come together to 
form a single system.
 There are two important ideas that are introduced in the first  chapter that form the 
core of its argument; the first is the idea of an “ostensibly binding practice” and the 
second is the connected idea of a “major social institution.” Ostensibly  binding social 
practices are those practices that persons understand as requiring that they act in ways 
specified by the practice. As an example, the practice of line-waiting is understood by 
participants as requiring that they wait in line in order to get service. There are two 
important features of this kind of practice. First, we can understanding these practices as 
requiring action without commit ourselves to the judgement that we should act in the 
required ways. In this way the practices are only “ostensibly” binding. For example, one 
could describe the practice of line waiting as included the rule that “one ought to wait in 
line” without themselves thinking that  persons really ought to wait in line. Whether we 
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should act in the ways required by  an ostensibly binding social practice is a moral 
question that is not answered by detailing our understanding of practice alone. 
 Second, I identify the “major social institutions” as those practice that meet two 
conditions; (1) the rules are specific enough so that persons can form definite claims on 
their basis and (2) the rules apply to us as members of society. For example, a property 
system is a major social institution because it requires that persons respect property 
specific claims that persons have due to their membership in society. As members of 
society, we know that persons are required by  the rules to act in that way, and we plan our 
lives against the expectation that they will do so. The fact that the major social 
institutions are specific enough to establish claims gives members of society  a kind of 
“background security.” As they  live and plan their lives, they can rely on people to 
generally  act according to the institutional rules. I then argue that we can best understand 
the basic structure as constituted by the major social institutions for a single society. 
Hence, the basic structure is the way in which the major social institutions together 
establish background security for persons as members of society. This is the key  idea that 
unites the basic structure as a single subject rather than a mere heap of institutions.
 With the identity of the basic structure thereby  established, I move on to the moral 
indispensability of the basic structure in the second chapter. It might seem natural to 
show any  particular subject is morally indispensable on the basis of a substantive moral 
view. For instance, one might argue that we need to assess the basic structure because of 
the moral importance of either autonomy or happiness and claim that the basic structure 
uniquely bears on autonomy or happiness. Instead, I give a more ecumenical argument 
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that is not based on a commitment to any  substantive moral claim. Instead, the argument 
is made on the basis of a view about the normativity  of social practices. Most simply, I 
claim that  to assess certain actions we need to assess the practices that those actions are a 
part of. Analogously, I claim that to assess the major social institutions, we need to assess 
the basic structure of which they are a part. 
 To see the motivating commitment of my argument, we should look to Hume. In 
his Treatise on Human Nature, Hume gives an example that highlights the kind of 
argument I mean to make. In §3.2.2, he writes
“A single act of justice is frequently contrary to the public interest; and 
were it to stand alone, without being followed by many other acts, may, of 
itself, be very prejudicial to society. When a man of merit, of a benevolent 
disposition, restores a great fortune to a miser, a seditious bigot, he has 
acted justly and laudably, but the public is the real sufferer. Nor is every 
single act of justice, considered apart, more conducive to private interest, 
than to public; and ‘tis easily conceived how a man may impoverish 
himself by a single instance of integrity.”
In these two cases, Hume gives examples of actions that would be quite wrongful if 
judged in isolation. If one had the choice between giving money to a bigoted miser or to a 
charity, then to give the money to the miser would be uncaring. Yet, if we see the action 
as an instance of returning a loan, our assessment  of the action changes. Here, the man of 
merit ought to give the miser the money because the action is part of a practice of 
contract-keeping. Whether the action is part  of a social practice is thereby relevant for 
properly  assessing the action. Hume here assumes that  the practice of contract-keeping is 
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a good one, because we would hardly approve of the action of the man of merit if it were 
not. For this reason, we can recognize the importance of assessing the practice of which 
the action is a part in order to assess that action. 
 The moral indispensability of the basic structure is explained by carrying this 
analysis to a second level. To properly  assess an action that is part  of a practice, we need 
to assess that practice. To properly assess an institution that is part of the basic structure, 
we need to assess the basic structure itself. We need to treat institutions as we treat the 
action of the man of merit; just as we see his action as part  of the practice of contract-
keeping we should see contract-keeping as part  of the basic structure. The basic structure 
is morally  indispensable as a subject because we can only properly assess our major 
social institutions by assessing the basic structure as a whole. 
 In the third chapter, I move on to explain why the basic structure is morally 
distinctive. To do this, I argue for a fundamental distinction between moral judgments 
that apply  within a social practice and judgments that apply to that practice. The reason 
for this distinction is because social practices affect the moral context  of individuals 
within that practice. Judgments made within a moral context should be sensitive to the 
context established by  the practice, but the judgments made of that practice should not be. 
For example, suppose that a property system establishes trespass as a wrong. Our 
evaluation of an action within a property system should be sensitive to the wrong of 
trespass, but our assessment of the property system should not be. The fact  that a property 
system makes trespass wrong is not a reason to support a property  system. I claim that it 
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is this distinction between judgments that apply within a social practice and those 
principles that apply to a practice that distinguishes the basic structure as a moral subject.
 In making this argument, I contrast my account of the moral distinctiveness of the 
basic structure with the primary alternative, the “division of moral labor” arguments 
offered by Thomas Nagel and Samuel Scheffler. Both arguments justify distinguishing 
principles for institutions from principles for individuals based on the efficacy of such a 
separation in satisfying our diverse moral aims.  Instead of this, I argue that what  justifies 
assessing the basic structure according to distinct principles is a division between 
principles that apply within a moral context and those that apply to practices that 
establish that moral context. Within an ethical life, the particularities of our social 
practices establish certain values, virtues, relationships and obligations that are relevant 
to determining how we should act. The principles that apply to these practices should not 
be sensitive to the particularities that they  establish, but principles that apply within these 
practices should be. The principles that apply to the basic structure are principles that 
should not be sensitive to any moral context whereas the principles that apply  to a variety 
of other subject should be. While the basic structure is not the sole determinant of the 
particularities of ethical life, it has a kind of independence that justifies treating it 
differently.
 With these three chapters complete, I will have explained the identity, moral 
indispensability and moral distinctiveness of the basic structure. First, the basic structure 
is the way in which the major social institutions together establish background security 
for persons as members of society. Second, we need to assess the basic structure as 
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subject in order to properly assess the major social institutions that together form it. 
Finally, the moral demands on this structure are distinct  because of the difference 
between principles that apply within a social context and the principles that apply to those 
practices that determine that context. What explains why the basic structure is a centrally 
important subject  for ethics is not the nature of justice, but the normativity  of social 
practices and the kind of social practices the basic structure consists of. It is because the 
basic structure is a system of practices that we need to assess it, and it  because it is a 
system of practices that it is morally distinct from the principle that apply within it. 
0.5 Significance and Two Objections
Together, the first three chapters show why  the basic structure is a centrally  important 
ethical subject. Depending on the reader, this conclusions might  seem either humdrum or 
extreme. In Chapter 4, I mean to counter both of these objections. I seek to show that the 
general approach I support meets a reasonable middle between those who insist that 
morality  is independent of our social context, and those who believe it is fully determined 
by our social context. In this way, the approach has the possibly  of appealing to both 
Kantians and Hegelians, communitarians and liberals, as well as sociologists and moral 
philosophers. However, I do not think that I am only creating friendships through my 
argument. I also claim that my argument is inconsistent with any moral theory that cannot 
accept “limited conventionalism.” I define limited conventionalism as the view that 
some--but not all--of our moral demands and claims are practice-dependent. If a moral 
theory  cannot recognize either (a) that some demands or claims are practice-dependent or 
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(b) that some demands or claims are practice-independent, then they will not accept my 
arguments.
 This fourth chapters does not complete my argument. I still want to respond to 
two objections in Chapter 5 and 6 respectively. Both objections are inspired by recent 
criticism of Rawls, but I dentify them with much deeper tendencies in moral and political 
theory.  In the final two chapters, I want to show why the approach I argue for is 
preferable to the approaches that are consistent with those deeper tendencies.
 The first objection is developed from Liam Murphy’s argument in “Institutions 
and the Demands of Justice.” There, Murphy makes an both a direct argument and an 
intuitive argument against separating principles that apply to institutions from those that 
apply  to individual actions. His direct argument seeks to show that separating the 
principles that apply to institutions frustrates our attempts to advance justice in our 
imperfect world. This argument can be easily addressed, but there is a deeper intuitive 
argument that presents a more persistent difficulty.  Specifically, Murphy appeals to the 
intuitive idea that all our moral principles are united at some fundamental level. Those 
principles that are at this fundamental level must then be general across all subjects; they 
apply  to institutions as much as they apply  to individuals. This intuitive view directly 
conflicts with the moral distinctiveness of the basic structure, because it limits the extent 
to which practices can affect our moral context. Murphy’s view is an intuitive view of 
moral theory, and since this view conflicts with the moral distinctiveness I defend, I need 
to address it. 
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 In response, I first want to show exactly  why Murphy’s argument would be 
problematic for the view I argue for. Our social context can affect the assessment of 
individual action in two ways. First, our social context might change the causal processes 
by which we satisfy moral principles. For example, one might think that the convention 
of driving on the right changes the ways by which I satisfy  my obligation not to harm 
others. One could argue that no news moral standards arise from this convention but only 
a new way by which to satisfy an older moral standard.   Second, our social context might 
establish new standards by which to assess individual action. For example, one might 
think that if the institutions of property is justified, then I should respect property claims. 
Someone with this view with think that our social context establishes new standard by 
which to judge actions. My argument relies on the possibility of the second way that 
social context affects our moral assessment of individuals. Murphy’s argument is only an 
objection against  my  view insofar as it  shows why the second possibility is impossible. It 
is not clear that Murphy seeks to make this point, but some might interpret his argument 
in this way. They might claim that “if all valid moral judgments are entailed directly by 
first principles, then social context cannot  create new standard by which to judge 
individual actions.” The act-consequentialist, for example, is committed to only  one 
principle as grounding any judgments of individual action. If such a view is necessarily 
correct, then social context is not as important for assessing individual action as my 
argument requires. Such a moral theory might seem to be entailed by  Murphy’s claim that 
all moral principles are united at a fundamental level. 
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 I identify  this challenge as a commitment to “Generalism,” which holds that all 
valid moral judgements must be entailed directly by a fully general first principle (or 
fully  general first principles). Now, I recognize that a commitment to generalism would 
block my argument for the moral distinctiveness of the basic structure because it would 
block the importance of social context, so Chapter 4 is focused on defending against 
arguments for generalism. Overall, I mean to show that an argument from generalism are 
not problematic because we have no reason to be committed to the generalism. Any 
argument that assumes it to argue against a focus on the basic structure is therefore 
question-begging. I look at four major kinds of argument offered in defense of generalism 
and show why each of them is lacking. Finally, I end by  giving one brief argument 
against a commitment to generalism. 
 In Chapter 6, I am concerned with a second objection that is used by G.A. Cohen 
in his 2009 book, Rescuing Justice and Equality. In this book, Cohen goes beyond the 
argument from his 1997 article and appeals more directly to the concept of justice to 
ground his criticism of Rawls. As I made clear in §0.2, my argument consciously avoids 
making any  claims about the nature of justice. I see the biggest impediment towards 
accepting the central importance of the basic structure to be the fact that persons see such 
a focus as only  motivated by views about the nature of justice. Yet, while I avoid arguing 
from claims about justice, someone might still object to my view from their own view 
about justice. Shouldn’t we be concerned with justice, especially when we are assessing 
something like the basic structure? As Cohen points out, if we think that  the basic 
structure ought to be just, then shouldn’t we first identify what justice requires and then 
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apply  it to determine how the basic structure ought to be? While I have been avoiding 
making claims about the nature of justice, I have ignored how justice bears on the issue. 
Since justice seems to be a central moral concern, shouldn’t  we be concerned with what 
justice requires?
 I meet this objection by  focusing on what the concept of justice is and how it 
bears on the basic structure. I draw a contrast between unified and disunified conceptions 
of justice. A unified conception of justice consists of a single moral demand that unifies 
all objects that we can rightly  consider just or unjust. A disunified conception of justice 
views the demands of justice as different for different subjects. A disunified conception of 
justice is like the deontological conception of rightness. For the deontologist, what is 
right is determined by a principle that applies in that circumstance (rather than a single 
overarching principle for all circumstances), and a disunified conception of justice 
maintains that what  is just is determined by a principle that applies to that subject (rather 
than a single principle of justice that applies to all subjects). Cohen’s argument relies on a 
unified conception of justice, and I argued against such a view in Chapter 5. Specifically, 
I show that such an understanding of justice does not fit well with the role that concept 
plays in our practical reasoning. I then show how a disunified conception of justice can 
better explain why  the basic structure of society would be the primary subject of justice, 
thereby returning to the original Rawlsian claim. 
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0.6 A Mooring
The arguments in the chapters to come will show why the basic structure is an 
indispensable and  distinct ethical subject, but I here want to briefly  preview the argument 
of Chapter 4 and say what is so important  about the basic structure for ethical theory. 
Recognizing that it is not profound and pervasive effects that either identifies or 
distinguishes the basic structure as subject, I want to return to explain why it’s profound 
and pervasive effects make the basic structure--otherwise distinguished--such a centrally 
important subject. 
 To see this, we need to recognize the effects that social practices have on ethical 
life. Our most important decisions are often made between options determined by the 
social structure, the relationships that mean the most to us are understood on conventional 
terms, and many of our moral obligations arise from customary norms. The influence of 
these various social practices on ethical life is apparent whenever one gains a deeper 
understanding of some distant culture. In comparing their ideals, virtues, relationships 
and obligations with our own, we can see how different life in one society  can be from 
life in another.
 Given the apparent influence of social practices, it  makes sense that some come to 
explain all of ethical life as dependent on contingent practices. One can easily go from 
recognizing that social practices substantially shape ethical life to supposing that these 
practices fully shape ethical life. However, when we take this perspective, we give up on 
the possibility of any ultimate assessment of those practices. While one might criticize a 
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society according to the values that  the society itself inculcates, we would still give up on 
any perspective that is external to these practices from which to judge them.
 Yet, when we then look to find some practice-independent ethical perspective 
from which to judge our own society, we risk a different problem. If so much of our 
ethical life is influenced by contingent social practices, then any practice-independent 
foundation for ethical life risks being too thin. The danger is that if we treat the practice-
independent perspective as though it were the only perspective, we then ignore the rich 
aspects of ethical life that come from being embedded in a specific culture. In looking for 
some way to assess our own practices, we risk looking past them; we risk losing sight of 
the significant practice-dependent aspects of ethical life. 
 Given these two difficulties, our ethical theories are pulled in two directions, one 
local and one universal. We are pulled towards a more local perspective in being 
concerned with the particular ideals, virtues, relationships and obligations that are 
specific to our society. We often care deeply  about these aspects of ethical life even when 
we recognize that our concern with them is explained by  our being embedded in a 
particular culture. Alternatively, we are also pulled towards a more universal perspective 
in seeking out a suitable principle or perspective from which to judge our own society. 
We can be concerned with this perspective even when we do not see how it can explain 
the richness of ethical life.
 The conflict  between these two contrary  pulls has manifested itself historically in 
arguments between figures allied more with either local or universal concerns. For 
instance, Kant was explicit in trying to identify a transcendental perspective from which 
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to judge all moral questions. He tried to identify  a valid standard that was not only 
independent of the contingencies of a culture but  also independent of the contingencies of 
our inclinations. In response, Hegel was pulled in the opposite direction. He was 
concerned that Kant’s ultimate standard was too thin to validate the full experience of 
ethical life.14  To do so, we need to recognize the richness of a particular culture at a 
particular time and we need to appreciate our place within it. Whether or not Hegel 
offered an adequate standard for assessing particular cultures, many readers stop with his 
criticism of Kant. For them, it  is more important to recognize the significance of a society 
for ethical life than to determine how one should assess that society. 
 Given the conflicting pulls of our local and universal concerns, perhaps the 
appropriate role of moral theory is to discredit one or the other. One could try and show 
that all the richness of ethical life can be validated by a practice-independent ethical 
perspective, or one could show that there is no practice-independent perspective that 
could provide such validation. Neither of these seem the right approach because each 
would miss something important. We should instead recognize that our contingent social 
practices have an important role in vindicating many  of the ideals, virtues, relationships 
and obligations that we care most deeply about, and a practice-independent perspective 
has an important role in both grounding certain duties and providing a perspective from 
which to assess those practices. With this view, the real difficulty is not to discredit one 
aspect of ethical experience but to show how they  complement one another. Some of the 
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14 Likewise, while Henry Sidgwick sought the standard that could decides all moral disputes, F.H. Bradley 
looked towards the particularity of our lives to identify the self that ethics sought to realization of.
most important aspects of ethical life are practice-dependent and some are practice-
independent, and we can hardly  expect  to progress far in ethical theory until we 
determine which are which. This project is all the more difficult because it must be done 
always from within a particular culture, but that is the project I am concerned with. 
 What I have found most valuable in Rawls’s political philosophy is his 
contribution to this project. Too often, theorists will read Rawls as carrying through on 
the Kantian project as conceived above; he is thought of as identifying the perspective 
from which we can assess all aspects of ethical life. Yet, that is not the Rawlsian view. He 
does not try to identify  a single perspective from which all ethical questions are 
addressed. Instead, he sought to identify  a perspective from which to address a specific 
question; how should the basic structure of society be organized? It is Rawls’s 
identification of this question that contributes to the project I am concerned with. 
Identifying the basic structure as ethical subject can properly respect  both the 
universalizing and localizing aspects of ethical experience.
 There are practice-dependent aspects of ethical life, and the particularities of a 
basic structure have profound and pervasive influence on those aspects of life. There are 
also practice-independent aspects of ethical life, and the particularities of the basic 
structure have no effect on these. In assessing the basic structure, we need to treat it  as 
having this profound effect on ethical life and differentiate it from the choices that 
happen within ethical life. We respect the practice-independent aspects of ethical life by 
ensuring that our assessment of the basic structure is sensitive to them. We respect the 
practice-dependent aspects of ethical life in recognizing that the basic structure has a 
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profound influence on the content of ethical life. It  is because the basic structure has this 
profound influence on the content  of ethical life that its assessment can properly respect 
both the universalizing and localizing perspectives in ethical philosophy. 
 According to this analysis, we can recognize that the particularities of our social 
context are relevant for much of moral and ethical philosophy. Our culture, shared 
meanings, institutional roles, and social ideals are important  for understanding how we 
should live; their importance is not merely a socially  determined illusion. Moreover, we 
can recognize particularities of ethical life without embracing a kind of moral relativism. 
How our society is organized will influence much of the content of ethical life, but how 
our society is organized should be justified by practice-independent values. In this way, 
our assessment of the basic structure acts as a kind of mooring for ethical life. The 
particularities of culture, history and chance will swash our culture in different directions 
and with it  carry  the particularities of our values, virtues, relationships and obligations. 
Nonetheless, so long as we hold that the basic structure of society should be a certain 
way, these particularities will not sweep our ethical life too far afield. We will stay 
tethered to the solid ground that our practice-independent values provide.
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Chapter 1: 
Social Practices, the Basic Structure, and Social Cooperation 
“‘Let us unite,’ he says to  them, “to protect  the weak from oppression, restrain the 
ambitious, and secure for everyone the possession of what belongs to him. Let  us 
institute regulations of justice and peace to which all are obliged to conform, which 
make an exception of no one, and which compensate in  some way for the caprices of 
fortune by  equally subjecting the powerful and the weak to mutual duties. In a word, 
instead of turning our forces against  ourselves, let  us gather them into one supreme 
power which  governs us according to wise laws, protects and defends all the 
members of the association, repulses common enemies, and maintains us in an 
eternal concord.” ...All ran to meet  their chains thinking they had secured their 
freedom, for although they had enough reason to feel the advantages of a political 
establishment, they did not have enough experience to foresee its dangers.”   
- J.J. Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality
When we plan our lives, we do so against a background of expectations. Some of these 
expectations are about the natural world, as when the sailor plans her voyage in 
accordance with the tides or a biker plans his cross-country trek for when his knees are 
sturdier. Other expectations are social. We plan a career on the basis of how professional 
fields are organized; going into marketing rather than sales or teaching mathematics 
rather than physics. We put work into a house based on the expectation that we will have 
an exclusive claim to use and sale of the property. We build a family with the expectation 
that we bear responsibility for our children. In these cases and so many others, we are 
able to plan our lives because we have reliable expectations about the social world. 
 The expectations we have about our social world are expectations about other 
persons, but they are not like those expectations we have of those we know personally. 
For instance, we might save up for a beachside cottage because we expect that it would 
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make our partner happy. Or, we might choose to live closer to home on the expectation 
that our closest friends will also stay near. These expectations are based on personal 
information in a way that our expectations about the social world are not. Instead, our 
expectations of the social world are based on an understanding of how persons--even 
strangers--will generally act. We expect that persons will generally continue to treat sales 
and marketing as fields and that strangers will abide by  the rules of property. Because 
these expectations are general, they can seem quite similar to our expectations of the 
natural world. The fact that our economy is organized as it is and that occupations are 
categorized as they are can seem determined by scientific laws. However, these 
generalized expectations are nonetheless expectations of other persons; they are 
expectations of how persons will generally act.15
 Oftentimes, our expectations about how persons will generally act  are backed by  a 
kind of normativity. It is not merely our observation that persons generally follow a 
certain pattern of behavior but that persons “ought” to follow this pattern.16  If a person 
doesn’t act in the expected way, they act wrongly (rather than merely acting strangely). I 
say that these expectations are based on a “kind” of normativity because it does not need 
to be the case that (a) one judges that persons really  should act a certain way  or (b) that 
persons objectively  should act that way. Instead, these expectations are backed by our 
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15 In The Company of Strangers (Princeton University Press, 2004), Paul Seabright advances the view that 
what makes society possible between creatures with our biology is a kind of trust in strangers to act 
according to expectations.
16 In Grammar of Society (Cambridge University Press, 2006, 11), Cristina Bicchieri analyzes social norms 
as having a similar structure. She argues that a social norm exists when a person prefers to act in a way 
because (a) they recognize a social rule that requires that action (b) they believe others in their social group 
will act in that way, and (c) they believe others expect them to act in that way. 
recognition that persons in a relevant group make claims on one another to act according 
to these patterns. For example, I expect others to wait in line behind me when they  come 
to get coffee, but I do not expect this merely because I have observed a pattern of people 
doing this. I also recognize that  those who wait in line make claims on others to do so. 
Whether I judge these to be valid claims is quite different from my recognition that 
persons make these claims. 
 Oftentimes, the phrase “normative expectations” is used exclusively to refer to 
those expectations that I hold others to. It refers to those expectations for which I think 
certain reactive attitudes are appropriate if those expectations are not met. Yet, I can 
recognize that persons will generally hold others to certain normative expectations even 
when I do not hold them to those expectations. I might think that one should not wait in 
line but still recognize generally held normative expectations that  persons “ought” to wait 
in line. 
 There is a sense in which mere patterns of behavior can be described in terms of 
“rules,” but it is when patterns are backed by claims and normative expectations that they 
seem most  “rule-like.” It is because there is a rule that persons should act a certain way 
that we can identify behavior that violates that rule as “wrong” in some sense. Since my 
recognition of such a rule involves my belief that the members of a relevant group make 
claims on others to act in certain ways that these rules are “social rules.” When I 
recognize a social rule, I recognize that the rule requires that I should act in a certain 
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way.17  I may or may not ultimately decide that I should act in the way  that the rule 
dictates, so we can identify these rules as “ostensibly  binding.” They  claim to bind in 
virtue of their form, but do not necessarily do so.
 In outlining ways in which persons should act, these rules can create certain 
obligations, rights, and powers. They create an obligation when the rules specify that a 
person must act a certain way, they create a right when the rules specify claims that a 
person has on the actions of others, and they create a power when the rules specify ways 
in which one might change the obligations and rights of others. Yet, these rules are 
merely ostensibly binding, so they can merely create ostensible obligations, ostensible 
rights, and ostensible powers. 
 As I will continue to emphasize, our social world is incredibly complex. I might 
recognize social rules that apply to members of a religious organization, an ethnic group, 
a company, or a group of friends. In each case, the social rules are relative to a particular 
social position. In this chapter, my concern is the social rules that apply to individuals as 
members of society. There are certain social rules that apply  to persons due to 
membership in a society, and the mutual recognition of these rules establishes 
obligations, rights, and powers for individuals as members of society. 
 From this idea, I argue that we can understand the basic structure of society as 
consisting of those and only those practices that  establish ostensible obligations, rights, 
and powers for individuals as members of society. Accordingly, the basic structure is a 
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particular community as generally holding normative expectations that I should act in a certain way.” 
However, I think that we tend to skip this step and merely understand social interaction in accordance with 
rules rather than as normative expectations.
basis for those expectations that we can rely  on as members of society in planning our 
lives. These expectations are not  merely based on observed patterns of behavior but on 
our recognition of social rules. Understanding the basic structure in this way gives us a 
clear standard by which to distinguish it from other aspects of the social world. A “social 
ethos,” for example, might be important in shaping the values and relationships in a 
society, but it does not specify clear claims. It does not  consist  of “rules” in the strict 
sense. By contrast, a property  scheme, economic system, political constitution and legal 
system are constituted by strict  rules that specify  individual claims. Accordingly, these 
institutions create determinate obligations, rights and powers. Moreover, the fact that the 
basic structure institutions establish our claims as members of society differentiates it 
from a myriad of other practices that might also ground specific claims. 
1.1 The Basic Idea of the Basic Structure
The idea of the basic structure is most familiar from Theory of Justice, where it is 
identified as  consisting of “the political constitution and the principle economic and 
social arrangements.”18  Examples of these arrangements include, “the legal protection of 
freedom of thought and liberty  of conscience, competitive markets, private property in 
the means of production, and the monogamous family.”19  While this characterization of 
the basic structure provides some guidance in thinking about what it  is, Rawls never 
provided a clear criterion by which one could identify whether some aspect of our social 
world is or is not part of the basic structure. He supposes that we should understand the 
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basic structure as “the main political and social institutions and the way they fit together 
as one scheme of cooperation,”20  but this notion leaves it unclear exactly  what the main 
political and social institutions are and how they fit together. 
 Rawls himself did not  see any  problem with his looser characterization of the 
basic structure. He writes, “Note that our characterization of the basic structure does not 
provide a sharp definition, or criterion, from which we can tell what social arrangement, 
or aspects thereof, belong to it. Rather, we start with a loose characterization of what is 
initially a rough idea.”21  Likewise, he says, “A sharp definition of that [basic] structure 
might have gotten in the way of fitting it into these other ideas, just as a sharp definition 
of them would have gotten into the way  of fitting them to it.”22  For Rawls, a more precise 
articulation of what the basic structure is was not necessary for his project and may have 
made issues unnecessarily difficult. Yet, while a clear criterion for identifying the basic 
structure was not necessary for Rawls’s primary purposes, recent objections show why 
such a criterion might be helpful for us. 
 Specifically, there are three recent objections that a more precise articulation of 
the basic structure might address. First, recent cosmopolitan challenges demand a 
principled differentiation between the basic structure and the global structure. Such a 
differentiation seems important for understanding why distributive justice would or 
would not be a concern for domestic society alone. Specifically, Aresh Abizadeh has 
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21 Justice as Fairness, ed. Erin Kelley (Harvard University Press; Cambridge, MA.  1999), 12.
22 Justice as Fairness, 57. The way that Rawls purposively uses an intuitive understanding of the basic 
structure is brought out in Samuel Freeman “The Basic Structure as First Subject of Justice,” Blackwell 
Companion to Rawls [forthcoming].
argued that none of the criteria typically used to ground a concern with the basic structure 
can actually justify restricting the difference principle to domestic society.23  Second, 
some political theorists have identified the basic structure of society as the coercive 
structure. Most prominently, Michael Blake has argued that we are concerned with the 
basic structure because of the kind of coercion it uses against us, which differentiates it 
from the global structure and justifies the limited scope of distributive justice.24 Since the 
justification of coercion has been one of the most historically  significant concerns in 
political philosophy, it is important to identify exactly what the connection between the 
basic structure and coercive power is. Finally, arguments like G.A. Cohen’s and Iris 
Marion Young’s put pressure on Rawlsians to include more informal aspects of society 
within the basic structure.25 For Cohen, the personal is political and an exclusive focus on 
the basic structure obscures this. Insofar as certain norms in society have important 
effects on us, why not  assess them by  the same standard we assess political and economic 
institutions by? To better address these three challenges, the contemporary  Rawlsian 
needs a more developed conception of the basic structure than Rawls himself used.
 Below, I develop a characterization of the basic structure that can address these 
challenges. Specifically, I argue that we can understand the basic structure as those social 
practices that  establish obligations, rights, and powers for individuals as members of 
society. To do so, I will first explain the Rawlsian use of “institution” as referring to--
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24 Michael Blake “Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol.  
30, No. 3 (2001) 
25 Young, Responsibility for Justice, Ch. 2; Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, Ch. 3
what I call--ostensibly binding practices in §1.3. Then, in §1.4, I will better explain what 
I mean by saying that we are concerned with those practices that  establish obligation, 
rights, and powers “for individuals as members of society.” In many ways, this idea 
allows us to see what unifies the major social institutions as all forming the basic 
structure.
 My central concern in this chapter is to show how we can conceive of the basic 
structure, and it is not to address the three criticisms above; an adequate answer to each 
would require its own focus. However, to see the general contours of the account I offer, I 
want to give a broad-brush response to each of these three challenges. 
 First, my response to Abizadeh’s cosmopolitan argument comes in two parts. We 
should distinguish the claim that (a) there is no principled way to distinguish the basic 
structure from the global structure from the claim that (b) there is no moral reason to be 
concerned with the basic structure and not the global structure. The argument of this 
chapter is concerned with addressing the first  claim, and I address the second in Chapter 
2. I want to give a characterization of the basic structure that distinguishes it from the 
global structure, but I do not here say why the distinction is morally significant. I will 
return to that issue in §2.3.2. I do not claim that the basic structure is the exclusive site of 
distributive justice (nor do I claim that it is not). Abizadeh is ultimately concerned with 
whether there is a morally significant difference between the basic structure and global 
structure that could justify restricting the scope of distributive justice.
 While I am not concerned with identifying the site of distributive justice, I am 
concerned with giving a principled distinction between the basic structure and the global 
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structure. While I do not deny that there are global institutions, these institutions do not 
establish obligations, rights, and powers for individuals as members of society in the way 
that domestic institutions do. The primary difference is that the basic structure institutions 
bind individuals as members of society whereas the global structure binds international 
bodies (such as states). Ultimately  this difference will be morally  significant, but it is left 
to Chapter 2 to say why. 
 To address the second challenge, I argue that some coercive institutions are part of 
the basic structure, but the basic structure is not identified as the coercive structure. For 
us, the basic structure of society is likely to be coercively  enforced, but that is not what 
makes it the basic structure. We could have a system of social practices that establishes 
obligations without those practices being coercively enforced, but coercive enforcement 
will always be an important part of ensuring that are institutions are reliable. Given the 
creatures that we are, the basic structure institutions should be coercively enforced, but 
that does not mean that they  are necessarily coercively enforced. We should not confuse 
the justification of coercive force within a basic structure with the justification of the 
basic structure. 
 Finally, to address the third challenge, I argue that the basic structure consists only 
of ostensibly  binding practices. While there are many  other important aspects of society 
that form the “informal structure,” the basic structure consists only of ostensibly  binding 
practices because those are the practices that provide the relevant kind of security. In 
requiring specific actions at specific times, these practices establish claims for individuals 
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as members of society. The informal structure does not provide this same level of security 
and specificity in our claims.
 In short, I argue that we should understand the basic structure as consisting of 
those institutions that establish obligations, rights, and powers for individuals as members 
of society. This provides us with not only  an intuitive sense of the basic structure, but a 
criterion. The basic structure is differentiated from the global structure by the moral 
demands it establishes, differentiated from the coercive structure because it is not 
necessarily coercive, and differentiated from the informal structure because it  consists of 
specific rules capable of establishing claims. To better explain the various aspects of the 
account, I will start with the idea of “ostensibly  binding social practices” in §1.2, explain 
social institutions as an instance of these practices in §1.3 and and then show which 
institutions form the basic structure in §1.4. 
1.2 Ostensibly Binding Practices
Social practices take a variety of forms and and diverse roles in social life. Some 
practices allow for coordination, others create new forms of behavior, and some require 
that we act in specified ways. In this section, I narrow our focus to “ostensibly binding 
practices.” I use this phrase because these practices present themselves as requiring 
action, but the mere fact that social practices present themselves in this way does not 
mean that we are morally or prudentially bound to follow its rules. As paradigm 
examples, I take the practices of line-waiting, property, and a legal system. An 
appropriate description of these practice’s rules requires a “should,” “ought,” “must,” or 
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similar term, but that does not mean that we actually should, ought or must follow the 
rules. The practices are not necessarily binding; they are only ostensibly binding. 
 Ostensibly binding practices have three key features; they are (a) conventional (b) 
systems of rules that (c) have an authoritative character. First, by  being “conventional” I 
mean that  these practices could have been otherwise.26  The specific rules that constitute 
the practice are not morally required or naturally required.27  Second, each practice can be 
understood by certain rules that guide behavior and specify valid claims that participants 
can make on one another. The feature that most distinguishes authoritative practices, 
however, is the third; we understand these practices as requiring certain actions or 
validating certain claims. Rather than merely providing opportunities or structuring our 
choices, these practices make a claim on what we ought to do.  For example, it is not only 
that we think we should wait  in line, but  that line-waiting consists in rules that persons 
should wait in line. Accordingly, we understand the rules of authoritative practices as 
ostensibly  binding; whether or not we actually  have reason to follow the rules, we 
understand the rules as having a binding character. 
 It can be potentially  misleading to refer to a social practice as constituted by 
“rules” because we often think of rules as explicit or promulgated while the rules of 
social practices do not need to be either. Instead, in referring to social practices as a 
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more precise. While I see much value in exclusively using the phrase to refer to social practices that solve 
coordination problems--as the way in which David Lewis (Convention: A Philosophical Study) and Cristina 
Bicchieri (The Grammar of Society) use the phrase--I here use only the vaguer popular use of “could have 
been otherwise.” In this, I follow Andrei Marmor (Social Conventions: From Language to Law)
27 It is possible that it is morally required that there be some rules to accomplish a particular aim, but that 
does not morally require a specific set of rules. For instance, we might have a natural right to property, but 
the rules of property are underspecified. 
“system of rules,” I mean that we can articulate our implicit understanding of a social 
practices in the form of rules. If we want to individuate or discuss the structure of a 
particular social practice, we do so by  articulating the features of this practice in terms of 
rules. Importantly, our implicit understanding of any social practice might very  well 
outrun our ability  to articulate rules for the practice. Just as we can accurately use a word 
in conversation without having an explicit  definition in mind, so can we follow a social 
practice without having any explicit rules in mind. We should not think that an individual 
understands a social practice by consciously applying explicit rules; an implicit 
understanding often comes before any rules can be articulated.
 Yet, while the rules of a social practice do not need to be explicit  or promulgated, 
they  can be.  When there are differences in interpretation of practices, it will aid 
cooperation when there is an “official statement” of the rules.28  This official statement 
might come from either a trusted or conventionally-recognized authority. For instance, a 
system of law acts as such an authority and makes many of the rules of social practices 
explicit  that might be disputed. In these cases, there will be an explicit and promulgated 
set of rules that outline the social practice because it will be codified in legislation or in 
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be an interpretation of that practice. Any particular set of rules will merely be what is generally understood 
about the practice rather than a uniform understanding across all participants. A description of the rules of 
the practice is meant to give explicit content to our shared implicit understanding, but that understanding is 
more likely to be an overlapping sense of the rules than any clear agreement. For instance, persons 
generally understand when a promise has been made, but there will surely be disagreements. Does it count 
as a promise when someone says, “I swear to you that I will do X” without uttering “I promise” and 
without further remark? Is there a mutual understanding that a promise does not need to be fulfilled when 
the personal costs exceed a certain amount, or is a wrong always done in such cases that needs be repaired? 
Different persons are likely to have different understandings on how the conventions of promising bear on 
these particular situations. When one offers an interpretation of promise-keeping, they seek to find the 
overlapping consensus that is implicit in our shared understanding. For this reason, I will refer to the rules 
of a practice as they are generally understood without any claim that there is a single authoritative standard 
in all cases.
court decisions. Yet, even if there are such cases in which social practices have definitive 
and explicit rules, we do not need to think that all social practices must. 
 In The Myth of Ownership, Thomas Nagel and Liam Murphy  seem to mistakenly 
suppose that the rules of a property system must be explicit legal rules. It is surely the 
case that most rules of property are explicit and legally enforced, but this does not mean 
that a property  scheme needs to have explicit rules or to be legally enforced. Perhaps 
Nagel and Murphy did not mean to suggest that  property  is necessarily a legal practice 
but merely meant to say  that it is a legally specified practice for us.29 In either case, it is 
important to recognize that a system of property can exist without explicit  rules. This is 
easiest to imagine in small societies where the conflicts related to property  claims are 
limited, but such an implicit  understanding would not be efficient in contemporary 
society. However, we should not confuse efficiency with possibility. There is nothing 
about a scheme of property or any normative practice that requires that rules be explicit.
 What is most distinct of ostensibly  binding practices is that our implicit 
understanding of the rules involves some implicit  “ought,” even when we do not think it 
is morally or prudentially required of us. Other practices might be articulable in terms of 
interpreted patterns of behavior, but ostensibly binding practices require that we act a 
certain way. When I choose to make a promise, I recognize a role that I “ought” to keep 
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taxation schemes do not violate anyone’s rights or claims to desert. They argue that a taxation scheme and a 
property scheme must be assessed together as part of a legal scheme, thus it is wrongful to suppose that a 
taxation scheme could conflict with moral claims to property. Their conclusion is correct, but it has nothing 
to do with whether a property scheme is necessarily legal. It is not their joint membership in a legal scheme 
that makes it wrongful to treat the property and taxation schemes as conflicting, it is because of their joint 
membership in the basic structure of society. I argue this in Ch. 2. 
that promise. How we should understand our recognition of this ought is open to 
interpretation, but I will take its recognition as basic for my account.
 In this same way that we can articulate the structure of social practices in terms of 
rules, we can articulate the authoritative character of social practices in terms of 
ostensibly-binding rules. The rules are not just that when persons utter “I promise to X” 
they  typically do X but instead the rules have the form that “a promise made ought to be 
kept.” We recognize a rule that we should wait in line even if we could sneak into the 
front. We recognize a rule that we should not steal even if we could get away with it. 
These demands are implicit in our understanding of the practice that is represented in the 
form of rules. When represented, these rules take the form of ought claims, “persons P 
ought to X in circumstances C.”
 In referring to the rules of a practice as ostensibly  binding, I purposively  mean 
that their authoritative character is not reducible to either moral oughts or prudential 
oughts. We represent the rules as requiring that “person P ought to do X in context C,” 
but we can recognize this rule without thinking that either “P morally ought to do X in C” 
or that “P prudentially ought to X in C.” In regards to the prudential ought, there is a 
tradition in rational choice theory that has explained conventions as arising from the 
coordination of individuals around a salient choice.30  Given this perspective, it would 
seem sensible to understand “recognizing a social rule” as either (a) a prediction about 
coordination or (b) coming to see a particular strategy  of interaction to be most rational. 
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Cambridge, UK. 2006) and Brian Skyrms, Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information (Oxford 
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Yet, the first does not explain the ostensibly binding representation of the rules and the 
latter fails to explain how we can recognize a social rule that applies to us even when 
following that rule would not be an optimal strategy. For instance, I might recognize a 
social rule that requires me to keep a promise, even without being sure whether keeping 
that promise would be most rational for me. Perhaps I should keep promises only when I 
might be found out instead. For similar reasons, we cannot explain “recognizing a social 
rule” as consisting in the judgment that a particular action would be morally best. As 
above, we can recognize a social rule without thinking that there is moral reason to 
follow that rule. For instance, an individual might recognize the social rules that they 
ought to follow (what is mutually recognized as) the law, without thinking that they  really 
have a moral obligation to obey the law. 
 Since we cannot reduce the notion of recognizing an ostensibly  binding social rule 
to either of these notions, we can distinguish three judgments from each other; (a) the 
judgment that an action would be prudential, (b) the judgment that an action would be 
morally best, and (c) the judgment that an action is required by a social rule. Oftentimes 
the fact that  there is a generally recognized convention that requires one to take some 
action will make taking that action prudential (as when the rules are backed by  coercive 
power) or moral (as when the practice serves a justified purpose), but neither of these 
need to be the case for us to recognize a social rule.
 In explaining ostensibly binding practices, I am most concerned with the fact that 
we can recognize a rule as part of a practice and still be uncommitted as to whether we 
ought to follow the rule. If a person were explaining the practice of line-waiting, they 
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would say that the practice consists in the rule that “persons ought to wait in line who are 
waiting for service” even if they do not think that persons morally ought to wait in line. 
A devout Nietzschean who thought line-waiting was the most pure form of herd-
mentality might think that persons ought not to wait  in line, yet still describe the social 
practice as consisting of the rule “persons ought to wait in line.” We can recognize the 
social rule without judging that we ought to follow it. This opens up the space for a 
person to ask “I know that the social practice of line-waiting requires that  I wait in line, 
but should I wait in line?” 
1.3 Institutions
The next step in this analysis of the basic structure is to show why “institutions”--in the 
Rawlsian use of the term--should be understood as a kind of ostensibly binding practice. 
To show this, I need to answer two questions. First, why  would we think that the 
Rawlsian understanding of “institutions” aligns with this model of ostensibly binding 
practices?  Second, what distinguishes the class of social institutions from the larger class 
of ostensibly binding practices? To answer the first question, we can look to Theory of 
Justice, where Rawls writes, 
“by an institution, I shall understand a public system of rules which 
defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers and 
immunities, and the like. These rules specify  certain forms of action as 
permissible, others as forbidden; and they provide for certain penalties and 
defenses, and so on, when violations occur. As examples of institutions, or 
more generally social practices, we may think of games and rituals, trials 
and parliaments, markets and systems of property”
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In this characterization of institutions, Rawls identifies institutions with social practices, 
but he does not mean “social practices” in the broadest sense of “regularities in conduct.” 
He specifically has in mind those practices that are a “public system of rules.” It might be 
possible that there are some practices that  could not be easily specified by a system of 
rules, let alone a public system of rules. For instance, many symbols in pop culture or 
artistic expression have a conventional significance that could not be easily specified by 
rules. In American music, the use of a banjo tends to suggest southern backcountry living, 
but this convention might not be aptly  describable in terms of rules.  If we would identify 
this use of the banjo as part of a social practice, then that is not the kind of social practice 
Rawls has in mind. Instead, Rawls is speaking specifically of those practices that can be 
specified by rules, and ostensibly binding practices are of this type.31
 The more important feature of Rawls’s characterization of institutions is the way 
in which the rules are authoritative. As Rawls puts it, these rules “specify certain forms of 
action as permissible, others as forbidden.” Rawls never explains the authority of these 
rules, but he cannot do so either in terms of moral or prudential authority. First, these 
rules cannot explain certain forms of activity  as “morally” permissible or forbidden 
because it is not a social practice that determines the morality of those actions. Whether it 
is morally permissible to follow the rules is different from what the rules make 
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duties, powers, etc. would be explained by appeal to the requirements of the explicit laws rather than by 
appeal to more implicit social rules. The first problem with this alternative is the fact that the law is one 
such institution that itself needs to be justified. If institutions are necessarily defined by laws, then it is 
difficult to see how law itself could be an institution. Second, it seems odd that Rawls would not say “laws” 
if that is what he meant, given that it would be easier to explain. Third, he compares the rules of institutions 
to the rules of rituals and games, which do not need to be codified in law.
permissible. The property norms might make it permissible for me to bequest my entire 
wealth to the Ku Klux Clan, but it is not morally permissible for me to do so. Likewise, 
we would not think of the rules of “games and rituals” as making certain action morally 
permissible, but only  permissible as part of the game or ritual. Second, these rules cannot 
explain certain forms of activity as “prudentially” permissible for similar reasons. 
Whether it is prudentially  right to follow a social rule is different from what the rules 
make permissible, as we can notice that the rules forbid breaking a promise even when 
doing so might be in our interest.32
 The model of ostensibly  binding practices is able to explain the authority of 
institutional social rules without recourse to either moral or prudential authority. The 
social rules specify  certain actions are permissible and other as forbidden because they 
are ostensibly binding.  We understand the rules as requiring certain actions, but that  does 
not mean that we have judged that it  would be moral or prudential to follow those rules. 
Insofar as Rawlsian institutions are systems of ostensibly binding social rules, then 
institutions are authoritative social practices. 
 Yet, what about the second question? Even if institutions are a kind of ostensibly 
binding practice, we might not think that all ostensibly binding practices are institutions. 
While someone is free to define institutions in any way they like, we typically  use the 
phrase “institutions” to apply to a subclass of ostensibly binding practices. However, 
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distinction between the constitutive rules of an institution, which establish its various rights and duties and 
so on, and strategies and maxims for how best to take advantage of the institution for a particular purpose. 
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there does not seem any necessary and sufficient conditions that a social practice might 
meet for it to be an institution. Rather, we are more likely  to call a social practice an 
“institution” to the extent that it meets three conditions. First, the rules of institutions are 
more clearly understood and less open to interpretation; there is a general understanding 
about what the core rules are that structure institutions. Oftentimes this feature is 
explained by the fact that there is some body that has the authority to determine those 
rules, but not always. Second, institutions are often more complex and structured than 
other social practices. This complexity is not just in the nuances of particular rules, but in 
the different roles that system of rules may establish. Institutions often include different 
positions, powers and privileges that  fit together into one system. Third, institutions are 
particularly important or socially significant.  There is no single definitive standard for 
determining when a social practice is an institution, but these are three features that 
“institutions” seem to have to a greater degree than social practices generally.
 This link between institutions and ostensibly binding practices is significant 
because it shows why we do not need to think of institutions as anything more than a 
particular kind of practice. They do not need to have a legal or material basis. There is a 
natural tendency to see aspects of our social world as if they were part of the natural 
world.  In short, we tend to reify our social institutions. This is quite obvious when one 
hears conservative activists claim that we should not allow same-sex marriage because 
that is not what marriage is, but reification of the social structure goes far beyond this.33 
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institution of marriage promotes are undermined by allowing same-sex marriage, but that does not seem to 
be the argument offered.
 The fact of reification should be no surprise because our institutions form a 
background for our plans, and we thereby take their presence and stability for granted. 
Thinking in these terms can even be quite helpful because it  allows us to abstract away 
from the complicated structure of interaction that forms an institution, and just focus on 
the institution itself. It is because of our commonsense reliance on these institutions that 
persons looks for something beyond social practices to ground social institutions, and 
they  ultimately  look towards the law or patterns of sanction as something more solid than 
mere social practice. Ultimately, however, our social structure is composed on nothing 
more than social practices, certain shared patterns of activity and expectation. The above 
analysis shows how we can understand institutions in these terms and do not need to 
make recourse to anything else. 
 So, the social world is structured by a thick array of social practices, some of 
these social practices are authoritative, and some of these authoritative practices are 
social institutions. The next step  of the analysis is to show that some of these institutions 
form the basic structure of society. The difficulty is explaining which social institutions 
do so. 
 
1.4 The Major Social Institutions and the Basic Structure
The basic structure is constituted by the “major social institutions,” but it is not 
immediately clear what qualifies a social institution as “major.” So, in order to explain 
what the basic structure is we need a standard by which to distinguish the major social 
institutions from the broader class of institutions. The goal of this section is to explain 
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this standard. I argue that the major social institutions are differentiated by their unique 
role in structuring our lives as members of a society. By better explaining the unique role 
of these institutions, I will identify the standard by  which we can distinguish the basic 
structure.
 The unique role of the major social institutions is that they establish obligations, 
rights, and powers for individuals as members of society. Accordingly, those institutions 
that do this are those that belong to the basic structure and we can understand the basic 
structure as the system of institutions that together establish these demands and claims for 
individuals as members of society. To better substantiate this idea, I want to break my 
exposition into two parts. First, I will better explain how the basic structure “establishes 
obligations, rights, and powers.” Second, I will explain the significance of the clause “for 
individuals as members of society.” With these notions explained, I then identify the 
basic structure as the way in which the major social institutions come together to form a 
single system.
1.4.1 “establishing obligations, rights and powers...”
In understanding how a class of practices can establish obligation, rights, and powers, it 
is crucial that we distinguish the ostensible from the actual. The mere fact that a social 
practice is practiced does not mean that we should act  in the ways required by the rules or 
that we have legitimate claims based on the rules. The practice itself is merely  a pattern 
of behaviors, expectations and understandings. To accurately explain these practices, we 
need to represent them as consisting of rules, but we need only  represent these rules as 
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“ostensibly binding.” The rules are understood as involving the claim to bind but might 
not actually bind. 
 In representing rules as “ostensibly  binding,” I mean to offer an analysis of 
practices that is consistent with social theory. Yet, I would need to draw on resources 
from a moral theory in order to explain when these rules are “actually binding.” Such a 
moral theory would need to explain both when persons should follow the rules of 
contingent practices and when they have claims on others to do likewise. Typical 
explanations appeal to the principle of fair-play, the power of consent, our identification 
with the social roles,34  and indirect utilitarianism. Any  such explanation will need to 
explain (a) why an individual is obligated to follow the rules of a morally justified 
practice (rather than merely showing how the rules are often efficacious ways to advance 
some end), and (b) when a practice is morally  justified. The fair-play theorist, for 
example, supposes that (a) we are obligated to practices because we owe a fair-share for 
receipt of the benefits and (b) we are so obligated when the practice is fair to each 
participant. 35 
 For my  argument to succeed, I do not need to argue for any  one of these theories 
over the others. Instead, I merely need to suppose that there is some explanation for why 
contingent practices can establish actual obligations, rights, and powers. I identify any 
moral theory  that meets this requirement as a form of “limited conventionalism.” It is a 
form of conventionalism because conventional practices can establish new requirements 
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35 The conditions that consent theorists and Hegelians would put on obligating practices are more difficult 
to articulate, but I nonetheless believe that both views need to satisfy both conditions. 
and claims, but it is a limited form of conventionalism because it does not suppose that 
all more requirements and claims are established by practices. Limited conventionalism 
is fully consistent with commitments to practice-independent obligations, rights and 
values. It merely needs to be the case that the major social institutions can establish 
requirements and claims. I better explain the commitments and importance of limited 
conventionalism in §4.1.  
 Importantly, practices can establish requirements and claims in two different 
ways. A practice can either (a) better specify pre-existing obligations/rights/powers that 
are too vague, or (b) create new obligations/rights/powers ab nihilo. For example, we 
might think that we have a practice-independent right to personal property, but that this 
practice-independent right does not entitle us to any specific property. According to this 
view, it is only when we live within a society with definitive property norms that our pre-
institutional right entitles us to the specific property that the norms identify as ours. Or, 
we might think that  there is no practice-independent rights to personal property. Instead, 
we might think that persons have come to coordinate around norms of property and that 
these norms bind us because the Principle of Fair-Play requires that we follow the rules 
that benefit us. In the first case, a practice of property specifies a pre-existing right while 
the practice creates a right to property in the latter case. Either case is consistent with 
“limited conventionalism.” In each, our practices establish specific requirements or 
claims that we would not have if the practice did not exist. 
 A moral theory that  accepts limited conventionalism will recognize that the major 
social institutions can establish actual obligations, rights, and powers. However, we do 
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not need to appeal to any such moral theory  to identify  a basic structure. The moral 
theory  explains when an an ostensibly binding practice is actually  binding, but we can 
still identify ostensibly binding institutions when they are not actually binding. 
 The major social institutions are those practices that establish ostensible 
obligations, ostensible rights, and ostensible powers. For this reason, society can have 
major social institutions that are so unjust that persons should not follow the rules of 
those institutions. For example, the institution of slavery is typically so unjust that no 
person has a moral reason to follow it’s rules. However, it is still likely that persons 
would understand that institution as consisting of ostensibly binding rules. The rules 
create ostensible obligations to obedience, ostensible rights of ownership, and ostensible 
powers of authority. The fact that these rules are morally  heinous does not change the 
analysis of these rules as ostensibly binding, and an institution of slavery can accordingly 
be amongst a society’s major institutions. 
1.4.2 “...for individuals as members of society”
The basic structure institutions are not all the institutions that establish (ostensible) 
obligations, rights, and powers, but are specifically  those that establish these demands 
and claims by virtue of membership in society. In this way, the basic structure institutions 
are closely tied with belonging to a particular society. To see the importance of this point, 
we can see that  there will be free associations that establish obligations, rights, and 
powers. For instance, the employees of IBM could mutually  comply with social rules that 
establish obligations amongst coworkers, rights to  vacation, and powers of authority. In 
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this case, these demands and claims are established for individuals as employees of IBM. 
Likewise, the members of a church could mutually  comply with social rules that  establish 
obligations, rights, and powers in the religious community. 
 What is unique about the basic structure institutions is not that  they establish 
demands and claims--since IBM and a church might do that--but that they  establish these 
obligations and claims for individuals as members of a society. It is because I am a 
member of the United States that I have certain obligations and rights. In a society that 
cooperates through norms of property, members can know that  each has obligations and 
rights to property. In a society that cooperates through certain norms of family life, 
members can know that there are certain demands and claims in a marriage. Even if a 
person chooses to be an ascetic and live without property or to be single and live without 
a family  they  are aware that they could be entitled to security  in those things as a member 
of society. They know that if they acquired property, then others would generally refrain 
from seizing it. They know that their authority  over and responsibility  for children would 
generally  be respected if they choose to have children. These demands and claims are part 
of being a member of society because all members of a society live under the same social 
rules. 
 At this stage, an objection from circularity might seem obvious. I have said that 
the basic structure institutions establish security for individuals as members of society, 
yet how can we understand who is a “member of society” in this sense? If one defines 
membership in a society  as being an individual to whom the rules of the basic structure 
institutions apply, then we define “member of society” in relation to the idea of  the 
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“major social institutions” and define the “major social institutions” in relation to the idea 
of being a “member of society.” If that is correct, my  account seems circular. I rely on a 
notion of members of society to explain who is a member of society. 
 Yet, there are two ways of getting away from this circularity  objection. First, I can 
deny that  the idea “member of society” is best defined as a participant in the basic 
structure institutions. While this first way of avoiding circularity  might be open to me, I 
do not currently know of any other satisfying way to explain who is a member of society. 
Accordingly, I will assume that  a “member of society” is best understand as “a person 
identified as participant in the basic structure institutions,”36 and I will appeal to a second 
way to avoid the circularity  objection. Even if “member of society” is explained in terms 
of participation in the major social institutions and the “major social institutions” are 
explained by relying on a notion of member of society, this is not actually  a problem. 
Remember that the various basic institutions are social practices. In explaining these 
practices and their relations to one another, we give an explanation of how persons act 
and reconstruct their implicit understanding of the social world. Doing this does not 
require an ontology  whereby we appeal to some fundamental notion from which all other 
notions are built. Rather, it  only needs to depict how persons act and understand the 
world. Such a depiction can be circular without problem. We start  from within an 
ongoing social practice, and we only need to characterize that practice. At this stage, we 
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might understand Americans as those bound by American institutions and understand 
American institutions as those that bind Americans. While this might be circular, it  is not 
problematic if it accurately describes our implicit understanding of these practices. 
1.4.3 the basic structure
At this stage, we have narrowed our concern from social rules to ostensibly binding 
practices to institutions and, finally, to the major social institutions. From this final 
notion, we can now understand the basic structure of society as constituted by the major 
social institutions. The basic structure is how these institutions come together and 
complement one another. Accordingly, we can now understand the basic structure of 
society as those ostensibly binding practices that together establish our obligations, 
rights, and powers as members of society. 
 In establishing obligations, rights, and powers for individuals as members of 
society, the basic structure creates a kind of social “background.” In deciding how to live 
our lives, we do so on the basis of various expectations about our social world. This 
includes the various opportunities we have, the powers and rights of individuals, and the 
limits on what we can rightfully do. As we plan our lives, we hold things about our 
society constant as we think about the different lives we might lead within that society. In 
such choices, the obligations, rights, and power that  we have as members of society form 
a kind of background for the choices about which particular life we will lead. Our various 
expectations of others give us a security with regard to the actions of others. Since we 
hold this security constant across the lives we might lead, the basic structure institutions 
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establish a kind of “background security.” As we make the choices that make our lives 
our own, we come to have security in particular things; in our property, our family, our 
occupation, and our worship. The basic structure institutions do not establish the security 
we have in these particular things, but they establish the security  we have as a member of 
society; it establishes background security.
 To better emphasize the significance of this point, it might be helpful to see the 
way in which a basic structure establishes background security through a comparison 
between anarchy and society. We do not need to suppose that anarchy would be a war of 
all against all, even if we recognize that it might be. Perhaps persons would not be likely 
to attack one another or even to make claims on them. In the absence of society, persons 
might live as in Rousseau’s “most-happy” age.37  There, persons are independent of one 
another and do not consider their needs to be satisfied by the actions of others. Now, 
regardless of whether persons are peaceful or at war in anarchy, persons will not have 
security with regard to the actions of others. Without  a social structure that specifies how 
each must act, no one can have rightful expectations of strangers. Even if moral rules or 
natural rights are binding, we only have security when we believe that persons will 
follow those rules. Even peaceful and safe anarchies do not have the obligations, rights, 
and powers we have as members of society.
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37 “This period in the development of human faculties, occupying a just mean between the indolence of the 
primitive state and the petulant activity of the our amour propre, must have been the happiest and most 
lasting epoch...The example of the Savages, almost all of whom have been found at this point, seems to 
confirm that Mankind was made always to remain in it...that all subsequent progress has been so many 
steps in the appearance toward the perfection of the individual, and in effect towards the decrepitude of the 
species.” (Cambridge Tran.  167). As Rousseau would argue, even if conflict is necessary with 
interdependency, we do not need to suppose interdependency in an anarchic state. 
 As soon as there are mutually recognized social rules, there is a social structure, 
and there is no longer anarchy. We move away from anarchy as soon as we “institute 
regulations of Justice and peace to which all are obliged to conform, which make 
exception of no one, and which compensate in some way for the caprices of fortune by 
equally subjecting the powerful and the weak to mutual duties.”38  These are rules that 
establish obligations, rights, and powers amongst the members of a society. In 
establishing these clear and reliable rules, our social rules establish a kind of background 
security. In §1.6, I will argue that we can understand “social cooperation” as the unique 
form of cooperation between members of society that establishes these rights, 
obligations, and powers. First, however, I want to survey a few objections to this 
understanding of the basic structure. 
1.5 Objections
On first look, this characterization of the basic structure might seem problematic for a 
number of reasons. I want to address three of the most pressing objections here. By 
addressing these objections, I should also be able to explain the central idea behind my 
account. 
 First, one might be tempted to think that my  characterization of the basic structure 
would be too expansive. For example, does it  include the obligations and rights we have 
against deception? After all, if we are lost on a street  corner and ask a random passerby 
for directions, we can have a right to the truth and the passerby has an obligation to tell 
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the truth. Since I characterized the basic structure as establishing such rights, it would 
seem like my characterization of the basic structure would include truth-telling. Since we 
do not typically recognize truth-telling as part of the basic structure, this would be 
problematic for my characterization.
 In response, I only  need to stress the importance of the clause that the basic 
structure establishes obligations, rights, and powers “for individuals as members of 
society.” When we have a right to the truth, it  has nothing to do with our position as 
member of society. Instead, if we do trust persons, it is either on the basis of a judgment 
of their individual character or on the basis of our position as persons. Regardless of 
whether that street corner is in one’s own society or in a distant society, we likely will 
still trust a random passerby to tell the truth. Accordingly, norms of non-deception are not 
part of the basic structure because they do not establish rights for individuals as members 
of society. 
 A second, and similar, objection would charge that my  account would include 
obligations like promise-keeping as part of the basic structure. If one thinks that it is a 
moral obligation of all persons to keep their promises, then my response to this objection 
will be the same as that above. Our promissory obligations are established by being 
persons rather than being members of society. If one thinks that promise-keeping is a 
moral obligation only because it is a social convention, then it seems more difficult to 
claim that our promissory obligation is established by our role as persons.
  Nonetheless, this obligation is still unproblematic. First, insofar as a person utters 
“I promise” it is clear that they identify themselves as a participant in the promise-
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keeping convention, regardless of whether they  are a member of society or not. So, if 
promise-keeping is conventional, it can still establish security for persons as persons 
because our security is explained by their recognition of the convention rather than our 
membership in society. To see the difference, compare the rights and obligations involved 
in a signed contract between strangers and the rights and obligations involved in a 
promise. The conditions that identify  a contract as valid are specified by  legal norms 
specific to a society whereas the conditions that identify a promise as valid are more 
important to interpretation and may vary from one social group  to the next. In this way, 
we can recognize security in contracts as arising from our role as members of society 
while we explain security in promises as arising from our role as persons. 
 Finally, as a third objection, one could point out that foreigners and tourists have 
obligations, rights, and powers specified by  the major social institutions even though they 
are not members of society. This objection might seem to show problems with the clause 
that the basic structure establishes security for individuals as members of society. 
 Yet, if everything else about the account is not problematic, then this last 
objection should be no worry. This is because when foreigners and tourists are treated as 
members of a society that is not their own, they merely assume the role of member of 
society.39 Now, this does not mean that  they assume the role of citizen. To be a citizen--in 
the way, I distinguish the phrase--is to have a particular role in a political and legal 
structure. Being a citizen entitles one to certain privileges and responsibilities, but being a 
citizen and being a member of society are not synonymous. It is fair to say that illegal 
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immigrants are members of society even if they are not citizens in the proper sense. 
Likewise, we might not consider tourists to ultimately be members of society, though we 
do treat them accordingly. When we travel to other societies, we likewise should act 
according to the norms that members of that society act in accordance with.
 In this way, the identification of basic structure institutions does not include moral 
rules because we do not have security in these rules as members of society, it does not 
include aspects of the informal structure because the rules of the informal structure are 
not sufficiently particular, and it does not rule out the possibility that those in a foreign 
society assume the role as member of society.
1.6 The Basic Structure, Social Cooperation and the “Fundamental Problem of Justice”
In this chapter, I have developed the idea of the basic structure in ways that Rawls does 
not. While I have not said anything that I believe Rawls would reject, I want to go 
beyond Rawls’s intuitive understanding of the basic structure and develop the idea in 
ways that withstand recent challenges. In this section, I want to explain one additional 
advantage of this account; it can better justifying Rawls’s own method by connecting the 
idea of “social cooperation” with the idea of the basic structure. 
 In Political Liberalism, the idea of social cooperation is central for unfolding the 
various aspects of Rawls’s theory. He writes, “the fundamental organizing idea of justice 
as fairness, within which the other basic ideas are systematically connected, is that of 
society as a fair system of cooperation over time.”40 In assessing a society, we should not 
be concerned with whether it  advances some particular moral end or makes human 
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perfection possible. Instead, we should be concerned with whether the terms of social 
cooperation are fair. In society, we work together to advance what we each think is 
important in life, but we need to ensure that we work together on fair terms. For 
Rawlsians, the central problem of political justice is then identifying the fair terms of 
social cooperation. Rawls makes this point explicit when he identifies “the fundamental 
question of political justice” as determining “what is the most appropriate conception of 
justice for specifying the terms of social cooperation between citizens regarded as free 
and equal, and as normal and fully  cooperating members of society over a complete 
life?”41  
 Now, it is not immediately obvious from Rawls’s own remarks why this concern 
with the terms of social cooperation justifies his focus on the basic structure of society. 
Rawls uses an intuitive extension of the basic structure as including “the political 
constitution,...the legally recognized forms of property, and the structure of the 
economy... as well as the family in some form.”42   Yet, why would these institutions be 
the ones most  relevant for setting the terms of social cooperation? Rawls starts from a 
concern with the terms of social cooperation, but then only stipulates that  we address this 
concern by  focusing on the basic structure. How is a concern with identifying the fair 
terms of social cooperation related to a focus on the basic structure?
 While the connection between these ideas is not obvious from Rawls’s explicit 
remarks, it can be explained by the account provided here. The key is a particular 
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understanding of social cooperation. Cooperation is distinct from coordination in that 
cooperation is done with deference to the others with whom one cooperates. One can 
selfishly  coordinate, but one cannot selfishly cooperate. The best way to interpret  Rawls’s 
use of “social cooperation” (in contrast to “cooperation” more generally) is as referring to 
the unique form of cooperation that exists between members of a society.43  Social 
cooperation is the distinct kind of cooperation engaged in by  members of society, it is 
neither mere coordination nor cooperation in all its forms. 
 Yet, what is the unique kind of cooperation between members of society? What is 
referred to by “social cooperation”? I maintain that we can best understand this unique 
form of  cooperation as the cooperation between members of society in following the 
social rules that establish obligations, rights, and powers for individuals as members of 
society. This is a form of cooperation when persons (a) coordinate in following the same 
social rules (b) with deference to those with whom they coordinate. This is a unique 
cooperative relationship between members of society  because it  specifically  establishes 
our obligations, rights, and powers as members of society. 
 Given this understanding of social cooperation, the terms of social cooperation in 
a particular society will be specified by the rules of the major social institutions. In this 
way, the terms of social cooperation are given form as the basic structure of society. 
Thus, by determining how the basic structure ought to be organized, we determine what 
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the terms of social cooperation are. In short, by focusing on “the first subject of justice,” 
we address “the fundamental problem of political justice.” 
 In the section, I have made important connections between a number ideas quite 
quickly,  so it will be helpful to provide a more formal summary of the main points. The 
core ideas that got us to the above conclusion can be expressed as follows:
1) Social cooperation is the unique form of cooperation that establishes the 
obligations, rights and powers of individuals as members of society.                   
2) In any society, these obligations, rights and powers are established by mutual 
compliance with certain social rules, R.                                                                
3) The major social institutions are those institutions defined by those social 
rules R.       
4) Thus, in any society, these obligations, rights, and powers are established by 
mutual compliance with the rules of the major social institutions.             [2, 3]
5) The basic structure of a society  is the way in which all the major social 
institutions together form a single system.                                 
6) Thus, these obligations, rights, and power are established in any society  by 
mutual compliance with the rules of the basic structure                             [4, 5]
7) Thus, in any society, social cooperation proceeds through the rules of the basic 
structure.                                                                                                       [1,6]
8) Thus, by evaluating the organization of the basic structure, we evaluate the 
terms of social cooperation.                                                     
All together, this explanation should make better sense of why the basic structure is “the 
arrangement of the major social institutions into one scheme of cooperation.”44  Social 
cooperation is the unique cooperation between members of society  in establishing 
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background security, and the basic structure is the entirety of those institutions that social 
cooperation proceeds through. In this way, the basic structure forms a single scheme of 
cooperation.
 Rawlsians do not ultimately judge society  by whether it accomplishes some moral 
end, such as the promotion of happiness, individual perfection or equality. Instead, 
society is a system of social cooperation and we ought to assess it by determining 
whether the terms of cooperation are fair. Since the terms of social cooperation are given 
form in the basic structure of society, we should take the basic structure as the primary 
subject for assessing society.
 
1.7 The Identity of the Basic Structure
The primary task of this dissertation is to show why the basic structure has primacy as a 
distinct moral subject. As I discussed in the introduction, I will do this by explaining 
three features of the basic structure; its identity, its moral indispensability, and its moral 
distinctiveness. The account of this chapter addresses the identity  of the basic structure 
specifically. It explains that the basic structure consists of those institutions that establish 
background security for individuals as members of society. 
 Starting from the idea of ostensibly binding practices and building up  to the 
notion of the basic structure, we have the tools to overcome many of the traditional 
problems with the idea of the basic structure. According to this theory, the basic structure 
consists of ostensibly binding social rules. It does not necessarily consist of rules that are 
legally  or coercively backed. Instead, it consists of rules that we understand as ostensibly 
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binding. Likewise, the rules are specific enough that they differ from the informal 
structure. While our entire social structure consists in many ostensibly binding practices, 
the basic structure does not include all of them. Rather, the basic structure consists of 
only those ostensibly binding practices that establish obligations, rights, and powers for 
individuals as members of society. This differentiates the basic structure from moral 
practices that bind all persons, from social practices that persons choose to be part of, and 
from the global structure that provides security for international actors. The basic 
structure remains a distinct and unified aspect of the social structure.
 Moreover, this articulation distinguishes the basic structure from the broader set 
of practices that establish our social context. There is wide diversity of practices in social 
life, and only some of them are part of the basic structure of society. In his objections to 
Rawls, Cohen appeals to the example of a society with an “egalitarian ethos.”45  Even if 
our major social institutions maximally promote equality, we promote equality even 
further if persons generally  acted for the sake of equality in their personal decisions. In 
his arguments from “On the Site of Distributive Justice,” G.A. Cohen argues that there is 
no non-arbitrary  way by  which Rawls can distinguish the norms that form the basic 
structure from the norms that would form an egalitarian ethos.46  Now, I have little doubt 
that such an ethos would be a significant part of social life. It might impact what 
individuals in that society value, the shape of their life plan, and their relationships. 
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Moreover, I do recognize that both the basic structure and an egalitarian ethos are formed 
by norms. However, neither of these points mean that there is no non-arbitrary way by 
which to distinguish an egalitarian ethos from the basic structure. 
 While the norms of an egalitarian ethos outline patterns of behavior, the norms of 
the basic structure require action or specify claims. The rules are particular in identifying 
specific actions as required and as rights-violations. Once one has security  in property  or 
security in religious freedom, then there are certain actions that individuals cannot take. 
With an egalitarian ethos, there is no such specificity. The fact that we live in a society 
where members of the military  are particularly esteemed does not require any particular 
actions from individuals or give any persons claims. I do not act wrongly  if I do not buy  a 
soldier a beer at the bar even if there is an ethos of appreciate for the military. Such 
informal norms--whether esteem for military personnel or appreciation for equality--do 
not establish particular obligations, rights, or powers in the way that  basic structure 
institutions do. 
 In his 2009 book, Cohen slightly changes his objection. He does not claim that 
there is not way  by which to distinguish the basic structure from informal norms like an 
egalitarian ethos. Instead, he argues that  any such distinction would be morally arbitrary. 
Ultimately, we only  care about identifying the basic structure as distinct from informal 
norms because we think that there is something morally  significant about the basic 
structure and not about the informal structure. Instead of focusing on the possibility of a 
distinction between the basic structure and the informal structure, Cohen focuses on the 
moral significance of the distinction. 
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 So far, I have only tried to show what the distinction is and not what the moral 
significance of this distinction in. In Chapter 2, I will show why the basic structure is an 
indispensable moral subject, and I show why the principles that apply to it will be distinct 
from the principles that apply to individual action in Chapter 3. Here, I have identified 
the basic structure as those institutions that establish our obligations, rights, and powers 
as members of society. An egalitarian ethos does not establish specific rights or 
obligations upon persons. In being concerned with the basic structure, Rawlsians are 
concerned with these specific institutions. Next I argue for why they  should be so 
concerned.
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Chapter 2
Levels of Moral Evaluation 
“The social virtues of humanity  and benevolence exert their influence immediately, 
by a direct  tendency  or instinct, which chiefly keeps in view the simple object, 
moving the affections, and comprehends not any scheme or system, or consequences 
resulting from the concurrence, imitation, or example of others...The case is not  the 
same with the social virtues of justice and fidelity. They are highly useful, or indeed 
absolutely necessary to the well-being of mankind: but the benefit, resulting from 
them, is not  the consequence of every  individual act; but  arises from the whole 
scheme or system, concurred in by the whole, or greater part  of society. General 
peace and order are the attendants of justice or a general abstinence from the 
possessions of others: But  a particular regard to the particular right  of one individual 
citizen may frequently, considered in itself, be productive of pernicious 
consequences.” 
- Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Appendix 3
Few doubt that we need some guiding principles for individual action. We are faced with 
the difficulties of ethics because we need to act, so we seek principles that help guide our 
choices. Being members of political communities, we are also accustomed to arguing 
about principles to guide the choices of the state, so few doubt that we need some guiding 
principles for government decisions. We know that we need principles for these issues, 
but why would we need principles that apply to the basic structure of society? 
 The question is not why we could develop principles for such a subject. After all, 
we might invent any number of subjects to develop principles for; we could develop 
principles to regulate which street fairs a city ought to have or what beers bars should 
serve. We are not concerned with all the subjects for which we could develop principles, 
so why  be concerned with the basic structure? Why wouldn’t the various issues 
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surrounding the basic structure be otherwise addressed? Why couldn’t a broader principle 
be applied to the specifics of the basic structure?  Since there are so many  ways to think 
about the moral questions involved in society, the questions that needs to be answered is 
why we would be particularly concerned with any particular subject. Why treat the basic 
structure as a morally indispensable subject?
 Many of the most intuitive answers do not explain why the basic structure, rather 
than some similar subject, deserves our attention. For example, my concern with the basic 
structure is not explained by a concern for its profound and pervasive effects on 
individual life because other aspects of the social world also have similar effects.47 
Undoubtedly, one of the reasons why the basic structure is so important is because of its 
profound and pervasive effects, but that  cannot be the reason why the basic structure 
(rather than all influential norms) is an indispensable moral subject in itself. Second, I 
cannot claim that a concern with justifying coercion explains why we need to evaluate the 
basic structure because I have not identified the basic structure as coercive. Third, I 
cannot claim that a concern for social cooperation explains why we need to evaluate the 
basic structure because I have identified “social cooperation” as the unique form of 
cooperation between members of society. Since the basic structure is constituted by the 
institutions that persons cooperate with one another through as members of society, 
justifying a concern for the basic structure on a concern for social cooperation would be 
like justifying a concern for the basic structure on a concern for the basic structure. 
Moreover, arguing from profound effects, coercion, or social cooperation would require 
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that I support a moral theory  that identifies coercion or social cooperation as particularly 
morally significant. I want to construct  an argument that fits with a broader range of 
moral views. 
 In “The Basic Structure as Subject,” Rawls did give one clear reason why the 
basic structure is morally indispensable.48  He argued that principles for the basic structure 
were needed in order to regulate “background fairness.” This argument starts from the 
intuitive idea that both the economy and society  generally should progress “in accordance 
with free agreements fairly arrived at  and fully honored.”49  Such an ideal ensures that 
persons’ free decisions are respected. However, free agreements can only be fairly arrived 
at against a background of fair relationships between persons. If inequalities are too great, 
then we could not expect the agreements made to truly be fair to all participants. Thus, 
we need to evaluate the basic structure of society in order to ensure background fairness, 
which would make the ideal of a society progressing according to free and fair 
agreements possible. Thus, the basic structure is morally  indispensable because of our 
concern for background fairness. 
 The force of Rawls’s argument, however, is limited. It  was meant primarily  as a 
response to libertarians and classical liberals who hold the ideal that “society  should 
progress according to free agreements fairly made.” In this way, the Rawlsian argument 
shows why libertarian ideals require a concern with background fairness and, therefore, a 
concern with the basic structure. While many others (besides libertarians and classical 
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liberals) share this ideal,  it is not universally held. If this was the sole argument for 
treating the basic structure as subject, a Hegelian who saw this ideal as inappropriately 
applying the ideals of civil society to the state would not have reason to treat the basic 
structure as subject.50  A second challenge that Rawls’s argument faces is to show why we 
need principles that apply specifically to the basic structure rather than principles that 
regulate background fairness. After all, the basic structure is not obviously  those and only 
those institutions that regulate background fairness. For these reasons, we should see 
Rawls’s argument in “The Basic Structure as Subject” as a response to the laissez-faire 
capitalists who see no reason to be concerned with the basic structure. It is not a complete 
argument in favor of taking the basic structure as subject. 
 With the identity of the basic structure established in the last chapter, I can now 
give a more complete argument for the moral indispensability  of the basic structure in 
this chapter. The argument does not rely on profound effects, coercion, social cooperation 
or background fairness. Instead, it relies on the normative structure of social practices. 
Oftentimes, individual actions are part of social practices. For example, if I walk through 
your land uninvited, I am trespassing. Yet, this action is understood as trespass only 
because it occurs within a generally  recognized practice of property. In order for me to 
fully  evaluate the actions that are part of a practice, I often need to evaluate the practice 
of which it is a part. Whether an act of trespass is rightful or wrongful, for example, 
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depends on whether the practice of property is rightful or wrongful. In such cases, the 
proper evaluation of an action requires that  we evaluate the practice that the action is part 
of.  This requires that we have some way of evaluating the practice; we need principles 
that apply to the practice that action is part of. In the example, we need some way of 
determining whether the property system is rightful. 
 Likewise, I argue that to properly evaluate certain social practices, we need some 
way of evaluating the systems of which those practices are a part. In the same way that 
we need to evaluate a practice to determine whether the actions that are part of that 
practice are justified, we need to evaluate a system of practices to determine whether the 
practices that are part  of that system are justified. Since the major social institutions 
together form a system--the basic structure--we need to evaluate the basic structure in 
order to properly evaluate the institutions that are part of the basic structure. All the basic 
structure institutions together specify our role as member of society, so we need to 
evaluate these institutions as part of that system. For example, in order to evaluate a 
property  scheme, political constitution or economic system, we need to see each as part 
of the basic structure; we need to see each as contributing to the specification of our role 
as members of society. 
 To establish this argument, the chapter will proceed in three parts. In §2.1, I 
explain why the evaluation of individual actions often requires that we evaluate the 
practices that the action is part of. Then, §2.2 explains why the evaluation of certain 
practices requires that we evaluate the systems of that those practices are part of. I then 
apply  this argument to show how it justifies evaluating the basic structure as subject. In 
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the final part, §2.3, I answer some important objections and highlight what needs to be 
established in the next chapter. 
 In making this argument, this chapter seeks to show one way in which ethical life 
is complex. Whether moral principles aid or determine our moral evaluations, we cannot 
think that moral principles apply only to individual actions. We must see actions as part 
of practices, which also need to be evaluated. Moral principle either aid or determine our 
evaluation of these practices. This makes for a complex moral landscape, especially since 
our actions are part of so many  different practices. This complexity extends even further 
when practices together form systems. We then evaluate not only actions and practices 
but systems of practices. The basic structure is an indispensable moral subject because it 
is the system that  specifies one’s role as member of society. As complex as the social and 
moral landscape is, we need to evaluate the basic structure in order to properly evaluate 
those institutions that establish our obligations, rights, and powers as members of society. 
2.1 Actions as Part of Practices
In many cases, we can properly  evaluate an action by  looking at it  and its effects in 
isolation. If one saves a child from drowning, for instance, we can generally  assume that 
the person acted rightly. In other cases, we can only properly evaluate an action when we 
look at it as part of a practice. Famously, Hume made this argument in A Treatise of 
Human Nature. In §3.2.2, he writes
“A single act of justice is frequently contrary to the public interest; and 
were it to stand alone, without being followed by many other acts, may, of 
itself, be very prejudicial to society. When a man of merit, of a benevolent 
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disposition, restores a great fortune to a miser, a seditious bigot, he has 
acted justly and laudably, but the public is the real sufferer. Nor is every 
single act of justice, considered apart, more conducive to private interest, 
than to public; and ‘tis easily conceived how a man may impoverish 
himself by a single instance of integrity.”51
In this passage, Hume emphasizes that we cannot merely  look at all actions as though 
they  “stand alone.” If we look at the act  of giving money to a seditious bigot, it would not 
call for our approval. A more laudatory  action would be to give that money to those who 
need it and not leave it in the hands of the bigoted miser. Yet, we might approve of the 
action when we see it as an instance of keeping contracts if we learn that the man of merit 
had agreed to repay a loan. In this case, we see the action as part of a social practice of 
contract-keeping. For Hume, this demonstrates that we cannot explain our judgment of 
actions merely by appeal to the action in isolation. He ends the passage by pointing out 
that doing so is no less problematic if we focus only on personal advantage. One might 
uphold a contract and thereby bring herself into poverty, and we would still approve of 
this action as appropriate. Looking at the effects of action alone--either the moral or 
prudential effects--cannot explain why the action is laudable. 
 In Hume’s view, our approval of the man of merit’s action is explained by our 
recognition that  the practice, as a whole, benefits ourselves and others. Our approval is 
transferred from the practice as a whole to the individual actions that contribute to it. 
Even if upholding a contract does not seem to have any merit on its own, we recognize 
that the practice of keeping contracts has merit, and so we approve of actions that are part 
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of the practice. According to Hume, to understand our response to such actions, we 
recognize how we see such action as part of a beneficial social practice. 
 Now, others might offer a different explanation of Hume’s particular example. 
They  might say  that what explains our approval of the man of merit is our recognition of 
a practice-independent moral obligation to keep contracts. So long as we recognize that 
keeping contracts is morally  laudable in isolation, we do not need to recognize the action 
as part of a practice of contract keeping. Yet, even if this response shows a problem with 
this particular case, it will not be a problem for all cases. Some actions will be 
praiseworthy  as part of a practice that will not be praiseworthy in isolation. For example, 
a citizen who researches the candidates and votes in an election does a praiseworthy 
action, but the fact that it  is praiseworthy only makes sense within a representative 
democracy. 
  Hume’s example works particularly well because it is a clear instance of an 
action that would be judged differently if it were not viewed as part of a practice. In our 
everyday life, however, the issue is much more complex. We live amongst overlapping 
practices, and even those actions that are praiseworthy  or condemnable because they fit 
within a social practice are not as clearly linked to any specific practice. I harm a 
student’s interests when I give a student a bad grade on a paper, but I am justified in 
doing so within the complex practices of education. Grades should be given on the basis 
of merit and the harm caused is irrelevant according to the practice. Beyond grading, if 
we praise a teacher as particularly  dedicated to students and clear in his explanations, 
such praise makes sense within the role that is established for teachers. To properly 
76 
evaluate the various actions one takes as teacher, we need to recognize the particular 
practices that a teacher acts within. 
 In broader society, the ways in which our actions are part of practices proliferate. 
We make choices as parents, citizens, and friends. All of these roles carry particular ways 
of acting, and proper evaluation of action should be sensitive to these actions. We should 
not think that Hume’s point is limited to simple cases where the rules are explicit and 
clear; we have much more complex practices that individual actions need to be seen as 
part of. 
2.1.1 Why we should see actions as part of practices
What examples like Hume’s show is the intuitive way in which we see actions as part of 
social practices, but it is less clear why  we should do so. Hume offers it  as a brute 
psychological fact that our approval of the practice transfers to a our approval of the 
action, but we can ask whether we really ought to transfer our approval in this way. Why 
should we evaluate actions as part of practices? Answering this question is particularly 
important for the larger argument of this chapter. Since I want to show that we should 
evaluate practices as parts of systems, I will need to show that the same reasons that 
explain why we should evaluate actions as part of practices can be extended to show why 
we should evaluate practices as part of systems. 
 Put simply, the reason why we need to see actions as part of practices is because 
the moral significance of a practice is not reducible to the significance of the actions that 
are part of the practice. When an individual action is part of a practice, that action is 
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significant as contributing to whatever is significant about the practice that is not 
reducible to the actions in isolation. If we did not see the action as part of the practice, 
our evaluation of that action would not  capture the way in which the action contributes to 
that practice. We would capture the moral significance of the action in isolation, but we 
would not capture the significance of the action related to the irreducible significance of 
the practice. 
 In Hume’s example, there is a particular good involved in being able to rely  on 
others with whom one has made a contract. This is a good in having a practice of 
contract-keeping that is not reducible to individual acts of keeping contracts. In isolation, 
acts of contract-keeping are good because they  promote the interests of the contracted 
with, but bad insofar as they could advance greater interests of others. As a part of the 
practice of contract-keeping, particular acts contribute to a system of reliance. Such a 
practice allows persons to coordinate and trust one another in ways that  might not  be 
possible in the absence of the practice. We can say that a practice of contracts facilitates 
trust and cooperation in ways that would not otherwise be possible. Accordingly, there is 
some value in having the practice that is not reducible to the value of persons generally 
doing that which they said they would. It is relevant to the evaluation of the man of 
merit’s action that it contributes to the well-functioning of the practice and thus 
contributes to this irreducible benefit. To properly evaluate the man of merit’s action, we 
need to see it  as contributing to the practice of contract. If we looked at the action in 
isolation, we would lose sight of this morally significant aspect. 
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 What is true in the case of Hume’s example is true of practices generally. To show 
this, §2.1.2 will look more carefully  at the benefits (and costs) of practices that are not 
reducible to the benefits (and costs) of individual actions. Then §2.1.3 will focus more on 
how we need to see individual actions as contributing to these practices. Finally, §2.1.4 
will show how this all requires that there is (at least) two levels of moral evaluation. We 
need to be able to evaluate actions, and we need to be able to evaluate the practices that 
actions are a part of. 
2.1.2 The irreducibility of practices
While practices manifest themselves through patterns of individual action, the effects of 
practices are not fully reducible to the actions that are part of the practice. This is not 
because there is some ontologically  important entity  over and above individuals, but 
because the recognition of a practice changes how persons understand their social world. 
In recognizing social rules, persons think about their own action in different ways and 
expect different actions from others. The existence of a practice changes the social 
context within which our choices are made. Our concern with social practices is not 
merely a concern with a convergence of individual actions, we are concerned with the 
ways that practices structure our actions.
 In his article, “Two Concepts of Rules,” John Rawls is focused on the difference 
between justifying a practice and justifying an action that is part of a practice.52 To show 
the importance of this distinction, he uses the practices of punishment  and promise-
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keeping as examples. From the utilitarian perspective, we cannot make sense of why 
keeping promises per se is justified. After all, we always ought to do that action that best 
promotes happiness and this will not always involve keeping a promise. Likewise, if 
harming another could count as happiness-promoting deterrence, the utilitarian 
perspective requires that we harm regardless of whether the harmed is innocent of a crime 
or guilty. Yet, we can justify  both punishment and promise-keeping as actions required by 
the rules of a practice, and we can see that practice as justified by  the utilitarian principle. 
Accordingly, when the utilitarian principle is used directly to justify acts of promise-
keeping or punishment, it  seems inadequate. Yet, when the principle is used to justify 
practices, and actions are justified as part of the practice, then utilitarianism seems like a 
more appealing moral position.
 Now this distinction would not be helpful if practices did not have effects that 
were not reducible to individuals’ actions. The reason why both punishment and promise-
keeping can serve as Rawls’s examples is because they both have effects that could not be 
captured merely by  individuals action. Punishment works as a deterrence only because it 
sets up a certain context in which persons who contemplate crimes can expect  to be 
harmed. Moreover, it works as a good system of deterrence because there are certain 
expectations about who does the punishment and under what situations, so that harm 
cannot be perpetrated on a mere pretense of punishment. Likewise, the practice of 
promise-keeping establishes a way of assuring others of your action due to the mutually 
recognized wrong of breaking promises. In both cases, it is not merely individual actions 
that are important, but the establishment of mutually  recognized rules. These rules 
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structure behavior in new ways, and the effects of this structuring go beyond the effects 
of individual actions. These practices establish a social context for our actions.
 Generalizing beyond these examples, we can recognize three ways that social 
practices structure behavior and thereby have unique effects. First, a practice structures 
behavior when it constitutes a new activity. As with punishment and promises, practices 
can have important effects by making a new activity possible. For instance, persons can 
only play chess when there are generally  recognized rules that constitute the game of 
chess. Likewise, persons can only have property  when there is a generally  recognized 
practice of property claims. Persons can only pass, enforce or obey laws when a system 
of law is in place. In any  of these examples, by establishing the new activity, the practice 
changes our social context. We now have an option to play chess that we would not 
otherwise have. We are bound by  claims of property  that we would not otherwise be 
bound by. We can make laws and be compelled to obey them. The effects of these 
practices go beyond the effects that persons have in playing chess, making property 
claims or making law. We need to also consider the effects that having the option to play 
chess, make property claims or make law have. Oftentimes, the existence of these 
practices will have an effect even when persons choose not to follow their rules. 
 A second way in which practices structure behavior is by facilitating cooperation. 
For instance, the practice of waiting in line provides a way of cooperating for those who 
wait for service. Through a mutually recognized system of rules, persons coordinate who 
gets service next--whether at  the DMV, at a coffee shop, or at Disneyland. While we can 
identify line-waiting as its own activity in one sense, people only engage in this activity 
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as a way of waiting for service.53  It coordinates our behavior rather than creating a new 
activity. Such coordination structures our behavior by establishing specific ways of 
working with others. As we make decisions, we hold these ways of coordinating with 
others as fixed. For instance, I might not go to the coffee shop if I am running late 
because I know there will be a long line. Moreover, such ways of coordinating can have 
broader effects than merely coordinating. Right now, line-waiting is a particularly 
egalitarian activity. However, in airports, a growing norm has been that those with a 
willingness to pay a higher price can bypass the line--either at security  or at the terminal--
because they have bought a special pass to do so. If this were to become pervasive across 
situations of line-waiting, then line-waiting would have a different social significance.54 It 
would be an indication of social class. In this way, practices structure behavior by 
coordinating our behavior and by  coordinating it in a certain way. The particular way of 
coordinating might have expansive effects beyond just coordination. 
 The third way that practices structure behavior is merely by  creating expectations 
of behavior. Even when individuals do not try to coordinate with others, the fact that 
persons act in ways specified by a practice will have effects on how they understand the 
social world. For instance, it might have an epistemic impact as persons take the fact that 
others act a certain way as evidence that it is a good way to act. For example, in a society 
where women primarily work in the home, members of that  society might be more likely 
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to think that there is something inherently  right in women working at home. In planning 
their lives, they will tend to think that this is the better way to live--even when they are 
not concerned with coordinating with others. Even beyond this, we cannot ignore the 
myriad ways in which expectations of the social world influence our linguistic practices, 
and with that the ways we understand the world. To be any more specific on this would 
require a theory of learning and development that I cannot offer, but  few can doubt the 
ways in which our social practices impact our habits, heuristic rules, modes of 
understanding and aims. 
 Regardless of which of these three ways practices structure behavior, each has a 
moral significance that is not reducible to the significance of those actions that compose 
it. The fact that persons see that practice as part of the social world has a deeper 
significance. These practices organize our behavior with one another and provide us with 
a social context within which to act. For this reason, we need to be concerned with these 
practices as having these effects. We need to be concerned with the irreducible 
significance of practices. 
2.1.3 Evaluating contribution
While the benefits and costs for any of these practices is not fully reducible to the effects 
of those actions that are part of the practice in isolation, it is nonetheless true that there 
would be no practice if persons did not follow the rules of the practice. Accordingly, 
those actions that  correspond to the rules of the practice contribute to the functioning of 
that practice, and those actions thus contribute to the benefits and costs of the practice. 
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When we evaluate those actions that are part of a practice, we need to evaluate them as 
parts of a practice in order to capture this morally  significant aspect of the action. The 
fact that the action contributes to the benefits or costs of the practice is relevant for 
evaluating that act.
 To see the point here, imagine a case in which a city will suffer from a drought 
unless persons generally  cut down on their water usage. Suppose that  the city is large 
enough such that no one person’s usage will either cause or avert the drought, but a 
general change by  all would solve the problem. If we look at an individual situation in 
isolation, there is little reason for any  individual to cut back. After all, their own choice 
will not either cause or solve the problem. Yet, we can praise an individual who 
contributes to the solution by cutting back--even if the drought is not ultimately  avoided. 
In this case, it is the effects of general behavior rather than any particular action that 
matters. We can then evaluate the action as contributing to this general behavior. 
Similarly, when we are concerned about the effects of a practice that are not reducible to 
effects of isolated actions, we should still evaluate actions as contributing to the practice. 
 Intuitively, we often jump from approving the general behavior to approving the 
individual action. We jump from thinking that a general reduction in water usage makes 
the particular choice of an individual to reduce their water usage good. Yet, this is a jump. 
It does not directly  follow and different moral theories will justify it on different grounds. 
For instance, some appeal to the “Principle of Fair Play,” which requires that persons 
contribute to a practice that they accept the benefits of. Alternatively, utilitarians might 
appeal to an indirect utilitarian principle such that persons ought to act in the way that, 
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when persons generally act that way, would best promote utility.55 My present concern is 
not to argue for any particular way of justifying individual contribution to practices, but 
merely to point out that there must be some ground that aligns with our intuitive approval 
of such actions. 
 In speaking of our evaluation of individual actions as “contributing” to a practice, 
it may  seem as though such actions would not be strictly  obligatory.  The phrase makes it 
seem as though the practice accomplishes an end, and our action is praiseworthy insofar 
as it contributes to that end. However, sometimes a practice strictly requires compliance 
and then our evaluation of the action does not seem to depend on any  contribution. For 
instance, a practice of contract-keeping does not explain praise of those actions that 
contribute to the reliability of contracts; it  requires that persons keep  their contracts. A 
practice of property does not explain praise of actions that secure property claims; it 
requires that persons respect property. How can we explain such requirements while 
being concerned only with the ways the actions contribute to the practice?
 Oftentimes, the efficacy of a practice requires that persons can fully  rely on 
individuals acting a certain way. For instance, a practice of promising only  works because 
persons are always required to keep their promises. It would not work the same way if 
the practice only requires that persons do enough to maintain trust in promises. A practice 
of property only works when persons have trust that others will respect their property 
claims. When such practices exist, then one contributes to the practice by strictly 
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following its rules. The praiseworthy  action is not to contribute however one sees fit--it is 
to follow the required rules. In these situations the rules of a practice will be obligatory. 
 What goes for good practices, equally  goes for bad practices. If we praise actions 
that contribute to good practices, then we condemn actions that contribute to bad 
practices. For example, in areas of Africa and the Middle East, there is a practice of 
female genital cutting. According to this practice, young girls undergo procedures of 
varying severity from limited circumcision to complete infibulation. Given the harm 
caused to these girls, we can condemn such a practice and with it condemn the actions 
that contribute to it. Just as we evaluate actions that contribute to a justified practice as 
good, we can evaluate actions that contribute to a unjustified practice as bad. 
Accordingly, our evaluation of individual actions will often depend upon our evaluation 
of the practice of which it is a part. To fully  evaluate individual actions, we need to 
evaluate the practices of which they are part. 
 
2.1.4 Two levels of evaluation
So, individual actions will have moral significance as isolated acts, and they will have 
significance as part of social practices. In order to fully evaluate an action we need to 
appreciate both perspectives towards the action. In order to evaluate the action as part of 
the practice, however, we need to evaluate the practice itself. If the practice is justified, 
then individuals have reason to contribute to the practice. If the practice is unjustified, 
then individuals have reason against contributing to the practice. A full evaluation of 
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action needs to take this into account, so a full evaluation of action requires a judgment of 
the practice of which the action is part.
 What all this shows is that we cannot suppose that moral evaluation happens only 
at the level of individual actions. At times, what an individual ought to do depends upon 
whether a practice is justified, and this shows that moral evaluation cannot be directed 
only at individuals actions. We need to be concerned with the evaluation of practices. In 
developing moral principles, we should have moral principles for individual action and 
we should have principles for practices. 
 So, this argument shows why we should be concerned with social practices, but it  
does not do so on the basis of any substantive moral theory. Instead, the argument relies 
merely on the role of social practices and the way in which actions contribute to them. 
This argument applies whether one ultimately thinks that social practices should be 
evaluated by self-interest, utility, rational agreement, reasonable agreement, pluralist 
values or god’s will. Since practices have effects that are not reducible to effects of 
isolated actions, we need to be able to evaluate those practices in order to evaluate the 
actions that contribute to them. 
 In section §2.2, I will extend this argument to systems of practices and the basic 
structure. I will argue that we have reason to view moral theory as having three levels. I 
argue that we should be concerned with actions, practices and systems of practices. Since 
the basics structure of society is a system of practices, we should be concerned with the 
basic structure of society. In this way, I will have argued for the moral indispensability  of 
the basic structure without relying on any particular moral theory.
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2.1.5 Applbaum’s objection
In his 1999 book, Ethics for Adversaries, Arthur Applbaum examines the morality of 
actions that are part of adversarial practices such as the law, business, and political 
campaigning.56 His primary concern is with behavior that would not be permissible were 
it not part of a social practice that licenses it. He asks how deceptive, coercive and violent 
actions can be justified merely  because they are part of a practice. As a particularly stark 
example, he offers the case of an executioner. Such a person kills, but we think he kills in 
virtue of a certain institutional capacity. If the executioner did not have a particular role in 
a legal system, we would not think such killings could be justified. Applbaum’s challenge 
is whether such killing is even justified within the institution. He asks how being part of 
such an institution could really justify this violent behavior. In what way does being part 
of a practice really change our evaluation of the action?
 Applbaum’s real object of concern is not executioners, but the more mundane 
institutions of law and market competition. In these cases, we pit persons against  one 
another and believe that a system in which they compete is beneficial in the long run. Yet, 
when lawyers manipulate or hide facts in the courtroom, they do not cease to lie merely 
because they are lawyers. When persons focus solely on profit in market exchanges, they 
are not less guilty of greed. While persons might cite their role as a justification for their 
conduct, it is not obvious how their role could justify such prima facie immoral conduct. 
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 Much of Applbaum’s argument presses against the view that I have argued for in 
this chapter. While I argue that we should see actions as part of practices, he convincingly 
argues that we should see actions in isolation. We ought to see lawyers as lying, 
businessmen as greedy, and executioners as killing. Being part of a practice does not 
justify  a fundamentally different evaluation of the action. In fact, we might wrongly judge 
an action by viewing it as part of a practice rather than by  viewing it as an isolated act. 
Applbaum’s arguments are significant because they push against the fundamental move 
of this chapter. They show why actions that are part  of a practice should not always be 
evaluated as part of a practice. 
 Yet, Applbaum’s views and my own do not conflict in any  way. Both can 
recognize that we should evaluate actions as part of practices and that we should evaluate 
actions in isolation. Both perspectives are relevant to the ultimate evaluation of that 
action. My claim is not that being part of a practice fully  determines whether an act is 
right or wrong. My claim is only  that a proper evaluation of that action requires that we 
evaluate it as part of a practice. In fact, there could be four ways in which our evaluation 
of the act in isolation and our evaluation of the act  as part of a practice interact in an 
ultimate evaluation of that action. 
 First, it  might be the case that  persons should generally follow the rules of a 
practice, but that situations arise when the rules should not be followed. Here, the 
particularities of the action in isolation require that we do not follow the rules that would 
typically justify the action. Perhaps it is wrong for an executioner to kill political 
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criminals even if an executioner can generally kill criminals.57  There might be cases 
when a lawyer should not lie, even if the adversarial legal system is generally good. 
There might be cases when one should not  keep  their contract, even if contracts should 
generally  be kept. In such situations the fact that  persons should generally follow the 
rules of a practice does not mean that they should always do so.
 Second, it might be that a practice is unjustified because it requires that persons 
act in ways that are immoral in isolation. It might very well be an objection against 
capital punishment that  it  causes persons to kill outside of self-defense. It  might be an 
objection against adversarial legal conventions that they require lawyers to lie. In such 
cases, the fact that practices encourage (if not require) such immoral acts would be a 
reason against the practice being practiced. When this occurs the reasons for the practices 
would be compared to the reasons against, and we could determine whether or not the 
practice is, ultimately, justified. 
 Third, Applbaum does not deny that a practice can make an otherwise immoral 
action moral, only  that we cannot assume it does so.58  It  is also consistent with both of 
our positions that a practice might be important  enough to justify persons acting in 
immoral ways as part of it. Perhaps the advantages of the adversarial legal system are 
great enough to justify  the lies that it  encourages. Perhaps a market system in which 
advertisers deceive could be sufficiently justified in a way that excuses individual actions 
of deception. 
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58 He offers a contractualist account of when practices can make prima facie immoral actions moral in 
Chapter 8 of Ethics for Adversaries. 
 Fourth, these two perspectives towards our action might very  well be 
irreconcilable. If the practice is justified, but the act it requires is immoral, then a person 
who acts according to the practice might act both rightly and wrongly. We do not need to 
suppose this conflict  can be resolved. This, after all, is how Michael Walzer treats the 
problem of dirty hands.59 The political leader is put in a place whereby they ought to do 
that which benefits their public. When this requires that they act in immoral ways, their 
political role pulls them towards one action and the immorality  of the isolated action 
takes them in another. For Walzer, the politician who acts in accordance with their role 
does right, but they do right by doing wrong. We should not suppose that the wrong is 
wiped away by the right. The politician should appreciate both aspects of his act. This 
might be a fact of moral life far beyond politics. Our institutional obligations and social 
roles might require that we do wrong to do right--and we should not think that the wrong 
we do is wiped away. 
 Applbaum’s argument importantly shows that the view of our actions as part of 
practices is not the only morally relevant  view of our actions. Even when they are part of 
practices, our actions are still isolated actions. For a full evaluation of them, we need to 
recognize both aspects. We need to see our actions in their particularity, and we need to 
see them as contributing to practices. How these two perspectives towards the action are 
resolved needs to be determined by a particular moral theory, so I cannot offer a general 
solution here. What matters is that his emphasis on evaluating actions in isolation does 
not itself conflict with my emphasis on evaluating actions as part of practices. 
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2.2 Practices as Parts of Systems
The reason why we need to evaluate certain practices as part of systems is the same as the 
reason why we need to evaluate actions as part of practices. Systems of practices can 
have certain effects that practices alone do not have. When practices contribute to such a 
system, this contribution is an important aspect of that  practice. A contribution to a 
beneficial system is laudable, and a contribution to a harmful practice is condemnable. 
For instance, the coercive enforcement of good laws can be a great good whereas the 
coercive enforcement of bad laws can be a great bad. While being part  of a system is not 
the only  salient feature of such practices, it will be relevant for determining whether that 
action is rightful. For this reason, it will often be the case that  to properly  evaluate an 
individual’s action, we need to evaluate the practice of which that action is a part. 
 To extend this argument from the last section, §2.2.1 will argue that systems of 
practices have the same kinds of unique effects as practices do. Oftentimes, systems of 
practices can be justified by the effects they  have beyond the effects of the practices they 
are made of. Following this, §2.2.2 argues that  we need to evaluate practices by their 
contribution to such systems. The fact that a practice contributes to a justified system 
counts in favor of that practice and it would count against it if it  contributed to an 
unjustified system. Finally, in §2.2.4, I better explain how we can understand the basic 
structure, specifically, as a system that the major social institutions need to be justified as 
part of. 
2.2.1 The effects of systems
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Just as practices have unique effects in creating a social context for individual actions, so 
do systems of practices create a context for practices. Accordingly, the effects of a system 
of practices are not reducible to the effects of practices in isolation. Once we see the 
unique effects that systems of practices have, we can see why we need to see individual 
practices as contributing to systems. 
 As an example, we can focus on the educational system in the United States. In 
this system, there is no one over-arching institution that has authority  or influence over 
the other institutions. Pre-schools operate under a different framework than primary 
schools, public schools operate under a different  framework than public schools, and 
colleges operate under a different framework than high schools. Moreover, there are 
plenty of secondary institutions that  are well integrated within these. For instance, the 
companies that administer Advanced Placement tests, the companies that organize the 
SAT, ACT, GRE, and MCAT tests, and the various financing organizations that offer 
student loans are all integrated within the educational system. While these various 
institutions are not unified as part of any formal system, they  do work together as part of 
“the educational system” in the United States. Each institution is organized in ways the 
presume the idiosyncrasies of other institutions, and members of society have certain 
expectations on the system as a whole. 
 Because our educational institutions are part of the educational system, they are 
all part of a particular social context. If we wanted to evaluate any one kind of institution, 
we would need to do so within the context set  by  the system as a whole. If we were 
evaluating high school education, we would need to think of it as situated within the 
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system of primary  schools, colleges and placement tests. We could not properly evaluate 
high school as an institution if we viewed it in isolation; we would need to see it  as part 
of the educational system. 
 In this way, the evaluation of educational institutions is quite similar to individual 
actions. If we are to evaluate the choice of the man of merit, we would need to see his 
action as within the context of a practice of contracts. To see the action in isolation would 
be to treat it wrongly. In fact, the same three ways in which practices structure individual 
action also apply for how systems structure individual practices. First, systems of 
practices could constitute new  kinds of systems. When this occurs, then the practices will 
only make sense within the system that it partly constitutes. For example, we might 
understand “the state” as constituted by various institutions--perhaps a political 
constitution, legal system, and police force. These institutions will only make sense as 
part of the state, as a whole, in the way that moves of chess only  make sense as part of the 
game of chess. Second, systems of practices will often coordinate the actions of other 
practices. For example, the educational system coordinates the activities of the various 
educational institutions. In this case, the way  the system is organized has influence on 
how its parts are organized. Third, systems of practices will also have a structuring role 
by setting expectations and a context for understanding. For example, persons might see 
themselves and their own maturity in the context of the educational system. As the 
normal course of education extends past high school into college, persons come to see 
themselves as adults after college and not after high school.
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  Just as practices structure behavior in these three ways, so do systems of 
practices structure practices in these three ways. Accordingly, we need to evaluate 
systems of practices as having this unique structuring effect; just as practices provide a 
social context for actions, systems provide a social context for practices.
 
2.2.2 The contribution of practices
So, systems of practices have irreducible effects by establishing a social context for 
practices, but it  is still practices that together form a system. Accordingly, the role that a 
practice plays in the system is important for evaluating that practice. Just as we need to 
evaluate individual actions as contributing to practices, we need to evaluate individual 
practices as contributing to systems. A practice will have morally significant  aspects as an 
isolated practice, but it  will also have morally significant  aspects as part of a system. 
Thus, a full evaluation of practices requires that we see them as part of these systems. 
 Just as evaluating an action as part of a practice requires that we evaluate the 
practice as a whole, so does evaluating a practice as part of a system require that we 
evaluate the system as a whole. A practice could be part of a justified system, and 
fulfilling a role within that system would count in favor of that practice. A practice could 
contribute to an unjustified system, and fulfilling a role in that system would count 
against the practice. A full evaluation of practices requires that we see them as part of 
systems. 
 Continuing our example, while the educational system in the United States is far 
from ideal, we can imagine an educational system that--as a whole--works well and 
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fairly. Now, whether this system works well will depend on the individual institutions 
that comprise it and how they work together. So, suppose that we focused on any one 
institution--such as pre-school. Now, there are certainly  parts of a pre-school that we can 
evaluate as an isolated institution. For instance, pre-schools should be healthy 
environments where children feel safe. However, we could not focus only on making pre-
school the best it could be without considering what role it plays in the larger system. If 
we evaluate pre-school in isolation, we would not be adequately  evaluating pre-school. 
Part of our evaluation of the institution also depends upon what we think of the system as 
a whole. The fact that a pre-school fulfills a necessary role in a justified system counts in 
favor of that institution. Yet, if a pre-school fulfills its role within an unjustified system, 
that does not count in its favor. In this way, the individual institutions that comprise the 
education system need to be viewed as part of that system, and this will often require that 
we be able to judge that system as a whole. 
 So, what all this shows is that we should be concerned with the moral evaluation 
of systems of practices. Just as our concern for adequate evaluation of individual action 
will require that we evaluate the practices that actions are part of, so does our concern 
with practices require that we evaluate the systems of which practices are a part. Again, it 
is not due to any substantive moral theory that we should be concerned with the system as 
a whole, but because of the structure of practices and of systems. Regardless of what 
moral theory one holds, we should be concerned with evaluating systems of practices. 
 Accordingly, moral evaluation cannot be confined to one level or two, but must 
occur at (at  least) three levels. We need to be concerned with individual actions, with the 
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practices that actions are part of, and with the systems that practices are part of. 
Oftentimes the evaluation of individual action requires that we view that  action as part of 
a practice and that requires that we evaluate that practice. To evaluate that practice, we 
may need to see it as part of a system of practices, and that requires that we evaluate that 
system as a whole. Accordingly, a full moral theory needs to have principles that apply at 
these three different levels. 
 The final step of the argument will be to show that the basic structure of society is 
one such system of practices that we should be concerned with. Yet, before I do that, I 
want to clear up one difficulty. 
2.2.3 What makes a system a system?
The argument thus far relies on the claim that  those practices that are part of systems 
should be evaluated as part of those systems. But, what exactly  counts as a “system” of 
practices? Whether or not we should evaluate any particular practice as part of a system 
depends on how we answer this question. That will determine when a practice should be 
evaluated only in isolation and when it should not be. 
 In accordance with the core analogy of this argument, I want to answer the 
question of what counts as a system by asking what counts as a practice. When do we 
know when actions are parts of practices? The same answer could potentially be applied 
to determine when practices are a part of systems. There are, however, two problems with 
this approach. First, we have an intuitive notion of practices that is not easy to articulate. 
As Wittgenstein claimed of games, it  is quite difficult to offer a clear standard by which 
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to identify a practice.60  Second, we might be able to refer to the participants’ attitudes 
towards a practice to identify  it as a practice, but  we cannot refer to the attitudes towards 
systems to identify a system. It is not nearly as common for persons to think of systems 
as it is to think of practices. Accordingly, it is not obvious how the analogy between 
practices and systems can be carried through.
 What we can say of both practices and systems is that they organize their parts as 
a single activity. Oftentimes that  activity is constituted by the rules of the practice, but 
other times it merely provides a way  of pursuing a prior activity. This is the key  aspect of 
practices that  can be extended to identify systems. A practice organizes individual actions 
around a single activity, and a system of practices organizes practices around a single 
activity. In our repeated example, the educational system organizes the various 
institutions around the activity  of educating members of society. Each institution has a 
role in education. 
 So, what makes a heap of practices into a system is that the practices jointly 
contributes to some activity or goal. This raises the question: what activity do the major 
social institutions jointly contribute to such that they form a system?
  In the last chapter, I explained the basic structure as consisting of those 
institutions that establish our obligations, rights, and powers as members of society. 
While this gives some unity to the major social institutions, it  is not clear whether it 
really counts as a single activity. Isn’t it actually a mere heap of distinct activities; 
establishing property rights, voting powers, and the like?
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 My response to this worry is to emphasize the ways in which the requirements 
and claims we have as members of society  define our role as members of society. The 
obligations, rights, and powers that the major social institutions establish jointly specify 
our role as member of society. The unity  of the basic structure as single system can be 
explained as joint contribution to the single activity of specifying our role. 
 To talk in terms of a “role” might seem odd in this context. Often, we might 
associate a role with specifying a particular goals that one has in virtue of occupying 
some office. For example, one’s role as parent  is to raise and healthy and autonomous 
individual. In being a member of society, the is no single goal that one has. It therefore 
seems odd to suppose that the major social institutions thereby specify our “role.” Being 
a member of society  hardly seems to give content to a role in the same way that various 
offices do. 
 However, this objection comes from a skewed way of viewing a role. Oftentimes 
our roles in an institution will be tied to the goal of that institution. Our role as parent is 
tied together with the broader role that the family  institution has. Yet, a liberal society 
does not have a single goal. Instead, it is organized in ways that facilitate the 
accomplishment of it’s members goals.  The rules that we follow are those that mutually 
advantage members of society  generally. Their justification is this mutual advantage and 
not a contribution to some goal. Accordingly, our role as member of society is not 
understood as goal-oriented. Instead, our role is specified by  the obligations, rights, and 
powers we have as members of society. Our role comes in the forms of claims and 
obligations rather than as ends. In a liberal basic structure, our goals will be our own and 
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our role as member of society will be specified by the rules of the major social 
institutions. 
 
2.2.4 Why evaluate the basic structure
At this stage, all the parts of the argument have been assembled to show why we have 
reason to be concerned with the basic structure of society. A full moral appraisal of 
certain actions requires that  we see them not only in isolation, but as part of a social 
practice. If a practice is justified, then persons have moral reason to follow the rules of 
the practice. If a practice is a morally  bad practice, then persons have a moral reason to 
not follow the rules of the practice. Accordingly our evaluation of the practice itself is 
relevant to our evaluation of individual action. We need to be able to evaluate actions and 
practices. However, to evaluate certain practices, we likewise cannot view them as 
isolated. Certain practices should be evaluated as parts of systems of practices. When the 
system is good, then the practice can be justified as contributing to the practice. When the 
practice is bad, then the fact that the practice contributes to it might make the practice 
unjustified. Accordingly, we need to be able to evaluate not only actions and practices; 
we must also be able to evaluate systems of practices. Our moral evaluation must reach to 
three levels. 
 As argued in the last chapter, the basic structure of society is a system of social 
practices. Specifically, it is the system of social practices that specify  our role as member 
of society. Accordingly, it makes sense that we view the basic structure as a system. The 
100 
various institutions that form the basic structure together specify the requirements and 
demands that I have as member of society. 
 More intuitively, we can see this point  by noticing that we live in a society, and 
that society  establishes a range of claims, obligations, and expectations. These various 
claims, obligations, and expectations are established by the major social institutions, like 
an economic system, property  scheme, legal system and political constitution. We do not 
have a choice to participate in any  one of these institutions and not any of the others. 
Instead, they come as a mutually supporting group. These institutions together establish 
the requirements on and claims of persons as members of society. Since we cannot 
choose to be a participant in one or the other, we should evaluate each of them as 
contributing to the whole. The most important moral concern then is whether these 
institutions as a whole are justified. Whether the society  we find ourselves in is justified. 
To try and evaluate one of these institutions in isolation from the others, like the legal 
system or property  system, would ignore the way in which they are part of the society 
that establishes our claims, obligations and expectations as a whole. It would be like 
evaluating preschool without understanding how preschool fits into the educations 
system; it would be like evaluating returning money to the bigoted miser without seeing it 
as part of contract-keeping.
 Once we conceive of the basic structure as a system of practices, we can see why 
we need to focus on the basic structure as an object of ethical concern. To fully evaluate 
any basic structure institution, we need to see it as part of the basic structure. Whether the 
institution is itself justified then depends upon its role within the basic structure and 
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whether the basic structure--as a whole--is justified. Accordingly, we need to have some 
way of evaluating the basic structure as subject. 
 The argument can be seen if we focus on particular actions. So, imagine we are 
concerned with whether an individual ought to follow the law. If we conceive of a legal 
system as a social practice that  consists partly of the rule “citizens ought to follow what is 
identified as the law,” then persons ought to follow the law if they ought to follow the 
rules of the legal system. Whether they ought to follow the rules of this social practice 
depends upon whether the social practice is justified, so we need to determine whether 
the legal system is a good one. To do this, we need to see the legal system as part of a 
system of practices. Since the legal system is one institution that establishes security for 
persons as members of society, we should evaluate the legal system as part of the basic 
structure of society. Whether the legal system is good partly  depends upon whether the 
basic structure of which it is part is good, and to determine this we must  be able to 
evaluate the basic structure of society. So, in order to properly evaluate certain actions--
like following the law--we need to be able to evaluate the basic structure of society. 
Regardless of what moral theory someone holds, we need to be morally  concerned with 
the basic structure of society.
 In this way, the argument for being concerned with the basic structure as subject 
extends the original argument offered by John Rawls in “Two Concepts of Rules.” As 
explained above, Rawls was there concerned with the distinction between justifying an 
action and justifying a practice. Some actions are parts of a practice, and the justification 
of those actions requires that we see them as part of a justified practice. Likewise, I 
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maintain a distinction between justifying a practice and justifying a system of practices. 
Some practices are parts of systems, and the justification of these systems requires that 
we see them as part  of a justified system. A concern with the basic structure recognizes 
the logical distinction between actions and practices and extends it to another level. The 
concern with the basic structure is justified by  this distinction between justifying 
practices and justifying systems of practices. 
2.3 Addressing Objections
At this stage, the core argument for focusing on the basic structure is established, but a 
number of objections might still be raised. In this section, I seek to anticipate two major 
objections and offer responses. Doing this should do more than seal potential gaps with 
the view, it should also  help to better explain the core argument.
 The first objection I address is one that questions the restricted focus of the basic 
structure. Why  not instead focus on the entirety of our social life and see our basic 
institutions as part  of that social system. While we should judge our social institutions as 
part of a larger social context, why restrict ourselves to seeing the institutions as only part 
of the basic structure? The second objection argues for extending the argument beyond its 
intended purview. Why wouldn’t we see the basic structure as itself part of an even larger 
system, the global structure? 
3.3.1 First objection: focusing on society as a whole
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Why do we need to see the basic structure institutions as part of the basic structure 
specifically? One might recognize that we should evaluate the major social institutions as 
part of a larger system, but does that larger system need to be the basic structure? Why 
not see them as part of society as a whole? Why not evaluate them as part of the full 
social structure, and determine how the entire social structure ought to be? In all 
likelihood, this would seemingly require that we evaluate both the basic structure and 
informal structure as working together as part of the same social system. 
  In “Remarks on Bentham’s philosophy,” J.S. Mill argues against  Bentham that he 
is too focused on individual actions and not the larger social context in which decisions 
are made. His own objection to Bentham might support this first objection to my view. 
Mill writes, 
“A theory, therefore, which considers little in an action beside that 
actions’s own consequences...will be most apt to fail in the consideration 
of greater social questions--the theory of organic institutions and general 
forms of polity; for those (unlike the details of legislation) to be duly 
estimated, must be viewed as the great instrument of forming the national 
character; of carrying forward the members of the community  towards 
perfection, or preserving them from degeneracy.”61
In this quotation, Mill recognizes the major driving intuition behind the argument of this 
chapter. We cannot merely evaluate individual actions in isolation, but must see them as 
part of the larger social context. For Mill, this meant using the principle of utility  to apply 
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to the entirety of the social context.62  He was concerned with using the principle to 
evaluate “national character” and sees our actions are part of these larger social questions. 
Mill does not make any such restriction in saying that we should see actions as only part 
of practices and practices as only parts of systems. Rather, he seems to suggest that they 
are all part of the whole of a national character. 
 Extending this idea, we only need to ask why we do not start from the largest 
possible unit of evaluation. Why not be concerned with evaluating society  as a whole, 
and see the various aspects of society as part of it. This would mean that we evaluate the 
basic structure institutions, the informal structure, and even particular acts as all part  of 
the national character. The perspective agrees with my claims that we need to take a 
larger perspective towards our actions than seeing them in isolation, but why wouldn’t 
this larger perspective see all aspects of social life as part of society as a whole and start 
from an evaluation of society? 
 Most simply, we do not evaluate practices as part of the society as a whole 
because society is not a system. There is no single activity  that all parts of society are 
contributing to. We evaluate the major social institutions as part of the basic structure 
because they all contribute to the specification of our role as member of society. While I 
urge us to take a broader perspective in evaluating actions and practices, this does not 
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be fruitful in other consequences, besides those particular acts.” Mill, Collected Works, Vol. 10 (Liberty 
Fund Press), 7.
require that I take a maximally broad perspective. It is because actions contribute to 
practices that we  need to evaluate them as part  of the practice and it is because practices 
contribute to systems that we evaluate them as part of the system. Since society is not 
understood as any single activity, we do not need to evaluate particulars as part of society. 
 In response, a teleological moral theory  might object that we can see all of society 
as contributing to a single activity; the furtherance of the moral end. The utilitarian, for 
example, will see all of society as contributing to the activity  of promoting the greatest 
happiness. Accordingly, we could evaluate any practice as part of a single system; the 
system that promotes happiness. Yet, even those who accept such a view need not reject 
my conclusion. That we should be concerned with all of society does not mean that we 
should not be concerned with the basic structure. If anything, it would only mean that we 
should see the basic structure as part of the social structure. If we have a comprehensive 
social view, then surely our evaluation of the basic structure should be consistent with 
that larger view, but it does not show that you should not focus on the basic structure as a 
particular system. Hence the argument does not seem like an objection against a concern 
with the basic structure. It  merely shows that  this concern is insufficient for moral theory, 
and I’ve never held that it would be. 
 As a final point, I want to make a more general point about ethical theory. From 
the perspective of any moral goal, anything might be evaluated as instrumental towards 
that goal. It is unsurprising that  someone who has an ethical goal would then see little 
reason to distinguish a concern for the basic structure from a concern with any other part 
of the social structure; all of the social structure is viewed as instrument to that goal. If 
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equality  is a moral aim, then the basic structure, like any other part  of the social structure, 
can contribute to equality. If autonomy is a goal, then both the basic structure and the 
informal structure are important for promoting autonomy. Yet, this does not really  change 
the underlying point of my argument. I mean to emphasize the distinct role that  the basic 
structure has in establishing our obligations, rights, and powers as members of society. 
Even if we ultimately assess the basic structure by some single moral end, the way in 
which it implicates that moral end will be unique. The basic structure forms a background 
against which each person lives their lives; obligations, rights, duties and opportunities 
are all explained by the idiosyncrasies of the basic structure. In so doing, the basic 
structure will have unique effects on whatever moral ends we take to be important. Even 
if we are concerned with how all of society affects autonomy, equality or happiness, we 
have reason to distinguish our concern with the basic structure because of the unique 
ways in which the obligations, rights, and powers we recognize will effect  autonomy, 
equality and happiness. 
3.3.2 Second objection: focusing on the global structure
A second objection extends my  argument and argues that just  as we should evaluate the 
major institutions as part of the basic structure of society, so should we evaluate the basic 
structure as part of the global structure. We could not then properly evaluate the basic 
structure without evaluating the global structure. 
 My first response is to point out that  this is not, strictly speaking, an objection to 
my argument. Even if we should see the basic structure as part  of the global structure, 
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that still does not count against evaluating the basic structure as a moral concern. It 
merely suggests that we need to take a broader view to properly do so. 
 Nonetheless, we also should not see the basic structure of society  as part of the 
global structure. Actions are part of social practices because practices only exist when 
persons act in accordance with the rules, and institutions are part of the basic structure 
because the basic structure only exists when the practices that  compose it exist. Yet, it is 
not the case that the global structure is made up  of basic structures. Rather, the global 
structure consists of international practices, and those practices consist in actions by 
international agents--such as states, corporations and various NGOs. In this way, the 
global structure is similar to the basic structures rather than constituted by basic 
structures. The difference between the two is that the basic structure is a structure of 
practices between persons whereas the global structure is a structure of practices between 
international agents. Whereas the objection supposes a relationship like that in figure A 
below, the real situation is like that of figure B
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So, while the objection supposes that my argument should be extended to see the basic 
structure as part of the global structure, the conclusion we should draw is quite different. 
Just as we need to evaluate the basic structure to properly evaluate individual actions, so 
we should evaluate the global structure to properly evaluate international actions.
 Of course, this argument relies on a certain empirical fact about the global 
structure, that international practices and the global structure are constituted by  actions of 
international agents rather than by individual agents. This point  might seem contentious, 
but my argument still stands even if I am wrong. Suppose it is the case that international 
practices are constituted by the actions of individual agents. This still would not imply 
that the basic structure should be evaluated as part of the global structure. Instead, it 
would imply either (a) that the global structure is a system of practices alongside the 
basic structure as system or (b) that the global structure counts as a basic structure. If (a), 
the global structure might establish claims that individuals make on one another as 
members of the globe--rather than as members of society. In the case of (b), the global 
structure would establish obligations, rights, and powers for persons as members of 
society, in which case there would be a global basic structure. In either case, it  would not 
mean that we should see the basic structure as part of the global structure. 
2.4 The Moral Indispensability of the Basic Structure
So, the core argument for being concerned with the basic structure does not arise from 
any particular moral value. I do not claim that happiness is important and the basic 
structure has a unique role in promoting happiness. I do not claim that autonomy is 
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important and claim that the basic structure has a unique role in protecting autonomy. 
Instead, the argument arises from the way in which our social structure is organized and 
how moral theory  needs to treat that  social structure. We live amidst social practices and 
those social practices are part  of systems of practices. In order for our moral evaluations 
to be complete, we need to see actions as part of practices and practices as parts of 
systems. As the basic structure institutions are practices that  are part of an important 
system, we need to see these institutions as part of the basic structure. Accordingly, 
complete moral evaluation requires that we have a concern with the basic structure, 
regardless of what is substantively  valuable. It is for this reason that the basic structure is 
a morally indispensable ethical subject. 
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Chapter 3
Within and Without an Institutional Context 
“In accord with the interests and occupations of the group, certain things become objects 
of high esteem; others of aversion. Association does not create impulses of affection and 
dislike, but it furnishes the objects to which they attach themselves. The way our group or 
class does things tends to determine the proper objects of attention, and thus to prescribe 
the directions and limits of observation and memory...Just as the sense requires sensible 
objects to stimulate them, so our powers of observation, recollection, and imagination do 
not work simultaneously, but are set in motion by the demands set up by current social 
occupations”
- Dewey, Democracy and Education
Having shown that we should evaluate the basic structure as a moral subject, I now turn 
to how we should do this. One intuitive approach holds that we should identify first 
principles that can be applied across all moral problems, and then apply these principles 
to the basic structure. Yet, this approach hardly warrants giving any more attention to the 
basic structure as a moral problem than we would give to any  other problem. In each 
case, we would merely apply first principles to the issue.
 To overcome this challenge, there must be something morally  distinct about the 
basic structure. What is morally  different about the basic structure such that we would 
evaluate it with distinct principles? Why not merely  identify the correct ideals for 
individual actions and recognize those as the same ideals for the basic structure? To claim 
that the we should focus on the basic structure seems to require that there is something 
that makes the basic structure worthy of distinctive principles. 
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 If one argues for a conception of justice that is uniquely  related to the basic 
structure, then one can easily  explain what is distinct about the basic structure. Justice 
strikes us as a distinct normative ideal. If justice uniquely bears on the basic structure, 
then the basic structure is distinct by its relation to justice. However, I do not argue for a 
focus on the basic structure from any particular conception of justice. Instead, I mean to 
show why the arguments for a focus on the basic structure transcend any particular 
conception of justice. 
 There is already an expansive literature on the ways in which the basic structure is 
morally distinct, though it  is not typically understood in these terms. Beginning with his 
1992 Tanner Lectures, G.A. Cohen has argued that being committed to the principles of 
justice should requires certain norms of conduct.63 In these arguments, Cohen challenges 
the Rawlsian approach of identifying principles that apply only to the basic structure. In 
1997, Cohen explicitly  argued that any distinction between principles that  apply to the 
basic structure and those that apply  to individual actions is morally  arbitrary; whatever 
concerns us about the basic structure should concern us about individual action.64  In this 
way, Cohen denies the moral distinctiveness of the basic structure as subject. Similarly, 
Liam Murphy’s 1998 article, “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” argues that our 
principles must  be unified at a fundamental level. Any separation between two principles, 
he argues, would only frustrate our attempts to promote our fundamental values or satisfy 
112 
63 Cohen, G.A. “Incentives, Inequality and Community” Tanner Lectures on Human Values, 1992. Also in 
Rescuing Justice and Equality (Harvard University Press; Cambridge, UK. 2009), Ch. 1.
64 Cohen, G.A. “Where the Action is: On the Site of Distributive Justice” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
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our first  principles. Most recently, Seanna Shiffrin has offered a more nuanced argument 
on behalf of a similar conclusion, claiming that our acceptance of the two principles of 
justice indirectly  commits us to certain norms for individual action because of our 
commitment to the justification of the two principles.65  Each of these arguments 
challenges the moral distinctiveness of the basic structure in claiming that  the 
fundamental principles that apply to the basic structure should also be applied to 
individual choices.
 The predominant response on behalf of the moral distinctiveness of the basic 
structure has been an argument from the “moral division of labor.” According to this 
view, we have a plurality of fundamental values, and we can best respect all these values 
by dividing the labor between principles that apply to institutions and principles that 
apply  to individuals. We do best in respecting all our values if our institutions are 
primarily  assessed by some values and our individual actions assessed by others. Thus, 
we should divide institutional principles from individual principles. Both Thomas Nagel 
and Samuel Scheffler advance versions of this basic argument, but they differ on why the 
separation between principles would best respect our values.66
 In this chapter, I will offer an argument that addresses Cohen’s, Shiffrin’s, and 
Murphy’s criticisms, but I will not  appeal to any moral division of labor. Instead, my 
argument relies on claims about how practices affect the content of moral and ethical life. 
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Like the last chapter, I rely on claims about the normative structure of social practices. 
Our social practices often establish an “institutional context,” and principles that  apply 
within this context should be sensitive to its particularities. For example, a justified 
practice of property  might identify certain acts as wrongful trespassing. For those who act 
within that practice, the wrong of trespass is relevant for evaluating their action in a way 
that the wrong of trespass is not  relevant for evaluating the practice itself. As particular 
persons in a determinate social structure, there are certain considerations relevant for 
assessing our actions only  because of the particular institutions we act within, and our 
individual principles need to be sensitive to these considerations. I will claim that it is 
these considerations that make the basic structure morally distinctive.  
 My argument for this conclusion will proceed in two sections. In §3.1, I argue that 
those committed to conventionalism will recognize certain considerations that are only 
relevant for evaluation within an institutional context. This allows me to provide a direct 
answer to Seanna Shiffrin’s recent argument. In §3.2, I apply the argument of §3.1 to 
justify  the general distinction between  principles that apply to the basic structure from 
those that apply to individual action. This allows me to answer Cohen and Murphy’s 
recent arguments. With my positive argument complete, I then contrast my own argument 
with the moral division of labor argument offered by Nagel and Scheffler. 
 All together, the three sections of this chapter show the importance of our moral 
context for the evaluation of actions and practices. In this way, it  contributes to a view of 
political and moral theory  that respects both the importance of a universal foundation for 
our moral claims as well as the ethical significance of our particular social context. We 
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are, after all, determinate persons living within a form of social life, and this shapes who 
we are, what we care about, and how we relate to others. Our individual principles should 
not be distant and detached from our way of life but embedded within it.
3.1 Our Institutional Context
For my argument to succeed, I will need to show why there are certain considerations that 
are relevant for moral evaluation within an institutional context that are not relevant 
outside that  context. To do this, I first need to explain what I mean by “institutional 
context.” Suppose we recognize that trespassing is wrongful only because it violates the 
rules of a specific system of property rights. In this case, the fact that an act counts as 
trespassing is a consideration against the act  for those to whom the practice’s rules apply. 
It is only  a wrong within the “institutional context” set  by the property  system. As we 
recognized in the last chapter, institutions can establish obligations, rights and powers. 
Because the institution so establishes these demands and claims, we say that a persons 
only has such an obligation, right, or power in an institutional context. 
 The influence of such practices is pervasive across ethical life. Our practices 
establish specific obligations that bind us and they set the terms of our most important 
relationships. These practices can shape our particular values and they  can define our 
virtues. In a variety of ways, our institutions establish a moral context within which our 
choices are made. If individual principles are to guide our conduct, then we cannot rely 
solely  on our foundational and universal values to determine how we ought to act. 
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Instead, our individual principles need to be sensitive to the particular values, virtues, 
relationships and obligations within our institutional context. 
 By contrast, the principles that apply  to our basic social institutions should not be 
sensitive to the particular values, virtues, relationships and obligations that arise within 
the institutional context that those institutions create. For example, it  would be wrong to 
justify  our system of property on the basis that it limited trespassing. For this reason, 
principles that apply  to the basic structure should not be sensitive to our moral context in 
the way that principles that apply  to actions within an institutional context should. I 
maintain that this distinction explains the distinctiveness of the basic structure as moral 
subject. 
 To build this broader argument, I will first need to show how practices can 
establish considerations that are only  relevant within an institutional context. In §3.1.1, I 
give a general argument for how this occurs that draws on resources from Chapter 2. 
Then, in §3.1.2, I show how this argument is relevant for addressing Seanna Shiffrin’s 
recent arguments that those who accept Rawls’s two principles of justice shouldn’t accept 
inegalitarian incentives. I then answer some objections in §3.1.3 and summarize the 
significance of these arguments in §3.1.4. 
3.1.1 Conventionalism
Consider the different ways in which property  systems could treat trespassing. In one 
system, the rules might absolutely forbid setting foot on someone’s land without their 
consent. In another, the rules might forbid such action unless someone is in dire 
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circumstances. In a third, the rules might only forbid setting foot on the land of another 
when doing so would harm the owner’s property. In a fourth, the rules might not forbid 
setting foot on another’s property at all, though it might forbid actions associated with 
trespass such as violating certain privacy rights. We might immediately  think that one of 
these property systems would be better than another, but we nonetheless recognize them 
as possible specifications of a property system. 
 Now, suppose we ask the moral question, “should an individual avoid setting foot 
on another’s land?”  According to some moral theories, we can only answer this question 
if we know which of the above property systems the individual lives within. These 
theories suppose that if the rules of property  forbid setting foot on another’s land, then 
one should avoid doing so. If the rules do not forbid it, then one does not need to avoid 
doing so. Whether a person should avoid setting foot on another’s land would then 
depend on the conventional rules of property. Of course, not every  moral theory would 
answer the question in this way. For some, trespass might be morally forbidden in every 
possible social structure--perhaps because of a natural right to property. Or, one might 
never act wrongly in setting foot on the land of another--perhaps because we all have an 
inalienable right to the use of land. 
 To simplify the issue, we can say that  one is either a conventionalist or absolutist 
with respect to the morality of trespass. One is a conventionalist in this respect when one 
must reference the conventions of the property system to settle whether one should not 
set foot on the land of another. One is an absolutist when the particularities of a property 
system are irrelevant for answering the moral question. A typically under-appreciated 
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point is that one can be a conventionalist about any particular moral obligation without 
being a conventionalist about all moral obligations. I might be a conventionalist with 
regard to trespass but an absolutist with regard to promise-keeping.
 In fact, it makes little sense to be a conventionalist about everything. One needs to 
be able to explain why a practice can create new obligations, rights, or powers. To supply 
this explanation, we need some non-conventional moral principle. For example, Rawls 
was a conventionalist with respect to property  rights. In this commitment, he followed 
Hume, who analyzed promise-keeping, property, allegiance to government and even 
fidelity  in marriage as conventional obligations.67  However, Rawls grounded his own 
conventionalism in two natural duties. First, the Natural Duty of Justice requires that 
individuals (a) follow the rules of just institutions when they exist and apply to that 
individual, and (b) build just institutions when they are needed.68 Second, the Principle of 
Fair Play requires that we follow the rules of a cooperative scheme when we have 
accepted the benefits of that scheme.69  Together, these two principles explain why we 
would be obligated by the rules of conventional practices. We are obligated by the 
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Principle of Fair Play  to follow the rules when we have voluntarily  accepted the benefits 
of a practice, and we are obligated by a duty of justice to follow the rules when the 
practice is sufficiently just and applies to us.70 
 Rawls was a conventionalist not only about obligations, but also about rights and 
powers. This point is often lost because he emphasized the Principle of Fair Play and the 
Natural Duty of Justice, which both explicitly specify obligations. However, his 
conventionalism goes beyond this. As he writes in Theory of Justice, 
“In a well-ordered society individuals acquire claims to a share of the 
social product  by doing certain things encouraged by the existing 
arrangements. The legitimate expectations that arise are the other side, so 
to speak, of the Principle of Fairness and the natural duty  of justice. For in 
the way that one has a duty to uphold just arrangements, and an obligation 
to do one’s part when one has accepted a position in them, so a person 
who has complied with the scheme and done his share has a right to be 
treated accordingly by others...what we can say is that, in the traditional 
phrase, a just scheme gives each person his due: that is, it allots to each 
what he is entitled to as defined by the scheme itself.”71
Rawls does not ever develop this idea extensively, but a full treatment of his 
conventionalism would need to recognize how claims arise and are linked to the natural 
duties. I take the basic idea here to be quite intuitive; if persons are morally  obligated to 
stay off my  land, then I also have a right that  they do not set foot on my land. If the 
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natural duty of justice explains why persons are so obligated, then a corresponding story 
should be able to say why persons have a right. While a complete account would need to 
be defended, the Rawlsian view accords with the general approach of this dissertation is 
identifying institutions as establishing obligations, rights, and powers. 
 As with the commitments of the last chapters, my argument only requires that 
persons recognize some way in which social practices can establish obligations, rights, or 
powers. Regardless of what moral principle one appeals to to explain this, the point 
remains the same; there are new considerations that  arise within an institutional context. 
The Natural Duty of Justice and Principles of Fair Play  are popular ways in which to 
ground such obligations, but they are not the only principles that can do so. 
3.1.2 Labor markets, conventionalism, and incentives
In “Incentives, Motives, and Talents,” Shiffrin argues that those who accept the difference 
principle are committed to treating talents as arbitrary from a moral point of view; the 
fact that someone possesses a certain talent makes that person no more deserving of 
social goods than someone without that talent. She then argues that if someone believes 
that talents are morally arbitrary, then that person cannot justifiably  seek out inegalitarian 
incentives on the basis of their talents. They do not have a claim to higher wages on the 
basis of their talents. 
 In this section, I will use the importance of an institutional context to address 
Shiffrin’s claim that  those who accept the difference principle should not pursue or accept 
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inegalitarian incentives.72  I will argue that an institutional context can change the way in 
which talents are relevant in determining what persons deserve. An institution that treats 
those with different talents differently can be justified on the basis of a commitment that 
talents are morally arbitrary. Within that institution, however, talents will no longer be 
fully  arbitrary. An institutions might specify what persons deserve, and treat  those with 
talents as having different claims than those without. In this way, talents are not morally 
arbitrary within a practice even when they  are morally arbitrary for justifying that 
practice. In this way, my argument will demonstrate the difference between moral 
considerations within a social practice from the moral considerations outside a social 
practice. 
 If we recognize, as Rawls does, that our institutions establish new rights, 
obligations, and powers, then individual actions need to be assessed within the moral 
context established by those institutions. For example, we can only say that  a person acts 
rightly or wrongly in setting foot on the property of another when we know whether 
trespass is proscribed by the rules of a sufficiently just property scheme. For ease of 
reference, I will say that we need to assess an agent’s actions within an “institutional 
context” when the institutions they act within affect the agent’s rights, obligations and 
powers. 
 Within a Rawlsian view, it is correct to say that talents are arbitrary from a moral 
point of view when determining how our institutions should be organized. However, 
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talents are not always arbitrary from a moral point of view within an institutional context. 
If the rules of an institution identify those with a particular talent as the bearer of a right, 
obligation, or power, then talents are no longer morally arbitrary within that institution. In 
this case, the fact that a legitimate institution differentiates a person’s rights, obligations, 
or powers on the basis of their talents makes talents morally relevant. 
 If we accept the moral arbitrariness of talents for assessing institutions, as Rawls 
does, then it would be wrong to justify any institution on the basis that either (a) it treats 
those with a particular talent well or badly or that (b) it gives them what they deserve. 
However, if the institution can be justified while treating talents as morally arbitrary and 
that institution treats talents differently, then talents are not morally arbitrary within the 
context set by the institution.
 Two examples might help  to bring out this core point. First, we can return to the 
property  case. Suppose I am committed to the view that, outside of social institutions, 
trespassing is not a moral wrong. In this case, I could not argue against some property 
system because it did not proscribe trespass. Whether a property system proscribes 
trespassing has no direct bearing on whether it is a good or bad property system. 
However, I can recognize that trespassing might be wrongful when a property system is 
established. While I do not think trespassing is wrongful when assessing the institution of 
property, I can think it is wrongful within an institutional context. 
 Second, we can imagine a simple case where talents are not morally  arbitrary. 
Suppose the members of our society  agree that high-quality music is a public good worth 
investing in. In this case, we might think that it is worth funding public education in 
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music and we might recognize the value of getting students started early in this 
education. Suppose we then establish a system of schools where those who seem to have 
exceptional musical talent are awarded a free and high-quality education in music. If such 
a system were justified, then those identified as having exceptional musical talents 
deserve the free education. If any particular child with sufficient talent were purposively 
denied the education--perhaps by a sinister administrator with nepotistic motives--we 
would recognize that the child was wronged. Yet, this wrong is not explained by a natural 
right to free musical education. The child was wronged because they  were denied a right 
established by their particular institutions. If the musical education institution was 
sufficiently just, then musically talented children have a right to that education. 
 Similarly, a labor market  is a kind of institution, the rules of which put labor-
buyers and labor-sellers at odds with one another. Sellers expect that buyers will want a 
low price and buyers expect that sellers want a high price. The labor price is thus 
established by the prices that buyers and sellers are willing to agree upon. Such an 
institution tends towards an efficient allocation of labor because an individual’s labor is 
then used in the place where it is most demanded. A labor market is efficient, in part, 
because labor sellers aim to get a high price for their labor. The market would not be as 
efficient if they did not do so. 
 While there are many good criticisms of a labor market as a way to distribute 
wages and labor, let us suppose--for the sake of argument--that a labor market can be 
sufficiently just under some conditions. Suppose the gains are greater than the costs, and 
the costs can be offset by  additional institutions like high quality and free education. If a 
123 
labor market can be sufficiently just, then the rights, obligations, and powers that are 
associated with that institution are legitimized according to Rawlsian conventionalism. If 
labor-buyers put a higher price on certain talents, then those with such talents act within 
the rules of the institution in seeking out or accepting that higher price. Their doing so 
contributes to an efficient allocation of labor. In the institutional context of a labor 
market, talents would no longer be morally arbitrary. If the labor market is justified, then 
persons have a right to the wage they can get on the market and their talents might 
explain their being offered that wage.
 Importantly, this argument does not support the libertarian view that an individual 
has a right to that which they can earn on a free market. A person’s claims are determined 
by their institutional context, and this context might be established by more than one 
institution. If a tax system taxes those with higher wages at higher amounts, then 
individuals only  have a claim to their post-tax income.73  Since the labor market is 
justified within a broader context that includes the tax system, individual claims are 
established by both the labor market and tax systems. 
 From Rawls’s perspective, a labor market is justified if it is part of a basic 
structure that satisfies the two principles of justice. He believes that a labor market can be 
sufficiently just because of the gains to efficiency, but his principles place strong 
restrictions on when a labor market would be just. First, the society would be one with 
fair equality of opportunity. This requires that we do not assess a labor market in isolation 
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but see how it relates to an education system and the broader patterns of inequality. 
Second, the society would be one in which the worst off are better off than the worst off 
would be under any other system.74  Third, Rawls suggests that a society that meets the 
two principles of justice will have a state that acts as employer of last resort.75  This 
possibility would insulate individuals from the more rapacious aspects of a labor market. 
When these conditions are met, it  seems far less strange to think that a labor market could 
be a sufficiently  just economic institution. If it is sufficiently  just, then the rights, 
obligations, and powers associated with the institution are legitimate. Persons have a 
valid claim to that which they can earn on the labor market. 
 When persons have a valid claim to what they can earn on the labor market, and 
the market rewards those with certain talents, then persons have a right to the wage they 
earn on the basis of their talents. Within the institutional context of a labor market, talents 
are not morally arbitrary. Instead, persons deserve the wage they earn on a labor market 
and that wage is partly explained by the talents one possesses. 
 For this reason a person can simultaneously  (a) accept the justification for the 
difference principle and (b) claim a right to higher wages on the basis of their talents, so 
long as they believe that (c) the principles of justice justify a labor market  that gives 
persons a right to a market wage partly  determined by talents. Such a person recognizes 
that talents are morally arbitrary  outside of an institutional context, but are not morally 
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arbitrary within the context established by a labor market. In this way, it is Rawls’s 
commitment to conventionalism that can explain why it is possible that one can accept or 
pursue inegalitarian wages on the basis of their talents. 
3.1.3 Three objections
I want to briefly address three possible objections to this argument.  First, one might 
object that my argument does not really  show that talents are not morally  arbitrary. 
Instead, it only  shows that  persons have a right to what they earn on a labor market. In 
this case, talents would only  be morally relevant insofar as those talents explain the wage 
one can earn on a labor market. The talent itself is not morally  relevant, but  merely the 
wage one is able to get. After all, having adequate talent does not entitle anyone to a 
wage or a job---as many a professional philosopher can attest to. According to this 
objection, talents are still morally  arbitrary in a sufficiently just labor market because 
talents do not actually  determine any claim. I only have a claim to what I can earn, it just 
so happens that talents might explain why I am offered some wage.
 I think this objection is broadly  correct. I recognize that my argument does not 
directly  explain why talents are not morally  arbitrary in an institutional context. However, 
I do not  think this changes the broader argument in any  way. A person might cite their 
talent as the reason they were offered a wage, and it  is the fact that they were offered the 
wage in a sufficiently  just market that gives them a claim to this wage. I have chosen to 
talk about the arbitrariness of talents because that is the language that Shiffrin and Cohen 
use, but I do not think that refining our language would substantially  change their 
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argument or my response. In either case, Shiffrin would find the pursuit of inegalitarian 
incentives wrongful whereas I argue that persons have a conventional right  to such 
incentives by the rules of a justified institution. 
 The second objection would claim that, “if this argument shows that talents are 
morally relevant for wages, can it equally show that race, gender or sexuality are morally 
relevant?” If my argument seemed to justify such discrimination, it would be a severe 
problem. Yet, unless one thinks that a labor market could never be sufficiently just or that 
a bigoted market could be just, the two cases will not be similar.76  My argument 
presupposes that a labor market can be sufficiently just, but  I doubt that a labor market 
that established claims on the basis of race, gender, or sexuality  could be sufficiently 
just.77  While a labor market might be part of a society that satisfied the two principles of 
justice, markets that  discriminate on the basis of race, gender and sexuality  would not be. 
Accordingly, a labor market  that discriminated on the basis of race, gender or sexuality 
would not establish legitimate claims in the same way that a market that discriminated on 
the basis of talents could. 
 The third objection points out a deeper problem of Rawlsian conventionalism. 
The two principles of justice specify what a fully just society would be like. They express 
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an ideal for a society. Yet, an institution only needs to be sufficiently just for that 
institution to establish rights, obligations and powers. We would not think that only the 
very best property system would establish property  rights. Instead, the property system 
only needs to be sufficiently  just. Likewise, we have a right to market wage even when 
the labor market is not part of an ideally  just society. Instead, it only needs to be part of a 
sufficiently just society. 
 Rawls does not give any general principles about when a basic structure would be 
“sufficiently” just. So, we could not use Rawls’s theory  to determine whether we--in our 
imperfect institutions--have a right to what we earn on a labor market. We would first 
need to argue about when institutions are sufficiently just before we could settle that 
argument, and that is a complex problem far from the current point.
 While Rawlsian conventionalism is limited in this way, it does not  limit its 
effectiveness against  Shiffrin’s argument. This is because Shiffrin focuses on the specific 
case of the well-ordered society in which all members accept the two principles of justice 
and their justification. Accordingly, whether the institutions they live under are 
sufficiently just is not an issue. After all, the institutions are fully just. So, the difficulties 
that arise when we try to specify  when institutions are sufficiently just do not arise. This 
difference is relevant for us to decide how we ought to act in the here and now, but it  does 
not represent a problem for Rawls’s ideal theory. 
3.1.4. How extensive is an institutional context?
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The significance of this argument goes beyond providing a Rawlsian response to 
Shiffrin’s argument. It  serves as an example of the way in which considerations within an 
institutional context are distinct from those outside that institutional context. In this case, 
the fact that the labor market establishes certain claims to wage shows why talents are not 
morally arbitrary within an institutional context. The fact that persons have such claims, 
however, has nothing to do with whether a labor market  is justified. We do not justify a 
labor market because the talented have certain claims, but the talented might have those 
claims within an institutional context. In the example of property, trespass becomes a 
moral consideration within an institutional context but it is irrelevant  for evaluating the 
property system itself. 
 The arguments of Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 appealed to the ways in which 
practices can establish new obligations, rights, and powers. That  is all my  argument relies 
on, but these same ideas might  be extended further to recognize other effects that 
practices might have on the particularities of ethical life. The fact that a particular 
practice is practiced might not only  ground demands and claims but also explain the 
emergence of certain values, virtues, and relationships. While I have focused on more 
rule-based features of moral life, the influence of social practices likely carries over to 
features of ethical life that are much less ordered. In this section, I want to suggest how 
my argument might be extended in this direction. 
 To show how this might be the case, I want to offer some possible examples for 
how the choice of particular basic structure institutions might  affect the relationships, 
ideals and self-conception of members of society. I do not suppose that any evidence 
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favors these stories, but I mean to show how our institutional context might effect ethical 
life beyond the obligations, rights, and powers directly specified by the basic structure 
institutions. 
 First, we might suppose that differences in the economic structure will create 
differences in how we view our relationships with others. For instance, one might 
stipulate that a capitalist  economic structure relies on competition in the labor market. In 
a competitive labor market, individuals are situated towards others as rivals. In order to 
achieve one’s goal of securing an occupation, one must out perform other members of 
society who vie for that job. While this mentality has its primary  manifestation in the 
adult search for jobs, it could easily spread to earlier stages of education; a competition 
for spots at universities gives rise to a competition for top-level classes and gives rise to a 
competition in high school, middle-school, elementary school, and pre-school. Children 
would then be raised against a background of competition against one another and 
parents would be aware that this is the relationship with which their children stand. Of 
course, this is not to suggest  that all children or parents will necessarily be competitive, 
but only that the capitalist economic structure tends to make persons more competitive 
than alternative economic structures. The relationship between persons is partly  a 
relationship  of competition. This differs substantially from the way in which G.A. Cohen 
envisions the relations of socialist society in which persons view one another through the 
spirit of fraternity.78  If such a socialist economic structure were able to counter 
competitive tendencies, then persons might view their relationships with one another as 
130 
78 See Why Not Socialism? (Princeton University Press, 2009).
part of a larger “siblinghood.” While this might seem far more appealing than a society of 
individuals in competition, it might also have different unfortunate results beyond a 
reduction in production. For instance, if each individual understood him or herself as 
related to the social family, this attitude might encourage social homogeneity. Persons 
would be hesitant to explore new ways of life and pursuits, and there would not be the 
diversity of pursuits available in a capitalist society. 
 Likewise, we could see why an individual’s conception of themselves might be 
influenced by the contingencies of the social structure. For instance, in a capitalist 
economy with a free labor market, and individual might conceive of themselves partly in 
terms of what their assets in such a labor market are. In a sense, the individual comes to 
see himself or herself as having “human capital”. The person with experience in the field 
of retail sales might come to identify  themselves partly as a retail salesperson (as others 
might as well). More troubling, the person who cannot find a job might come to see 
themselves as being less valuable of a person merely because they see themselves as less 
valuable on the job market. Here, the individual identifies his personal value with the 
market value of his skills. One might suppose that in a socialist  economy, individuals 
would be less likely to view themselves in terms of their human capital. Instead of being 
individualized atoms competing in a chaotic and alien labor market, they see themselves 
as having a place in democratically  planed production scheme. In this economic system, 
persons may be more likely to see themselves in terms of their contribution to society’s 
projects. However, persons might also come to see themselves merely as parts of these 
projects and not as self-standing and full individuals. In understanding themselves in 
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terms of their role in society’s projects, they may be less likely to identify themselves 
with their human capital, but also less likely to identify themselves with their own goals 
and aspirations--atomistic as those might be.
 With these differences in mind, we can likewise see why  different ideals might be 
emphasized in a society with a capitalist economic structure than an socialist structure. In 
the competitive and labor-differentiated markets of capitalism, it would be unsurprising if 
the public culture emphasized the ideals of individual achievement and self-perfection. 
Likewise, insofar as capitalism tends to engender commercialism across its culture, the 
ideals of personal happiness would be emphasized and associated with the accumulation 
of goods. Alternatively, in a more socialist structure, the social ideals of solidarity might 
be emphasized while the ideals of achievement and individuality are degraded. 
 What holds for the way  in which the choice of economic structure impacts 
relationships, self-conception, values and obligations also holds for our choice over other 
aspects of the basic structure. While it is much more difficult to imagine alternative 
family structures than economic or political structure, it is much easier to recognize how 
differences in family  structure might change a society’s public understandings. Likewise, 
choice between government forms would be fundamental in how persons conceive of the 
relation between themselves and those with political authority. We can imagine that the 
members of a democracy would have different public understandings from the members 
of an Aristocracy, Plutocracy, Military dictatorship, Theocracy  or Hereditary Monarchy. 
Still we can imagine different schemes of property whereby the class of things that can be 
owed is different or who can own what is different. If the maternal head of a family were 
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recognized as the primary  owner of all property, then public understandings would be 
quite than if all members of a family were recognized as co-owners. 
 When a basic structure protects a certain freedom, the existence of such an 
institutionalized freedom has its own effects. The role the free religious institutions play 
within a basic structure might have a quite profound influence on ethical life. For 
instance, protecting freedom of religion will likely lead persons view their religious 
denomination as a choice. The lesser role that religious institutions have on public life, 
the more likely it is that persons will see these institutions as only part of their social life. 
Rather than seeing themselves as liable for their behavior to the religious official or as 
educating their children through church resources, they may see the religion as a resource 
for personal, social and spiritual fulfillment. This will tend to impact the ways in which 
religious officials interact with members as religious institutions seek ways to better 
address the expectations and needs that members come to them with. More noticeably, a 
plurality  of religious organizations will likely create an environment of pluralism. 
Optimistically, this might lead persons to better come to appreciate a diversity of views as 
well as better know their own beliefs in all the ways that J.S. Mill suggests. 
Pessimistically, it might lead to a kind of society that Marx warns about as public life 
becomes a the space of satisfying wants, and persons treat other members of society as 
means to their ends. In either case, the religious organizations themselves are not part of 
the basic structure, but the freedom that allows free worship is. This freedom itself has 
profound ethical effects. 
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 In each case, the choice of basic structure institutions has a much broader effect 
on ethical life than what is immediately  obvious. The choice of an economic structure has 
a broader effect than merely  efficiencies in production or employment rates, the choice of 
family has broader effects than health and education of children, the choice of a 
government has a broader effect than control over coercive power, and the choice of a 
property  scheme has a broader effect than the control over material objects. In each case, 
the choice of a basic structure institutions exercises direct impact on our public 
understandings and thereby on our relationships, self-conception values and (especially) 
obligations.
 There are difficult questions about the extent to which an economic structure 
affects the content of ethical life as opposed to merely affecting our perception of that 
content. If a socialist economy has the tendency to stifle individuality, that does not make 
individuality any less morally significant. If a capitalist economy tends to stifle social 
solidarity, that does not make solidarity any less significant. In this case, the economy 
merely influences our perception of what is significant. However, the influence of social 
institutions is still worth our attention if the major social institutions merely change our 
perception of ethical life. The fact that our relationships and values are affected by 
particular institutions is reason to evaluate the institutions differently  from our individual 
choices within those institutions. Beyond this, we should not diminish the extent to which 
our perception of our values, virtues, and relationships affects what is actually ethical. 
How we should live our lives is often partly  dependent on how those around us our living 
their lives. The fact that persons hold certain ends or think about their relationships in 
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specific ways gives us some reason to value those ends and act within those relationships. 
Otherwise, we risk acting as Prince Myshkin amongst St. Petersburg’s Yepanchins. 
Living with others in a social world affects what ends we should hold and the terms 
within which we should affect others. While the extent to which our institutions affect the 
actualities of ethical life versus our perspective of ethical life is a difficult question on 
which much more should be written, but I think the arguments of this section emphasize 
the great influence of social institutions regardless of how you answer that question. 
 This all suggests that our institutional context is quite extensive. Which values, 
virtues, relationships, obligations, rights, and self-conceptions are specific to our 
institutional context and which are independent of that context? For my argument to 
succeed, I only need it to be the case that  the obligations, rights, and power established by 
our major social institutions contribute to an institutional context. While much more of 
moral and ethical life might be specific to such a context in the ways discussed above, I 
do not  require that  it  is. The more impact the basic structure has on ethical life, the more 
important and distinctive the basic structure is. I now return to my more limited 
argument, and explain how the establishment of obligations, rights, and powers justifies 
distinct principles for the basic structure. 
3.2 Moral Principles Within and Without an Institutional Context
The aim of this chapter is to show why  the basic structure is a morally distinct subject. In 
§3.1.1 - §3.1.3, I showed why the considerations relevant for evaluating actions within an 
institutional context are different from the considerations relevant for evaluating the 
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institutions that determine that  context. What I have not  yet shown is why this justifies 
developing distinct principles for the basic structure of society. Cohen and Murphy argue 
that, at a fundamental level, the principles that apply  to institutions must be the same as 
the principles that apply to individuals. In §3.2.1, I will show how the difference between 
relevant considerations differentiates the principles that apply within an institutional 
context from those that apply to the institutions that establish that context. Then in §3.2.2, 
I will show why the principles that  apply  to the basic structure are distinct from the 
principles that apply to other institutions/systems. Finally, in §3.2.3, I will explain why 
the principles that apply to the basic structure are distinct from those that  apply to the 
informal norms in a society. 
3.2.1 Deliberative and decisive principles
To make the transition from talking about “considerations” to talking about “principle, I 
need to  make a distinction between two kinds of moral principles; deliberative principles 
and decisive principles. I understand “deliberative principles” as guiding us towards the 
recognition of considerations that are relevant for moral and ethical evaluation. I call 
them deliberative principle because they guide us in our deliberation about moral and 
ethical problems. By contrast, “decisive principles” guide us in reconciling various 
considerations and coming to a final evaluation or decision. They are decisive in the 
sense that they provide the decisive evaluation of that to which they apply. 
 Some moral theories, like forms of intuitionism or pluralism, will only  recognize 
deliberative principles as valid. Such theories suppose that we cannot articulate any final 
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principles that can reconcile relevant considerations. Perhaps autonomy and well-being 
are both irreducible moral considerations, but  there are no principles that determine how 
tradeoffs between the two should be made. Other moral theories will only recognize 
decisive principles as valid. According to such views, the only relevant considerations are 
those that decisive principles identify  as decisive. Since other considerations do not 
ultimately  determine how we should act, they are not really  considerations because they 
should not be considered. A third group of theories might recognize both kinds of 
principles, supposing that we need to understand what considerations are relevant before 
we can make any  decisive judgments. If we think that  decisive judgments are explained 
by a relation between considerations, then we will think both kinds of principles will be 
relevant. 
 In §3.1, I argued that the considerations relevant for evaluating actions within an 
institutional context will be distinct from those that are relevant for evaluating the 
institutions that determine that context. Why does this mean that the principles that apply 
to institutions will be distinct  from the principles that apply  to individual actions? Well, 
that depends on what kind of principles you have in mind. 
 First, if one is concerned with deliberative principles, then such principle will 
need to present the considerations that arise within an institutional context in some way. 
If one is deliberating about whether they  should accept inegalitarian wages, a deliberative 
principle should present the claims that arise within a labor market as a relevant concern. 
In this case, the (deliberative) principles that apply to an action within an institutional 
context will not be the same as those (deliberative) principles that apply to the institutions 
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that determine that context; the principles that apply to actions should represent the 
claims within a labor market whereas the principles that  apply to the labor market itself 
should not. 
 My claim is not that all the principles or considerations that  apply within an 
institutional context  will be different from those that  apply  to the institutions.  Helping 
persons satisfy their basic needs might be a consideration that is relevant for evaluating 
both individual and institutions. Though some considerations might be relevant for each, 
not all are. The crucial point is that the set of considerations relevant for assessing 
institutions is distinct from the set of considerations relevant for assessing individual 
action, so we should distinguish institutional principles from individual principles. 
 Second, if one is concerned with decisive principles, then we need recognize how 
a institutional context ultimately affects what an individual should do. Suppose that two 
different property schemes, A and B, would identify two different people, Y and Z, as the 
owner of a particular object. If we live under property  system A and that system grants 
the property  right to Y, then we think that Z should not claim that property  as her own. A 
decisive principle should recognize this, so decisive principles need to be sensitive to the 
particularities of the institutional context in which they are applied. Y’s ownership of the 
object is only a consideration against Z’s seizing it  within a particular institutional 
context, and our decisive principle should track the relevance of such considerations. 
 So, regardless of whether we are concerned with deliberative or decisive 
principles, the principles that apply to individual actions within an institution’s context 
should be distinct from those that apply to that institution. It should then be no surprise 
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that moral theories that recognize both the validity of both deliberative and decisive 
principles will recognize that principles should be distinct in these two cases. To present 
and track the significance of considerations relevant in an institutional context, the 
principles for the two should be distinct. 
 How does all this bear on the arguments of Cohen and Murphy. Well, Cohen’s 
overall view is concerned with considerations that are represented by fundamental 
principles. Suppose we recognize that equality, autonomy, and well-being are always 
significant for any moral problem.  Cohen wants to argue that we address moral problems 
by seeing how they  relate to these fundamental values, regardless of whether we are 
evaluating institutions or individual conduct. I can agree with this. I only maintain that 
we do not only evaluate individual actions by these fundamental moral values. The 
considerations that are particular to an institutional context are also relevant. The fact  that 
our institutions specify  obligations, rights, and powers is also relevant to evaluating 
action. Our moral principles must also present the particularities within an institutional 
context as relevant, and these considerations can oftentimes change our overall evaluation 
of an action. It might be permissible for a person to enhance inequality within a justified 
labor market if that labor market grants her a claim to such incentives. I do not need to 
deny that equality, autonomy, and well-being are fundamental values to recognize that the 
set of considerations relevant for evaluating actions within an institution’s context are 
distinct from those relevant for evaluating that institution. 
 A similar point applies to Murphy’s argument. Murphy emphasizes that  the same 
fundamental principles should apply  to individuals and institutions. I will have more to 
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say on Murphy’s complete argument in §5.1, but let me give a preliminary reply here. So 
long as we recognize that our institutions can establish obligations, rights, and powers, 
then the considerations relevant for evaluating actions will be distinct in an institutional 
context. Fundamental principles will still apply to both individuals and institutions, but 
there will be additional (and often decisive) considerations that apply to individual action. 
 At this stage, I have shown (a) that the considerations relevant for evaluating 
individual action within an institutional context are distinct from those relevant for 
evaluating the institutions that establish that context, and (b) that the principles that apply 
to individual actions in that context  are distinct from the principles that apply  to the 
institutions. This does not yet get me to the claim that the basic structure is a distinct 
moral subject. After all, the basic structure is not constituted by all institutions, but  only 
those that establish our obligations, rights, and powers as members of society. First, I 
need to explain why it would be that principles for the basic structure would be morally 
distinct from the principles for other institutions or practices. I do so in §3.2.2. Second, I 
need to explain why  the principles for the basic structure would be morally distinct from 
the principles for the network of informal norms that also have a role in shaping ethical 
life. I do this in §3.2.3. 
3.2.2 Institutions and the Basic Structure
What would justify  treating the basic structure differently from other institutions? So far, 
I’ve only discussed the difference between principles that apply to actions in an 
institutional context and the principles that apply  to the institutions that establish that 
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context. However, it would be wrong to think that individual actions are the only subject 
evaluated within an institutional context. Our social practices and institutions shape the 
moral context relevant for assessing individual actions, but  they  also shape the moral 
context relevant for assessing other practices. Sometimes an institution will be justified 
only because of the role it plays within a particular institutional context. What 
differentiates the basic structure from other institutions is that our assessment of the basic 
structure should not be sensitive to any  institutional context whereas  our assessment of 
other institutions often should be. In this way, my strategy to distinguish principles for the 
basic structure from institutional principles more generally is merely  an extension of my 
argument for distinguishing principles that apply to institutions from those that apply  to 
actions within an institutional context.
 To see why the assessment of the basic structure should be insensitive to moral 
context in a way that other institutions do not need to be, we need to look again towards 
what the basic structure is and why  it is morally  indispensable. The basic structure is that 
system of social institutions that establish our obligations, rights, and powers as members 
of society. In so doing, it forms a social background against which the various other 
practices and institutions in society  are formed. Accordingly, these other practices and 
institutions will often need to take into consideration the institutional context established 
by the basic structure institutions. It is because various practices and institutions are 
situated within a basic structure that we should treat the basic structure differently  from 
these other institutions. The basic structure is not situated within any other institutions 
that its assessment should be sensitive to. 
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 As an example, consider our assessment of a particular educational practice--such 
as the  admission tests like the SAT and ACT. This practice is not itself part of the basic 
structure because there is nothing about the practice that  establishes obligations, rights or 
powers as members of society. Instead, the practice is a general understanding amongst 
students and admission officials about what one needs to do to get into a college. If we 
want to assess the practice, we need to look at how it fits within the various practices 
around it. We should look at the role that college plays in the job market, at the ways in 
which high school prepares students for the test, and so on. Our assessment of the 
educational practices as a whole requires that we see how education fits within the larger 
society. How does education prepare students for the life they will live? Does it prepare 
them for the economy? Does it prepare them to contribute to a democracy? In this way, 
we assess our educational practices as within the basic structure institutions of the 
political constitution and economic system, and we assess the admission tests within this 
education system. Now, if we assess the individual actions of students, teachers, and 
administrators that are related to admission tests, we need to see their actions as within 
these practices. So, the actions of individuals are within an institutional context, but the 
practices are also within such a context. The basic structure, however, sets the 
fundamental rules in society around which various other practices are formed. This 
distinguishes the basic structure as uniquely removed from the moral context established 
by institutions. 
 Now, the explanation that I give here should not be confused for a mistaken 
historical theory. I recognize that the particularities of the basic structure that one lives 
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within were not created first and followed by the creation of other institutions. I 
recognize that the institutions that constitute the basic structure were themselves 
developed against a moral context composed of particular practices and norms that were 
themselves within another basic structure. The point is not to say that the assessment of 
other institutions should be sensitive to the moral context established by the basic 
structure because the basic structure institutions are temporally prior. Instead, the idea is 
that the rules of the basic structure institutions apply to all persons in a society, and so 
they  apply  to persons engaged in other institutions within society. Accordingly, the 
background that the basic structure sets is a background for these other institutions. It is 
not because the basic institutions came first, but because their rules set a background for 
the activities of other practices that  we need to assess these other practices within the 
moral context set by the basic structure. 
 For example, we can recognize the activities that religious organizations engage 
in will be limited by the basic structure institutions. If our society establishes certain 
basic rights, then the activities of religious organizations need to respect  these rights. 
Whatever property system is recognized designates what  property  rights these groups 
have. What economic system we live within determines how the group can fund itself. In 
these cases, it is within the broader systems of the basic structure that religious activities 
proceed and religious groups are sustained. Even if we carve out exemptions for religious 
groups, for example by allowing gender to be a factor in hiring, it  is a feature of our legal 
institutions that grants that exception. It might be the case that the basic structure of 
society is explained because of the structure and influence of these religious groups, but 
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that does not change the fact that their activities are now bound by their rules. Even if the 
historical story  is one in which the religious traditions explain the basic structure, the 
normative story is that the religious traditions are now within a moral context set against 
the rules of the basic structure. 
 One might object that the basic structure is situated within another institutional 
context, the global structure. It might seem like the particularities of the global structure 
should influence our evaluation of the basic structure, thus reducing the centrality of the 
basic structure as subject. In response to this objection, I want to return to the response 
made in §2.3.2. There, I argued that the global structure is constituted by  norms that bind 
governments whereas the basic structure is constituted by norms that bind individuals. 
Because of this, I think it is wholly  appropriate that  we evaluate the decisions of 
governments as occurring within a global context. However, that does not mean that we 
should evaluate the basic structure as within a global context.79 
 So, the core argument of §3.1 distinguishes institutions generally from the basic 
structure in the same way that it distinguishes actions from the institutions those actions 
occur within. Principles within a context should be sensitive to the particularities within 
that context, but principles that apply to whatever establishes that context (whether an 
institution or system of institutions) should not be so sensitive. Our assessment of college 
entrance exams, for example, needs to be sensitive to the larger context set by the 
education system. The basic structure is distinct as a moral subject because it establishes 
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79 We should also bear in mind that the idea that a state represents the interests of its citizens in 
international relations is itself part of the basic structure of society. In this way, the features of the global 
structure are, in part, best understood as within a context of basic structures (rather than the other way 
around).
a context within which our various other institutions and practices are situated. For this 
reason, the principles that apply  to the basic structure will be distinct from those that 
apply  to other institutions. Principles for other institutions need to be sensitive to the 
moral context established by the basic structure within which they fit, but principles for 
the basic structure do not need to be.
3.2.3 The basic structure and the informal structure
Now, it is of course true that institutions are not the sole determinate of the content of 
ethical life, and this might seem to warrant  an objection to the view. Recall that any 
conception of the basic structure will need to distinguish the basic structure from the 
various informal norms and generalized expectations within a society. These norms and 
expectations might not rise to the level of “institutions,” but they still have profound and 
pervasive effects on social life. Call these various features of social life, the “informal 
structure” of society. 
 Now doesn’t the informal structure of society have as much affect on the content 
of ethical life as the more formal institutions of the basic structure? Couldn’t we also say 
that institutions occur within a context set by  the informal norms of a society? It seems 
just as important that a good society have the right mores as that it have the right 
institutions. Since these norms establish a moral context as well, their assessment seems 
formally similar to the assessment of institutions--if we need to distinguish principles for 
the basic structure because they establish a moral context for other institutions why 
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wouldn’t we distinguish principles for our basic mores on the same basis? If these are so 
similar, then why wouldn’t the principles that apply to one also apply to the other?
 The appropriate response to this criticism is to focus our attention on the 
difference between systems of rules and patterns of behavior. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
we should understand social rules as ostensibly  binding. There are behaviors that are 
identified as right or wrong by  appeal to these rules. By  contrast, the informal norms of 
society do not have this bindingness. They undoubtedly have influence as persons aim to 
either adhere to flout those norms, but they are not rule-like. If persons in society 
generally  celebrate the military, care about equality, or see poetry as the highest form of 
achievement, then that society  will have certain informal norms. It is not until persons 
recognize rules that specify how they ought to act that such norms becomes rules.
 Because of this difference between rules and informal norms, we can ask what 
rules we should have without directly  asking how persons ought to choose. By contrast, 
our concern with the informal structure is fully captured by our concern with how 
individuals should choose. Now, deciding how individuals should choose will always be 
dependent upon their own social context and the complexities of their situation. In 
deciding how the basic structure ought to be, we develop principles that apply to the 
institutions that determine and institutional context whereas principles for the informal 
structure must apply within an institutional context. 
 For example, if a basic structure gives parents the prerogative to choose private 
schools or public schools, certain patterns will emerge wherein certain groups--the rich, 
the religious, the artistic--might tend to enroll their children in private schools more 
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often. If these patterns become sufficiently embedded, they could be considered part of 
the informal structure. In this case, one might say  that persons ought to choose to send 
their children to public school. This would then seem to be a principle that applies to the 
informal structure. However, it is quite difficult to make this claim independent of the 
social context. It will depend on the quality  of education as well as its fit with 
philosophical and religious views. It will depend on the structure of society--with 
democracies perhaps giving stronger reason--and the norms within family life. It will also 
depend upon how that choice is viewed amongst persons, whether it will be seen as elitist 
and selfish or as selfless and encouraging excellence. The particularities of a social 
context seem highly relevant to determining how particular individuals should choose. 
 So, the objection is addressed by carrying through the original distinction that this 
argument is based upon. While individual choices and the informal structure do affect the 
structure of ethical life, the principles that apply to individual choice and the informal 
structure will need to be principles that apply within ethical life because individual 
choices always occur within a social context and the informal structure is constituted only 
by individual choices. The basic structure, as a system of rules, can be assessed outside of 
a particular social context. 
 Of course, none of this is to say that individual choices should not take into 
consideration their effects of the structure of ethical life. In a society where women are 
viewed as having a particular role in the family and in the workforce, then women and 
men ought  to recognize that their own choices have an effect on either reinforcing or 
overriding those traditional ideas. Individuals need to recognize that their personal 
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choices have influence on the structure of ethical life. However, recognizing this does not 
mean that no women ought  to pursue traditional roles if that is their life-plan. To make 
such a broad claim would be insensitive to the complexities of ethical life. Such a 
principle might be appropriate in some societies, but it  will not be in many others. Each 
person should take their effect on ethical life into consideration, but other concerns also 
need to be considered. The point is only that the principles that apply to individual 
choices will, in the end, need to be principles that apply within the particular context of 
an ethical life. The principles that apply to the basic structure should not be.
3.3. Contrast with the Moral Division of Labor
In Equality and Partiality, Thomas Nagel gave an influential justification for developing 
distinct principles for the basic structure that centered on the distinction between 
principles for individuals and principles for institutions. Specifically, he argued that it is 
appropriate to distinguish the two because of a fundamental difference between two 
moral perspectives--one personal and one impersonal. When institutions were assessed by 
appeal to the values of a impersonal perspective, it  allows individuals to pursue those 
values that are particular to the personal perspective. By dividing institutional and 
individual principles in this way, we create a  “moral division of labor” under which we 
are better able to pursue our personal concerns secure in the knowledge that our 
impersonal concerns are secured by our shared institutions. The choice to develop 
principles specifically for the basic structure was justified by this kind of moral division 
of labor.
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 While it was meant as a defense of the Rawlsian focus, Nagel’s interpretation set 
the terms of the debate in ways that were quite favorable to Rawls’s opponents. To many, 
Nagel seemed to say  that institutions were to take care of the requirements of justice so 
that individuals did not have to. Famously, G.A. Cohen argued that  the focus on the basic 
structure licensed capitalistic avarice in personal decisions because institutions and not 
individuals were charged with promoting equality. Liam Murphy tried to show that such a 
distinction was ultimately unsustainable due to the challenges it faced in non-ideal theory. 
Even Nagel was not fully  enthusiastic about the approach he argued for because it did not 
fully avoid conflicts between our values, leaving the possibility of a dissociated self.
 Recognizing these difficulties, Samuel Scheffler offered a new argument on 
behalf of a moral division of labor. This time, he was sure to emphasize that the division 
between institutional principles and individual principles was not justified on the basis of 
the pursuit of self-interest. Instead, he argued from a kind of value pluralism. He started 
from the recognition that we have many important  values, some are more “small-scale” 
and some are more “large-scale.” The small-scale values are typically related to 
interpersonal interaction and individual responsibility. The large-scale values are more 
typically related to impartial concerns like equality, justice and fairness. Prima facie, 
there seem to be conflicts between these kinds of values because acting for the sake of 
one might frustrate acting for the sake of another. This conflict can be represented in two 
kinds of cases. First, persons might live their lives in accordance with the small-scale 
moral values, but feel that they  are failing to adequately respect the large-scale values. 
For instance, a strong dedication to family success might draw resources away  that could 
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be used to benefit the world’s worst off. Second, one might focus on respecting large-
scale values and thereby neglect small-scale values. For instance, a dedication to global 
justice might take one away from one’s family or community in ways that  seem not to 
respect small-scale values. 
 One solution to these possible conflicts is to try and explain one set of values as 
arising from the other. If this were possible, then one could grant deference to the more 
basic set of values in any  possible conflict. This deference might go in two possible ways. 
First, if the rules of interpersonal interaction are explained in terms of the large-scale 
values, then we know that ultimately  we ought to act on behalf of the large-scale values 
in any ostensible conflict. Scheffler identifies consequentialism as taking this approach 
by explaining small-scale values in terms of the large-scale value of universal happiness. 
Second, if the large-scale values can be addressed by proper adherence to small-scale 
values, then the conflict is likewise resolved. Scheffler similarly identifies libertarianism 
as taking this approach and being unconcerned with any large-scale values, such as 
equality or social welfare, that are not addressed by proper respect for small-scale values. 
 Scheffler seeks to avoid both of these approaches and to avoid explaining one 
kind of value in terms of the others. To do so, he recommends a division of moral labor, 
which he identifies with egalitarian liberalism. Such a theory properly respects small-
scale values in interpersonal relations and large-scale values in the design of institutions. 
Accordingly, we assess individual action predominantly by  small-scale values and 
institutions by large-scale values. Whereas Nagel explained the division of labor as 
grounded in two aspects of the self, Scheffler explains the division of labor as grounded 
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in a single capacity to recognize diverse values. It is our responsiveness to both small-
scale and large-scale values that explains why we would distinguish principles for 
institutions from principles for individuals. This allows us to respect both kinds of value. 
 The reason why Scheffler’s view counts as a “division of labor” is because he 
recognizes a guiding aim that we ought to jointly accommodate our values, both large and 
small-scale. What justifies the division of labor is that it is the best way  of accomplishing 
this guiding aim. By dividing labor amongst individuals and institutions, we best 
accommodate this guiding aim similarly  to how we most efficiently produce pins by 
dividing labor according to the different aspects of the pin-making process. Scheffler 
does not suppose that there is some one measure by which our accommodation of values 
can be maximized, so this guiding aim is not like the typical consequentialist aim. 
However, it is nonetheless the effectiveness in accommodating value that justifies 
Scheffler’s division of moral labor. 
 Upon first look, it might not be immediately obvious what kind of distinction 
Scheffler means to draw in dividing “small-scale” from “large-scale” value. If we 
interpreted small-scale values as those that are particular to a local community  and large 
scale values as those that are general across communities, then his arguments would be 
much closer to my own. Under such an interpretation, the small/large distinction would 
be similar to the practice-dependent/practice-independent distinction that I draw. 
However, this is not how Scheffler wants to divide these values. Instead, he identifies 
small-scale values as those that apply to micro-phenomena like interpersonal interactions. 
By contrast, large-scale values are those that apply to macro-phenomena like patterns of 
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distribution. For example, he identifies small-scale values with libertarian concerns over 
interpersonal transactions and identifies large-scale values with utilitarian concerns for 
total welfare. While Scheffler does not give an exact specification for which values are 
small or large, he seems to have something like the micro-phenomena/macro-phenomena 
distinction in mind. Instead of being focuses on micro/macro-phenomena, I rely on  a 
distinction between ethical considerations that are relevant within an institutional context 
contrasted with those considerations relevant for evaluating the institutions that establish 
that context. 
 What makes my distinction possible is the way in which institutions establish 
obligations, rights, and powers. What makes Scheffler’s distinction possible, is a 
commitment to value pluralism. His distinction matters because we have a plurality of 
irreducible fundamental values, some of which more directly  apply to micro-phenomena 
and others which apply to macro-phenomena. Now, it is important to identify  the specific 
kind of pluralism that Scheffler here appeals to because there are at least three ways in 
which we tend to use the phrase. First, we might  recognize “principle pluralism,” which 
holds that there are distinct principles that legitimately apply to different subjects. Both 
my argument and Scheffler’s support “principle pluralism.” After all, we both seek to 
explain why the evaluation of the basic structure is distinct from the evaluation of 
individual conduct. Neither of us, however, argue from principles pluralism because that 
would be begging the question. Principle pluralism is the conclusion and not a premise. 
Second, another kind of pluralism is  “pluralism of the good,” which holds that (a) 
different people can hold different conceptions of what matters in life and (b) these 
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different conceptions can be equally  worthy of respect. Scheffler, myself and Rawls all 
accept pluralism of the good. However, our acceptance of this pluralism is unrelated to 
current arguments. This variety of pluralism has much more to do with an argument for 
liberalism than with an argument for the division of labor. Third, the last  kind of 
pluralism is “meta-normative pluralism,” which holds that  our moral and ethical 
justifications are ultimately grounded in a plurality of fundamental values.  According to 
this view, our justification ultimately bottom out in a plurality of irreducible value. Now, 
neither myself nor Rawls argues from meta-normative pluralism, but Scheffler does. It is 
his commitment to meta-normative pluralism that grounds his moral division of labor. He 
supposes that there are a plurality of principles and the moral division of labor is justified 
because it best allows us to respect our different values without reducing them to one 
another. This justificatory strategy requires a commitment to pluralism that neither mine 
nor Rawls’s own strategy require.
 For this reason, Scheffler’s approach requires more substantive presuppositions 
than my own argument requires. I only need claim that our institutions establish 
obligations, rights, and powers whereas Scheffler needs meta-normative pluralism to be 
the best account of ethics. Even if this is not a significant advantage for my  argument--as 
I think it is--it is nonetheless a clear contrast between our approaches. 
 To better understand this contrast, we should recognize the ways in which meta-
normative pluralism relies on a set conception of our values whereas I argue that many of 
our values are dependent on our social context. The fact that we live in a specific social 
world will tend to bring out certain values that would not be the same in another social 
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world. How we ought to act will be sensitive to those context-dependent values, and not 
merely the set conception of values with which we began. I suspect that any  fundamental 
values that Scheffler might appeal to would be too abstract and amorphous to adequately 
function in our deliberation and justifications. To take a Hegelian point, our abstract 
values always need to be made real, and they are only made real to us within a particular 
social structure. We need a linguistic community to differentiate values, to identify them 
with concrete particulars, and to discuss their nuances with. We need shared practices and 
activities through which to mutually understand one another. Only within a social world 
does it  make sense to identify some abstract and amorphous value without the boundaries 
of a particular word or practice. For that value to function as part of a justification, it 
needs to be given a content that can only exist  in a social world. In different social 
worlds, the particular and real values that  are the shared objects of deliberation will be 
different--even if those real values are ultimately explained as valuable due to their 
connection with a set catalogue of abstract values. By contrast, Scheffler’s argument 
presupposes that  our values are sufficiently  specified prior to a social context such that 
they  could themselves justify a moral division of labor. It seems to me that such a 
justification requires a much more concrete conception of values than would be available 
independent of a social context. 
 To see the present point in a specific example. It seems that Scheffler would like 
to include the values we associate with specific relationships within the range of small-
scale values. In this regard, he might include the relationship between parent and child, 
between husband and wife, between sisters or between old friends. When we use these 
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relationships as justifications, we appeal to the value of these specific relationships. We 
appeal to parent-child relationships or the nature of friendship. Yet, in many ways, these 
relationships are based on conventional terms. The fact that the family or friendship takes 
the form that it  does is not a necessary aspect of human life, but exists within the 
particular form of life that we occupy. Accordingly, there is a clear way in which the 
contours of our social structure shape those values we think relevant for individual 
choices. It is not that there was a value of family prior to and always independent of 
social structure such that  it can be used to justify the shape of our social and normative 
life. Instead, the shape of the social world makes the family values we care about 
particularly understandable and valuable. It is true that the value of such relationships is 
crucially important for personal choices in a way that it is not important for the 
assessment of institutions, but we cannot say that is because there is some determinant 
value of friendship that is always important such that we should structure social life to 
make it part of personal choices. 
 So, the core problem with the division of labor argument provided by Scheffler is 
that it appeals to meta-normative pluralism with a static conception of fundamental 
values. He justifies the division of moral labor--and a normative/institutional scheme 
more generally--by the joint accommodation of a determinate and static set of values. Yet, 
the values that serve as justifications  for us are much more dynamic. They change with 
the social structure, with culture and with the existing normative structure. The argument 
that I appeal to is much more fitted to recognize such dynamic values.
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 We live in a particular social world, and in the particular social world there are 
certain specific things that matter to us and the people around us. Accordingly, the 
justification of actions within that social structure will need to take the specifics of our 
social world into consideration. If it does not do so, it ignores the thick and nuanced ways 
in which we live ethical life. This will differentiate the ethical assessment of actions 
within our social structure from the ethical assessment of actions outside of that  structure. 
Within the structure, we need to pay attention to the particular form that our values take, 
but outside of that  structure it would not be as appropriate to do so. Insofar as Scheffler’s 
account relies on a conception of values that are fully independent of our social structure, 
his account seems problematic. 
3.4 Moral Distinctiveness
In the introduction, I set three tasks for my account. First, it  needed to explain what the 
basic structure is. Second, it needed to explain why the assessment of the basic structure 
is morally indispensable. Third, it  needed to explain why the assessment of the basic 
structure is morally distinct. Accomplishing these three tasks will show why the basic 
structure is a centrally  important ethical subject without relying on any claims about the 
nature of justice. The first two chapters accomplished the first two tasks, and this chapter 
accomplishes the third. In summary, the assessment of the basic structure is morally 
distinct because we need to differentiate the assessment of actions (and institutions that 
are within a moral context established by systems) from the assessment of the practices 
those actions happen within. Since the particularities of the basic structure institutions 
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establish much of the moral context for assessing individual action and the non-basic 
institutions, we need to differentiate the assessment of the basic structure. 
 These arguments should be widely acceptable across any moral theory  that 
recognizes how practices can establish an institutional context. Most simply, we need to 
recognize that our ethical life is best understood as embedded within a complex of 
practices. The assessment of actions needs to be sensitive to the particularities of the 
practices they occur within, and the assessment of practices needs to be sensitive to the 
particularities of the practices that those systems are formed within.
157 
Chapter 4
Limited Conventionalism, Primacy, and the Local 
“That  principles for institutions are chosen first  shows the social nature of the virtue 
of justice, its intimate connection with social practices so often noted by idealists. 
When Bradley says that  the individual is a bare abstraction, he can be interpreted to 
say, without too  much distortion, that a persons’ obligations and duties presuppose a 
moral conception of institutions and therefore that  the content  of justice institutions 
must be defined before the requirements for individuals can be set out.”  
- John Rawls, Theory of Justice, 95
The three preceding chapters have sought to show (1) what the basic structure of society 
is, (2) why it is indispensable as a moral subject, and (3) why its evaluation is distinct 
from the evaluation of other subjects. I argued that the basic structure is the set of 
institutions that establishes our obligations, rights, and powers as members of society. In 
order to evaluate our actions, we often need to evaluate the practices that those actions 
contribute to. Likewise, in order to evaluate our practices, we often need to evaluate the 
systems that those practices contribute to. The institutions that belong to the basic 
structure constitute the system that specifies our role as member of society, so we will 
need to evaluate the basic structure as a whole in order to properly evaluate the 
institutions that belong to it. How we evaluate these institutions should be quite different 
from how we evaluate individual action because individual actions occur within the 
social context established by these institutions. Our evaluation of individual action should 
be sensitive to this social context whereas our evaluation of institutions should not be. 
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 Recently, the focus on the basic structure seems to have fallen out of favor 
amongst political theorists, many of whom have been convinced by G.A. Cohen’s 
criticisms of Rawls. Now, Cohen offers a number of arguments and there is no single 
response that shows all of them to be mistaken. However, the arguments of the last three 
chapters both provide responses to many of Cohen’s arguments and present a perspective 
from which to respond to others. First, Cohen challenges the possibility of distinguishing 
the basic structure from aspects of the informal structure such as an egalitarian ethos. In 
response, Chapter 1 showed the way  in which to distinguish them. Second, Cohen seems 
to think that there is no reason to focus exclusively on the basic structure if justice--as an 
ideal--does not uniquely  adhere to the basic structure. In response, Chapter 2 shows why 
an evaluation of the basic structure is morally indispensable regardless of one’s 
conception of justice. Third, Cohen often claims that we cannot  distinguish the 
fundamental principles that evaluate the basic structure from those that evaluate 
individual action, but Chapter 3 shows a deep  difference between the evaluation of 
institutions and the evaluation of individuals. 
 The value of these arguments, however, does not lie exclusively in their reply to 
Cohen.  The arguments also give a broader perspective for the importance of the basic 
structure of society in moral and political philosophy. Even when we recognize a 
universal or absolute foundation for our moral claims and obligations, we should still 
appreciate how our contingent practices affect the particularities of ethical life. In order to 
appreciate our particular place---with its specific obligations, claims, powers, virtues, 
relationships and values--we need to appreciate the significance of our participation in 
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social practices. In order to properly evaluate our choices within these practices, we also 
need to evaluate these practices. This perspective shows why it is important to focus on 
the basic structure as subject. To evaluate some of the most influential practices--those 
that establish our claims as members of society--we need to evaluate the basic structure 
that they are part of. 
 The goal of this chapter is to better motivate this broader perspective in moral 
theory  and thereby further support my claim that we should focus on the basic structure. 
In §4.1, I want to better specify (a) what my core argument relies on, (b) it’s core 
conclusion, and (c) how it differs from similar arguments. Then, in §4.2, I will emphasize 
the range of moral theories for which my  arguments are relevant. There are undoubtedly 
some moral theories, like Act Consequentialism, that deny  the premises upon which my 
arguments rely. However, my argument fits with a broader range of moral theories than it 
might at first seem. Following this, I give a broader motivation for the perspective that I 
advocate. In §4.3, I argue that treating the basic structure as moral subject can contribute 
to a reconciliation between two seemingly opposed impulses in moral and ethical theory. 
The arguments of this dissertation provide a way  to respect both the universal and local 
features of moral and ethical life. In recognizing the way  in which our practices specify 
the particularities of our ethical life, I respect the local features of morality. However, I 
also respect the universalizing features in requiring that these practices stand in need of 
justification outside of an institutional context. 
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§4.1. What do I claim?
To summarize my core argument in a sentence, we can say “those who accept a limited 
form of moral conventionalism should recognize the primacy of the basic structure as a 
distinct moral subject.” In §4.1.1, I explain what I mean by “a limited form of moral 
conventionalism.” One accepts “conventionalism” if they recognize that moral demands 
or claims can be established by contingent practices. Conventionalism has a bad name in 
moral theory because people think that it  either (a) seeks to explain all our obligations 
and claims as part of social practices, or (b) is some form of relativism. Yet, the form of 
conventionalism that I argue from accepts (a1) only some of our obligations and claims 
are explained as part of social practices, and (b1) that those practices be morally justified 
by appeal to practice-independent values. In this way, I argue from  a limited form of 
conventionalism.
 In In §4.1.2, I argue from limited conventionalism to the “primacy of the basic 
structure as a distinct moral subject.” As I use the phrase, a moral problem has “primacy” 
when we must first address that moral problem in order to fully address other moral 
problems. I argue that the basic structure has primacy because we need to evaluate it 
before we can fully evaluate certain individual choices and institutions. The basic 
structure is a “distinct” subject because we cannot evaluate the basic structure with the 
same principles used to evaluate all others subjects.
 Finally, in §4.1.3, I will show how the argument from limited conventionalism to 
the primacy of the basic structure differs from similar arguments for the Rawlsian focus 
on the basic structure. First, I return to a claim made in the introduction that my argument 
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does not rely  on any conception of justice. Second, I explain how my argument differs 
from the “moral division of labor” argument offered by Scheffler and Nagel. Third, I 
differentiate my view from one which identifies the basic structure as instrumentally 
necessary  for social cooperation. While I do not make any claim that these arguments are 
wrong, I think they require more contentious commitments than my own arguments. 
4.1.1. What does the arguments rely on?
My arguments rely on a commitment to, what I call, “limited conventionalism.” Here, I 
characterize conventionalism as the view that social practices can determine the 
particularities of moral and ethical life. While there is a tradition that exclusively uses the 
phrase “convention” to refer to strict coordination games, I use it  in the broader sense to 
refer to any practice structured by rules. So understood, there can be a wide range of 
conventionalist theories. Some are fully  relativist in that there is no part of ethical or 
moral life beyond our contingent way of life. My argument relies on a very different form 
of conventionalism. In this section, I want to better explain what this limited form of 
conventionalism requires
 First, I do not claim all obligations, rights, and powers are practice-dependent. For 
example, the argument is consistent with practice-independent obligations to tell the 
truth80  or to help others.81  Whether any particular aspect of ethical life is practice-
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80 Of course, we could recognize assertion as a social practice and then asserting what you take to be true or 
what you take to be false would be practice-dependent in some sense. Yet, even if assertion is practice-
dependent, this does not mean that every form of indicating beliefs is practice-dependent, so lying (or 
indicating that you have beliefs that you do not have) could perhaps exist without assertion or other social 
practices.
81 For more on this perspective, see Herman, Barbara. "The Scope of Moral Requirement." Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 30.3 (2001): 227-256.
dependent will always be open to debate. For example, the demands of promise-keeping 
and the family may or may not be practice-dependent. The demands involved in line-
waiting seem to be conventional but there is always the possibility  of an argument that 
they are not. 
 My argument need not show exactly which features of moral and ethical life are 
or are not practice-dependent. However, I do suppose that a property system, legal 
system, political constitution and economic structure are examples of practices that 
establish obligations, rights, and powers. Whether our practices create these demands and 
claims ab nihilo or whether they specify our vague pre-existing rights does not need to be 
settled by  my current claim. I do not need to claim that all obligations, rights and powers 
are established by social practices in order to claim that these institutions establish new 
obligations, rights, and powers. 
 Second, I do not claim that “if a practice gives rise to new claims, then it is part  of 
the basic structure.” I recognize the possibility  of practices, like line-waiting, that are 
morally significant and are not assessed as part of the basic structure. Whether line-
waiting is a good practice does not depend on how it contributes to the system of claims 
we have as members of society in the way that the major social institutions do. 
 Third, I have not claimed that there is one and only one moral theory that  can 
ground practice-dependent claims. I have not exclusively appealed to the principle of fair-
play, a consent theory, or a conception of our roles82  in order to ground practice-
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82 For an example of the last type, see Michael Hardimon’s "Role Obligations." The Journal of Philosophy 
(1994): 333-363.
dependent claims. Instead, my arguments are consistent with any of these ways to ground 
practice-dependent claims and many others. So long as a theory can explain why 
practices change our moral demands, that is sufficient for the view I hold. 
 All together, a moral theory is “conventionalist” insofar as it recognizes that social 
practices can give rise to new moral demands, and it is “limited” insofar as it recognizes 
that there are features of moral and ethical life that are not explained by social practices. 
My argument relies only on limited conventionalism as a feature of complete moral 
theories and it does not itself require a particular moral theory. Kantians, Intuitionists, 
Hegelians and even some varieties of consequentialism might accept limited 
conventionalism, and my argument will apply to those theories. 
4.1.2 What is the core conclusion?
From a commitment to limited conventionalism, I argue that the basic structure has 
primacy as a distinct ethical subject. The “primacy” of the basic structure refers to the 
way in which we must evaluate the basic structure in order to evaluate the actions and 
practices that are part of the basic structure. In this section, I will better explain how the 
arguments of Chapters 2 and 3 support the primacy of the basic structure as a moral 
subject. 
 In Chapter 2, I argued that in order to fully  evaluate individual action, we often 
need to evaluate the practices of which that action is a part. If this is the case, then the 
evaluation of the practice has primacy over the evaluation of the individual action that is 
part of the practice. In this sense, primacy  identifies an “order of evaluation;” in order to 
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fully  evaluate individual action, we first need to evaluate practices. Likewise, in order to 
fully  evaluate certain practices, we first  need to evaluate the systems of which they are a 
part. The major social institutions are part of the system that is the basic structure, so the 
basic structure has primacy in the order of evaluation. First, we evaluate the basic 
structure, which allows us to fully evaluate the major social practices, which in turn 
allows us to fully evaluate the actions that are part  of these institutions. The basic 
structure has this kind of primacy, and it is because it has this primacy that it  is an 
indispensable subject. 
 Importantly, this order of evaluation is only needed for a “full evaluation” of 
individual action. We can surely assess action in some way without assessing the practice 
of which it is a part, but  any such evaluation would be incomplete. For a full evaluation 
of the individual action we need to see how it contributes to the social practices it is part 
of. Since these practices will have moral effects that are not reducible to the moral effects 
of individual action, we need be concerned with how individual actions contribute to 
these practices. Likewise, an evaluation of practices will be incomplete if we do not 
consider how that practice fits with others in a system. In order to properly evaluate 
actions and practices, we need see them as contributing to broader practices and systems. 
 To see the significance of the primacy of the basic structure, I want to return to an 
issue discussed in Chapter 3. G.A. Cohen has recently argued that those who hold 
equality  to be an important aspect of social justice should be concerned with how 
individual actions (and not only institutions) impact equality . Many egalitarians have 
jobs that  provide them with incomes that far exceed a society’s median income. In 
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accepting these wages, we seem to be contributing to inequality in some way. If persons 
were willing to forgo these inegalitarian incentives, wouldn’t we have a more equal 
world? Doesn’t  our concern for equality  give us reason to reject higher wages when our 
receiving those wages does not promote equality?
 According to my argument, we cannot merely  look at the individual choice to 
accept inegalitarian incentives and then evaluate it outside of its social context. Our 
decision to accept higher wages is situated within a set of institutions, the most prevalent 
of which is a labor market. In theory, A labor market promotes efficiencies by (generally) 
distributing labor to the places where it can produce the greatest monetary value. If 
persons generally  refused inegalitarian wages, it is not clear that a labor market could do 
this as well.83  This raises questions about the role of a labor market  in society. Is it a 
justified institution? Do its advantages in efficiency  justify  its inegalitarian effects? Is the 
individuality that it encourages an advantage or disadvantage? When our action, as part 
of a well-functioning labor market, is ultimately justified depends--in part--on our moral 
assessment of the labor market. Moreover, we cannot adequately  assess the labor market 
in isolation. Instead, we need to see how it works alongside our educational system, 
unemployment system, tax system, and much else. A labor market in one society might 
be morally  heinous whereas it’s bad effects might be offset  by other institutions in 
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83 Even if we assume--as Joseph Carens does in Equality, Moral Incentives, and the Market: An Essay in 
Utopian Politico-Economic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981)---that persons were fully 
motivated by a concern for equality, then we would still need competition amongst workers to secure the 
greatest income. There are informational advantages involves in a well-functioning labor market, and those 
who want to work where their work best promotes the position of the worst off might not know how they 
can do so. That is why Carens supposes that our obligation to help meet social needs manifests itself as a 
obligation to maximize pre-tax income, which is then redistributed as equal shares of income. Our question 
would then be whether a Carens-system would be morally better than a system in which persons received 
an income more associated with the price of their labor.
another society. Accordingly, our moral assessment of the labor market depends on our 
evaluation of the basic structure of which it is part. It is in this sense that the basic 
structure has evaluative primacy. In order to fully  evaluate our actions in the labor 
market, we need to first evaluate the labor market of which it is a part. In order to fully 
evaluate that labor market, we need to first evaluate the basic structure of which it is part. 
 With this example, we can also return to the distinctiveness of the basic structure 
as subject. Our evaluation of individual action should be sensitive to the social context 
determined by institutions like the labor market. Whether a person acts rightly depends 
on the obligations, rights, and powers established by institutions. Our evaluation of 
certain practices should be sensitive to the social context in which those institutions are 
situated. Our evaluation of the labor market, for example, needs to be sensitive to other 
features of the basic structure. By  contrast, our evaluation of the basic structure should 
not be sensitive to such social context. Since it influences so much of our social context, 
it needs to be justified separately  from this context. In this sense, it should be distinct 
from our assessment of individual actions and practices that are part of systems. 
 This argument only puts a minimal bar on the ways in which the basic structure is 
distinct as a moral subject. Given the normative structure of social practices, we should 
distinguish the assessment of the basic structure from the assessment of particulars that 
are part of practices or systems. There will be other reasons to distinguish the basic 
structure even further as a moral subject. These further reasons, however, will be specific 
to particular moral theories. Depending on what one thinks is important, the basic 
structure might be importantly distinct in other ways. If, for example, one thinks that 
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coercion is a distinct moral problem, we should recognize that that  use of coercion is part 
of (not a defining characteristic of) the basic structure. Our coercive institutions would be 
justified as part of the basic structure, and the basic structure would be distinct for that 
reason as well.84 If one is concerned with, say, society progressing according free and fair 
agreements between persons, then one will be concerned with background fairness.85 
Insofar as the basic structure uniquely effects background fairness, the basic structure will 
be a distinct moral subject for that reason as well. If one has a particular conception of 
justice that identifies the basic structure as a particularly  important site of distributive 
justice, then that is another reason for the basic structure to be distinct. My argument 
does not exclude these additional reasons to distinguish the basic structure. They are 
merely more specific to particular moral theories than my argument is. 
 If one is committed to limited conventionalism, then one should accept the 
primacy of the basic structure as a distinct moral subject. In order to fully evaluate 
individual actions and major social institutions, we need to first  evaluate the basic 
structure of society. This makes the basic structure a crucially  important moral subject  for 
addressing a broader range of moral problems. Moreover, how we should evaluate this 
subject is distinct  from how we should address these other moral problems in at least one 
respect; the basic structure should not be assessed as within a particular social context. 
4.1.3 How Does this Argument Relate to Similar Arguments
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84 In this way, I suggest that those who see the primary problem of political philosophy as the justification 
of coercion should see the evaluation of the basic structure as even more primary. In order to justify state 
coercion, we need to evaluate it as part of the larger social system that it coerces the rules of. 
85 For more on this, see the introduction to Chapter 2.
There have been a range of recent arguments made on behalf of the Rawlsian focus on 
the basic structure, but the above approach is unique in relying on claims about the 
normative structure of social practices. I do not need to show that these other arguments 
are wrong to show why mine is correct, but I nonetheless want to draw a contrast with 
three recent alternatives. For each, I want to highlight the additional assumptions that the 
alternative approach needs to succeed. 
 The most typical argument for the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure relies on 
claims about the nature of justice. These arguments develop a conception of justice that  is 
explicitly institutional. Arguments claim, for example, that justice is an institutional 
virtue or that publicity  is a condition on justice.86  Implicit in these views, as I understand 
them, is an understanding that (a) the basic structure is morally indispensable because 
justice is morally indispensable and (b) the basic structure is morally distinct because 
justice is morally distinct. Accordingly, the basic structure has primacy as a distinct  moral 
subject because justice has primacy as a distinct moral concern. 
 I offer this as the most  “typical” argument because it is the one that I think is most 
often ascribed to Rawls as the basis of arguments.87  It is also the interpretation of Rawls 
that I take Cohen to be primarily  concerned with. Accordingly, it seems to form a sort of 
“starting point” for both criticisms and defenses of the focus on the basic structure. 
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86 Williams, Andrew. "Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity." Philosophy & Public Affairs 27.3 (1998): 
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87 Persons take the claim “Justice is the first virtue of social institutions” to be a claim about the identity of 
justice rather than a claim about what ideal we should use to evaluate institutions. Given the context, this 
can be a strange claim. After all, Rawls immediately compare justice to truth in saying “as truth is [the first 
virtue] to systems of thought.” We do not take this later claim to be a definition of what truth is, yet persons 
are willing to take Rawls’s remark at a definition of justice.
Defenders might try  to show why an institutional conception of justice is appropriate 
while critics show it to be inappropriate. 
 My argument does not rely on any conception of justice. In this way, it  tries to go 
beyond the more typical argument. It is possible that someone will object to my view 
from a particular conception of justice, but I leave that  issue until Chapter 6. My 
argument transcends a particular conception of justice because it shows the importance of 
the basic structure as a moral subject regardless of what  one’s conception of justice is. 
Whether justice is a concern relevant for or the regulative ideal for the basic structure 
does not change the fact  that  the basic structure has primacy as a moral subject. The 
importance of the basic structure does not depend on whether justice is specifically an 
institutional virtue. 
 I have avoided making an argument from a conception of justice because I doubt 
that those with substantively different moral views will agree on a such a conception. 
What determines whether one thinks that a particular conception of justice is the correct 
conception will depend on how that conception fits with their broader views on moral 
methodology, on the nature of justification, and on their substantive convictions. It  is 
undoubtedly an important part  of moral and political theory that we argue about what 
justice requires. At the least, it  facilitates discussion between persons with wholly 
different approaches. However, I doubt that I will be able to convince the reader about the 
primacy of the basic structure on the basis of a conception of justice. Instead, I think it is 
better to show how the primacy of the basic structure fits with more widely acceptable 
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views. I think I am more likely  to get agreement on limited conventionalism than I am 
about a particular conception of justice. 
 A second approach that  has been used to defend the Rawlsian focus on the basic 
structure is an argument from a “moral division of labor.” Both Thomas Nagel and 
Samuel Scheffler have developed versions of such an argument, each relying on remarks 
that Rawls makes in “The Basic Structure as Subject.” According to both versions of this 
argument, not all of our values are best applied to all moral problems. Rather, some 
values are best understood as applying to institutions whereas other values apply to 
individuals. 
 For Nagel, the difference is between personal values, which are recognized from 
our first-personal perspective, and impersonal values, which are recognized from a third-
personal perspective. We best reconcile these two moral perspective when we assess 
institutions in terms of impersonal values and assess individual choice in terms of 
personal value. For Scheffler, the difference is between small-scale and large-scale 
values. He sees the failure of utilitarianism as trying to explain small-scale values in 
terms of large-scale values, and he sees the failure of libertarianism as trying to explain 
large-scale values in terms of small scale values. By  contrast, he recommends the liberal-
egalitarian perspective that can respect both kinds of value without reducing on to the 
other. 
 The moral division of labor argument works particularly well to explain why the 
principles that apply to the basic structure of society would be distinct from those that 
apply  to individual action. That is why I drew an extensive contrast with these views in 
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Chapter 3. The division of labor argument claims that principles should be distinct 
because the values that apply to these subjects are fundamentally  distinct. On its own, 
however, the argument is incomplete in two ways. First, it does not identify what the 
basic structure is in a way that  distinguishes it from other institutions. After all, even if 
we recognize a distinction between institutional and individual principles, why  should we 
distinguish institutional principles that apply to the basic structure from principles that 
apply  to other institutions (including global institutions)? Second. the moral division of 
labor argument does not show why the basic structure is indispensable as a moral subject. 
It shows why the principles that apply to it would be distinct from principles for 
individual action, but it does not show why we need principles for the basic structure as a 
moral subject.
 However, one interpretation of the moral division of labor argument does address 
this second gap. If we understand the moral division of labor argument as showing us (a) 
that justice is  an institutional value, and (b) that the basic structure is uniquely related to 
justice, then this argument would show that the basic structure is indispensable as a moral 
subject. The moral division of labor argument would then be a type of the “conception of 
justice” argument. It  would be an argument for why justice is specifically  an institutional 
value. Insofar as one wants to interpret the moral division of labor argument as an 
argument for the primacy of the basic structure as moral subject, this is the way  in which 
I think it  should be interpreted. It gives us clear reasons to think of justice as uniquely 
tied to the assessment of institutions, and it is because the basic structure is uniquely  tied 
to justice that we should focus on the basic structure. 
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 Yet, I do not advocate the “moral division of labor argument for a conception of 
justice” approach. Such an argument might add additional support to my argument 
through an accompanying conception of justice, but I do not need such an argument. 
Specifically, I do not need to claim anything about a fundamental distinction in our 
values. Instead, I merely claim that social context is important for the evaluation of 
actions and practices. I claim that a proper evaluation of individual action will oftentimes 
require seeing that action as part of a social practice and evaluation of such practices will 
oftentimes require seeing those practices as parts of a system. It might also be the case 
that the proper evaluation of individual action is sensitive to individual values and the 
proper evaluation of institutions should be sensitive to institutional values. That seems 
completely feasible to me, but it  goes beyond the requirements of my argument. Instead, I 
only need to claim that our practices/systems make certain considerations relevant for 
evaluating actions or practices that would not be relevant outside of that practice/system.
 A third approach for defending the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure is the 
idea that the basic structure is understood as the set of institutions that are instrumentally 
necessary for social cooperation. The importance of social cooperation as an end then 
explains the importance of the basic structure as necessary for bringing that end about. As 
an example of this argument, one might read Samuel Freeman as offering an 
interpretation of Rawls that appeals to this “instrumental-necessity” reading. Freeman 
writes that, 
“it’s not  the coercive enforcement of social rules themselves that 
distinguishes basic institutions from other institutions. After all, if 
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everyone freely accepted the application of the rules all the time, coercion 
might never be needed. Rather it’s the reason for coercion, namely that 
basic institutions are essential to social life. The distinctive feature of the 
basic social institutions that constitute the basic structure is that they are, 
in some form or another, necessary for productive social cooperation, and 
hence for the continued existence of any society, particularly any 
relatively modern one.”88
In this passage, Freeman distinguishes a concern with the basic structure from a concern 
with coercion, and he does so on the basis of the relationship between productive 
cooperation and the basic structure. Aresh Abizadeh explicitly reads Freeman as offering 
this “instrumental necessity” interpretation in “Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and 
Coercion.” There, Abizadeh argues that such a justification cannot justifiably limit a 
concern with distributive justice to a domestic basic structure.89
 However, I do not think that this “instrumental necessity” interpretation is the 
only way  to understand the relationship between the basic structure and social 
cooperation. The phrase “necessary” in Freeman’s remarks might be read in two different 
ways. First, it might be that  the basic structure is instrumentally  necessary  for social 
cooperation; it is because the basic structure creates certain conditions that people can 
engage in social cooperation. Second, it might be that  the basic structure is conceptually 
necessary  for social cooperation; we understand “social cooperation” as the kind of 
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of the political, social, and economic institutions that make social cooperation possible and 
productive” (Rawls, 101).
89 Abizadeh, Arash. "Cooperation, Pervasive impact, and Coercion: on the Scope (not Site) of Distributive 
Justice." Philosophy & Public Affairs 35.4 (2007): 318-358.
cooperation that  persons who live in a society engage in with one another. In this way, 
whether Freeman understands the basic structure as instrumentally necessary for social 
cooperation depends on how we understand “necessary.”
 In §1.6, I argued for the view that the basic structure is conceptually necessary for 
social cooperation. Social cooperation consists in the cooperation between members of a 
society in following the rules of the major social institutions. It  is because we understand 
“social cooperation” as this specific kind of cooperation that we recognize a basic 
structure as conceptually necessary for social cooperation. One cannot have social 
cooperation without a basic structure to cooperate in following the rules of. 
 The challenge in thinking that the basic structure is instrumentally necessary  is 
that one must articulate a conception of social cooperation that requires there to be a 
basic structure. How should we think of social cooperation? If social cooperation is 
coordination on fair terms, then we do not need the basic structure to cooperate on fair 
terms. If social cooperation is coordination between strangers, then social norms alone 
may be sufficient for that. Moreover, does this view identify the basic structure as only 
those institutions that are necessary for social cooperation? After all, there could be 
seemingly justified institutions--such as universal health care--that are not necessary for 
social cooperation but might nonetheless be part of the basic structure. 
 Importantly, I recognize that these challenges to the instrumentally-necessary 
approach could be overcome, but  they do highlight a contrast with the conceptually-
necessary  approach that I advocate. I have tried to present a view that sees social 
cooperation as the kind of cooperation that results in society. This cooperation creates 
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obligations, rights, and powers for persons as members of society. The complex social 
world in which we live takes these obligation, rights and powers as setting the 
background for free interaction. Our following these rules allows us to live and plan more 
stable lives. We define the basic structure as the institutions that  persons follow the rules 
of as members of society. In this way, the basic structure is conceptually  necessary  for 
social cooperation. 
 Altogether, I claim that it  is limited conventionalism that explains the primacy of 
the basic structure as an ethical subject. It is not a particular conception of justice, a 
division of moral labor, or the independent importance of social cooperation. It  is because 
the major social institutions establish new obligations, rights, and powers for individuals 
as members of society. In order to fully  evaluate these institutions and the actions that 
occur within them, we need to first evaluate the basic structure of society. 
§4.2. The Scope of the Argument across Moral Theory
My argument relies on limited conventionalism, which not all moral theorists will accept. 
However, a much broader range of moral theorists can (and should) accept limited 
conventionalism than one might  think. In §4.2.1, I explain the conditions under which a 
foundationalist moral theory is consistent with my arguments. In §4.2.2, I focus on the 
deeper significance that my arguments have for constructivist moral theories. All this will 
set the stage for the broader arguments offered in §4.3, which seeks to better motivate the 
approach that this section claims is widely accessible across moral theories. 
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§4.2.1 First principles and limited conventionalism
As I understand “foundationalism,” it is the view that all justifications must  ultimately 
appeal to some first principle or set of first principles. With such a view, the primary task 
of moral theory is to identify  the first principles and then determine how they relate to 
particulars. There is not anything about foundationalism, per se, that necessarily supports 
or undermines the argument I offer. Whether foundationalism is consistent with limited 
conventionalism will depend on the  specific foundational principles that  one advocates. 
Certain foundational principles will allow institutions to establish obligations, rights and 
powers. Other foundational principles will not. In this section, I want to better explain the 
difference. 
 To begin, let me give two toy  examples of foundationalist theories that are 
consistent with limited conventionalism. First, imagine a moral theory  that identifies self-
realization as the end of all ethics, however, the self that is realized is a socially-
determined self in a specific social world. This moral theory  resembles the view that 
Bradley sketches in the “My Station and Its Duties” chapter of Ethical Studies. Here, 
there is a single foundational moral principle: realize your self. Yet, the institutional 
context created by our institutions is centrally important in specifying the self that needs 
to be realized. At least part of ourselves is determined by our role in social life, so the 
specifics of our role are significant for morality  and ethics. Second, imagine a theory  that 
consists of a number of foundational principles, one of which is the Principle of Fair Play. 
This principle requires individuals to follow the rules of those social practices that are (a) 
fair to each participant, and (b) advance their interests. According to this moral theory, 
177 
what particular obligations we have will be partly  determined by which social practices 
exist in our society. In this way, the particular institutions that exist  will affect what 
obligations we have. In either of these two examples, we have moral theories that 
ultimately  justify  any  judgment on the basis of foundational principles and are consistent 
with limited conventionalism. 
 What allows these theories to support limited conventionalism is that some 
particular judgments are justified indirectly (rather than directly) by  the foundational 
principles. For example, if my particular social role includes being a participant  in a 
democracy, then either example theory could (potentially) explain why I have an 
obligation to vote. According to the first, we could explain my role as citizen as part of 
my identity. Realizing my self would then require that I fulfill the part of my identity  that 
is consistent with being a citizen, and I should then take up the duties of citizenship. If I 
were to live in a different form of government, however, I would not have these same 
duties. According to the second view, we can understand a democratic form of 
government as a particular social practice that  advantages the citizenry. In order to 
support this practice, I owe a contribution that is specified by the rules of the practice. If 
the political system requires citizens to vote, then I should vote in order to support the 
system. Again, if there were a different political system, I would not have these same 
obligations. In both cases, I have obligations that are particular to my social context, and 
these obligations are grounded indirectly  by fundamental principles of self-realization 
and Fair Play that are applied to my particular political structure. 
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 By contrast, there are also versions of foundationalism that are inconsistent with 
limited conventionalism. For example, Act-Consequentialism (AC) does not explain how 
social practices could establish obligations, rights, or powers. For the sake of argument, 
let us define AC as the view that an action is right if that action promotes the best 
consequences. Undoubtedly, AC can recognize that a practice can change which actions 
are those that promote the best consequences. In this way, the fact that an action takes 
place within an institutional context can change our evaluation of that action. However, 
our evaluation is not  changed because the action is part of a practice but because the 
prevalence of a practice has changed the causal path by which we can promote the best 
consequences. 
 To see this point more clearly, recall that AC does not really recognize an 
obligation to follow the rules of property. It can say that we should often follow the rules 
of property, but it is not because we have an obligation to follow the rules. Rather, we 
should only do that which a property system requires when we promote the best 
consequences by doing so. When we do not promote the best  consequences, we do not 
have moral reason to follow the rules of property. According to AC, it might be good that 
persons think they have such an obligation, and it might also be good that persons have a 
disposition to follow the rules. AC can even claim that it  is good that property rules are 
coercively enforced and good when coercion is used against someone who acts rightly in 
breaking the rules of property. All these claims are consistent with AC, but it  is not 
consistent with AC to claim that we have an obligation to follow the rules of property. 
179 
 AC would reject limited conventionalism because, according to AC, practices do 
not change our obligations, rights, and powers. Practices can change the causal paths by 
which to satisfy  our single obligation, but it does not change our obligations. According 
to AC, thinking that our obligations change is a fundamental mistake. Perhaps we take 
our laudable dispositions too seriously or have bought into a noble lie. The feature of AC 
that explains why it is inconsistent  with limited conventionalism is its view that whether 
any particular action is right is determined by directly appealing to the foundational 
principle. 
 Act-Consequentialism is not the only  version of foundationalism that is 
inconsistent with limited conventionalism. We can imagine any number of foundational 
principles that do not make a social context morally relevant. If all particular judgements 
are justified by direct appeal to foundational principles, then social context will be 
irrelevant in the way that it is irrelevant  for Act-Consequentialism. Suppose I recognize 
four foundational principles; (1) promote autonomy, (2) promote well-being, (3) promote 
equality, and (4) promote knowledge. Suppose that any particular judgement is justified 
by directly  applying these four principles. Whether a person is good or bad will depend 
on whether they promote autonomy, well-being, equality, and knowledge. Whether an 
action, institution, practice, or disposition is appropriate will likewise  depend on 
promoting these four values. This form of pluralist foundationalism will also be 
inconsistent with limited conventionalism unless promoting one of these values explains 
how social practices establish obligations, rights, and powers.
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 If a version of foundationalism conflicts with limited conventionalism, then 
whether we should accept foundationalism or my argument will be determined by  much 
more holistic considerations. I doubt that any single argument can show such a version of 
foundationalism to be wrong, and I do not attempt to give one here. After all, a fully 
committed foundationalist could even give up their commitment to the truths of logic if 
they  needed to. Instead, the best argument for or against any  moral theory will be holistic. 
How does the theory  really  fare as a whole? My arguments only show a moral theory to 
be wrong insofar as the approach seems to better provide what we want from a moral and 
political theory. 
 Yet, even if some forms of foundationalism can accept the primacy of the basic 
structure, this might seem like a trifling conclusion for the foundationalist. What matters 
for the foundationalist is ultimately first principles, which are then applied to all moral 
problems--including the evaluation of the basic structure. For any moral problem, we 
look to see how the fundamental principles bear on that problem. What, then, is the 
significance of saying that we should “focus” on the basic structure? 
 For versions of foundationalism that accepted limited conventionalism, the focus 
on the basic structure is quite significant. It  identifies a particular moral problem to which 
only foundational principles are applied. The evaluations of practices and actions within 
the basic structure will need to be sensitive to those non-foundationalist considerations 
that are determined by an institutional context. By contrast, there are no non-
foundationalist considerations that are relevant for evaluating the basic structure. This 
makes the distinctiveness of the basic structure as moral subject significant even for the 
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foundationalist. It  is a subject to which foundational principles are not applied indirectly, 
but only directly. 
 Of course, the distinction between the basic structure and other moral problems 
might be significant for other reasons beyond this. Versions of foundationalism might 
recognize some foundational values as relevant for evaluating the basic structure that  are 
not relevant for evaluating individual practices or actions. As I understand it, the Division 
of Moral Labor argument advocates for such a version of foundationalism. The argument 
understands justifications as appealing to foundational values, but it also supposes that 
some foundational values are appropriate for evaluating institutions whereas others are 
appropriate for evaluating individual conduct. According to this form of argument, the 
distinctiveness of the basic structure will be significant  for two reasons. First, only certain 
foundational values apply  to the basic structure. Second, the foundational values that 
apply to the basic structure apply to it directly rather than indirectly. 
 I suspect that  both Nagel and Scheffler would want their views to be consistent 
with limited conventionalism, but they  do not argue from such a commitment. The 
argument of this dissertation differs from theirs in arguing from limited conventionalism 
rather than a particular form of foundationalism. I do not need to claim that  a particular 
form of foundationalism is the true moral theory but only that the true moral theory, 
whatever it is, needs to accept limited conventionalism. I think this is especially 
important for understanding Rawls’s own argument for focusing on the basic structure 
because he is not a foundationalist. Instead, he is a constructivist. In the next section, I 
want to emphasize the deeper significance of my argument for constructivist theories. 
182 
§4.2.2 Constructivism and limited conventionalism
Foundationalism may be the most intuitive form of moral theory, but it is not the only 
form. Rawlsian Constructivism is one example of a non-foundationalist moral theory, and 
the conclusions of my  argument are much more significant for such non-foundationalist 
theories. To draw this out, I want to first  highlight a feature of Rawlsian constructivism; 
the procedure that warrants principles is “problem-dependent.” By this, I mean that 
constructed principles are always constructed to address a particular moral problem 
(rather than providing general first principles). Insofar as constructivism’s procedures are 
problem-dependent, the primacy of the basic structure will be even more significant. 
 To see this point, we should notice that some versions of constructivism will be 
foundationalist. By this, I mean that the relevant procedure (or perspective) will be 
constructed to warrant  a foundational principle or set of principles.90 For example, there 
are attempts to justify act-utilitarianism91  and rule-utilitarianism92  by appeal to 
constructivist reasoning. Likewise, a constructivist reading of Kant would identify him as 
using a constructed procedure to warrant the categorical imperative, which some might 
read as being a fundamental principle. In these cases, constructivism is used to warrant 
foundationalism. Whether they are consistent or inconsistent with limited 
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conventionalism will then depend on the specific foundational principles as I discussed 
above. In this section, I am concerned with forms of constructivism that are not 
foundationalist. 
 Rawls’s considered view is the most prominent example of non-foundationalist 
constructivism. Persons in the original position do not agree to a set  of principles that 
settles all moral questions. Rather the original position is designed to settle a particular 
moral problem; “what are the fair-terms of social cooperation?” The arguments of Theory 
of Justice and Political Liberalism are directed towards this particular problem, and 
Rawls says relatively  little about how the constructivist approach would be applied to 
different problems. However, Rawls does develop a different constructive procedure in 
Law of Peoples, and that procedure is specified for a very different problem than 
determining the fair terms of social cooperation. Likewise, Rawls also suggests that 
different procedures would be necessary to settle questions about justice in associations.93 
 The few remarks we get about Rawlsian constructivism suggest that any 
legitimate procedure will need to generate principles that (a) respect persons as free and 
equal and (b) satisfy a practical need. In a slogan, Rawls suggests that, according to his 
view, “free and equal moral persons are to construct reasonable and helpful guidelines for 
moral reflection in view of their need for such organizing principles and the role in social 
life that these principles and their corresponding subjects are presumed to have.”94 In this 
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articulation, principles are always constructed with the “need for such principles” and 
their “social role” in mind. This is what I meant to refer to in saying that the procedure 
that warrants principles is “problem-dependent.” The specifics of the procedure are 
determined by the particular problem that principle is developed to address. The 
construction that warrants the two principles of justice, for instance, was constructed 
specifically for the problem of identifying the fair terms of social cooperation.
 When a form of constructivism is problem-dependent in the way that Rawlsian 
Constructivism is, the primacy of the basic structure as a distinct subject  has a greater 
significance for two reasons. The rest of this section will be spent explaining the two 
ways in which my conclusions are especially significant for such views.
 First, the nature of the basic structure as subject influences the content of the 
principles that apply  to it. When a form of constructivism is problem-dependent, the 
principles that evaluate the basic structure are developed specifically to apply to the basic 
structure. Accordingly, the particularities of the basic structure are crucially  important for 
the development of the principles. We do not merely apply  first principles to the 
identified subject. Instead, the nature of the subject determines the principles.
 This feature of Rawlsian constructivism is well-represented in the phrase, “the 
correct regulative principle for anything depends on the nature of that thing.” Rather than 
merely applying a fundamental principle to a particular subject, Rawls means to develop 
principles in ways that  make them suited to that  subject. This phrase appears in Theory of 
Justice when Rawls offers a quick rejoinder against the utilitarian conception of justice; 
185 
“whereas the utilitarian extends to society the principle of choice for one 
man, justice as fairness, being a contract view, assumes the principles of 
social choice, and so the principles of justice, are themselves the object of 
an original agreement. There is no reason to suppose that the principles 
which should regulate an association of men is simply an extension of the 
principle of choice for one man. On the contrary: if we assume that the 
correct regulative principle for anything depends on the nature of that 
thing, and that the plurality  of distinct persons with separate ends is an 
essential feature of human society, we should not expect the principle of 
social choice to be utilitarian”
In Theory, this is only  a brief and relatively unexplored contrast between justice as 
fairness and utilitarianism, but I think that it is an important one. It  argues that, given a 
certain methodological perspective, we can see a central problem for the utilitarian. 
Utilitarianism is modeled on the rationality of a single individual in maximizing their 
own utility, which is extended to model the rationality  of a social choice to maximize 
total utility. Yet, the choice over how society  is structured is distinct from how a single 
individual ought lead their life, so it seems odd to suppose that one can be addressed by 
merely extending the other. A utilitarian conception of justice seems to violate the 
methodological perspective that any regulative principle should depend on the nature of 
that which it  regulates. For Rawls, our recognition of the basic structure as a distinct 
moral subject is significant because our conception of the subject influences the 
principles that appeal to that subject. In moral theory, our principles should fit with our 
understanding of a moral problem. We should not try to make our understanding of the 
problem fit our principles.
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 The second reason why the primacy of the basic structure has a greater 
significance for problem-dependent forms of constructivism is due to a way in which 
such theories can explain moral unity. One might think that a problem-dependent form of 
constructivism is condemned to disunity  amongst its principles. If we accept 
foundationalism in some form, then it  is easy  to see how our various judgements form a 
unity; they all express our commitment to foundational principles. Yet, there is no such 
unity  for a problem-dependent form of constructivism; each principle is developed for the 
specific problem it addresses. This might seem to result  in a hodgepodge of principles, 
each principle merely meeting the conditions for its own use and failing to express any 
deeper moral vision.
 In “The Basic Structure as Subject,” Rawls recognizes this problem in a section 
titled “Unity by Appropriate Sequence” and offers a solution. He writes, 
At first sight the contract doctrine may appear hopelessly unsystematic: 
for how are the principles that apply to different subjects to be tied 
together? But there are other forms of theoretical unity  than that defined 
by completely  general first principles. It  may be possible to find an 
appropriate sequence of kinds of subjects and to suppose that the parties to 
a social contract are to proceed through this sequence with the 
understanding that the principles of each later agreement are to be 
subordinate to those of all earlier agreements, or else adjusted to them by 
certain priority  rules. The underlying unity is provided by the idea that 
free and equal moral persons are to construct reasonable and helpful 
guidelines for moral reflection in view of their need for such organizing 
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principles and the role in social life that these principles and their 
corresponding subjects are presumed to have.95
In this passage, Rawls supposes that  contractualist theory  can still be unified through an 
“appropriate sequence.” This is a methodological sequence as principles are agreed to by 
appeal to principles that have been previously developed. For each principle in the 
sequence, the principles are those that free and equal moral persons would agree to. If 
such a process were completed, a problem-dependent form of constructivism would 
express a kind of unity.96 
 Rawls does not say  much more about how this sequence would proceed beyond 
this passing remark. However, there are two features of Rawls’s theory that seem to fit 
well with this perspective towards unity. First, he orients questions about global justice 
and justice between generations as being addressed after developing an account of 
domestic justice. In “Law of Peoples,” he writes 
Typically, a constructivist doctrine proceeds by taking up a series of 
subjects, starting, say, with principles of political justice for the basic 
structure of a closed and self-contained democratic society. That done, it 
works forward to principles for the claims of future generations, outward 
to principles for the law of peoples, and inward to principles for special 
social questions. Each time the constructivist procedure is modified to fit 
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96 In unpublished lecture notes, Rawls identifies Scanlon’s form of contractualism as a “general moral 
conception” like utilitarianism, perfectionism, and intuitionism. By contrast, he identifies a possible 
contractualism that applies the notion of agreement to different areas of morals. He writes, 
“Contractualism might be a general conception of the following kind: while a notion of agreement is 
always applicable, the notion of agreement is specified differently from one part of morals to another; 
and also, the principles and precepts that result are not universally applicable. So while contractualism 
would leave a certain unity, it would not have the unity given by general principles universally 
applicable”
the subject in question. In due course all the main principles are on hand, 
including those needed for the various political duties and obligations of 
individuals and associations.”97
In this passage, Rawls appeals to his methodology  of approaching a range of subjects in 
an appropriate sequences; first, principles of justice for a closed society, then global 
justice and justice between generations, and eventually  explicating personal obligations 
as members of political organizations or associations. Likewise, in Theory of Justice, 
Rawls appeals to a four-stage sequence in addressing questions of justice for a closed 
society. A conception of justice does not itself determine the answers to all the relevant 
political questions. We not only need first principles of justice, but must also appeal to 
those principle that (a) evaluate constitutional arrangements, (b) evaluate legislation and 
policies, and (c) evaluate particular instances. For each question, Rawls constructs an 
appropriate perspective from which to reason about the relevant issue, but each 
perspective is constrained by acknowledgment of the principles decided in earlier stages. 
For instance, he writes, “In framing a just constitution, I assume that the two principles of 
justice already chosen define an independent standard of the desired outcome. If there is 
no standard, the problem of constitutional design is not well-posed.”98  Likewise, one 
cannot judge the justice of law without knowledge of the constitutional procedures within 
which they  are developed and one cannot judge particular acts without knowledge of the 
laws from which they follow. As such, the four-stage sequence models the way in which 
principles are developed for specified contexts in a way that  relies upon prior principles, 
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but does not suppose that the prior principles can be easily applied to new contexts. 
Instead of an appeal to an overarching general principle that addresses each of these 
diverse concerns directly, Rawls appeals to developing these principles in an appropriate 
sequence, each relying on the preceding development of principles.
 Yet, what is it that makes an appropriate sequence appropriate? With the four-
stage sequence, it makes sense why this sequence would be as it is. At each level, the 
relevant contractors have more and more information about the society in which they 
live, so there is a natural order to the progression. Yet, what would make any particular 
sequence more appropriate than another beyond this? What makes certain subjects the 
ones that  should be addressed before others? We cannot appeal to moral principles to 
settle this issue because the order of the sequence will likely influence our moral 
principles. We cannot appeal to moral facts because the constructivist denies such moral 
facts. How should the appropriate sequence proceed? The answer to this question is far 
from apparent in Rawls’s own writings. What would be an appropriate argument to show 
that one starting place is more appropriate than another?
 I take the argument of this dissertation to show why we would think that the basic 
structure has primacy in such an appropriate sequence. I do not think it shows that the 
basic structure is the first  subject in such a sequence, but it does show why it should 
precede other subjects. Perhaps it only shows why the basic structure is the primary 
subject of justice.99 To appropriately evaluate particulars, we often need to evaluate them 
within a particular social context. This requires that we have some prior way to evaluate 
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the social context. This gives a reason for the primacy of the basic structure that does not 
appeal to moral principles or to moral facts. Instead, it appeals to intuitions about the 
normative structure of social practices. Those who accept limited conventionalism have 
reason to accept the primacy of the basic structure in an appropriate sequence.
§4.3 A Mooring for Ethical Life
So, those who accept forms of foundationalism and constructivism can accept the 
primacy of the basic structure as subject. In this section, I want to better motivate both 
limited conventionalism and the deeper moral importance of the basic structure. Instead 
of showing the relationship between limited conventionalism and the basic structure, I 
want to show how a central concern with the basic structure provides a way to reconcile 
the localizing and universalizing impulses in moral theory. 
 There is a consistent conflict between those who see ethical life as grounded in 
universal principles that apply to all and those who see ethical life as particular to social 
context. We can see this conflict between universal and local in arguments from Plato and 
Aristotle, Kant and Hegel,  Sidgwick and Bradley, and Rawls and Walzer. While I would 
not claim a focus on the basic structure settles this conflict, I do believe it can contribute 
to a moral theory that respects both the universal and local in moral and ethical life. I 
want to motivate my approach by  showing how it combines the best features of both 
perspectives.
 Limited conventionalism recognizes that our moral obligations, rights, and 
powers are often grounded by contingent  social practices. In §3.2.3, I argued that such 
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practices likely influence our values, virtues, relationships and self-conceptions. The view 
does not, however, require that all values, virtues, relationships, self-conceptions, rights 
and obligations are grounded by such practices. In fact, limited conventionalism needs to 
appeal to some universal principles in order to explain why practices have this influence 
on moral and ethical life. Accordingly, there is already some balance between the local 
and universal in the theory. Some moral demands and claims will be particular to our 
social context whereas others will be universal across social contexts. Which are which is 
an issue that needs to be settled by a moral theory. 
 Limited conventionalism also recognizes that, in order to change our moral 
demands, social practices must be morally justified. Not every practice can establish new 
obligations; only morally justified practices can. At times, whether a practice is justified 
will be determined by universal principles. At other times, a practice will be justified by 
its social context. According to the view here, when a practice is part of a system, we will 
need to evaluate the system in order to evaluate the practice that it is part  of. This adds 
another way in which our evaluation is particular to a social context. Whether a practice 
is justified will often depend on the social context that practice occurs within.
 With this view, the basic structure of society  is a moral subject at the nexus 
between the local and the universal. Many  of our particular claims will be explained by 
the practices that they belong to. For many practices, whether they  are justified and give 
rise to genuine claims will be determined by how they  fit within a basic structure. So, the 
basic structure is quite central for our local evaluations--we often need to evaluate 
practices by how they  fit within a basic structure. However, the evaluation of the basic 
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structure itself does not appeal to our social context. There is no larger practice or system 
that the basic structure is part of. Instead, it is evaluated by appeal to more universal 
principles. 
 To show how this approach can reconcile the localizing and universalizing 
features of ethical life, I will rehearse one of the most appreciated Hegelian objections to 
Kantian moral theory. This will allow me to contrast a concern with the practice-
dependent aspects of ethical life with a concern for the practice-independent aspects. 
Then, I will suggest  a middle ground that recognizes the importance of both these aspects 
of ethical life. Since a focus on the basic structure is part of this middle ground, such a 
focus respects both the practice-dependent and practice-independent features of ethical 
life. 
4.3.1 The Hegelian criticism
Hegel’s most (in)famous criticism of Kant has been the claim that his argument for the 
categorical imperative amounts to nothing but an empty  formalism. In §135 of 
Philosophy of Right, Hegel writes, 
“However essential it is to give prominence to the pure unconditioned 
self-determination of the will as the root of duty, and to the way in which 
knowledge of the will, thanks to Kant’s philosophy, has won its firm 
foundation and starting-point for the first time owing to the thought of its 
infinite autonomy, still to adhere to the exclusively moral position, without 
making the transition to the conception of ethics, is to reduce this gain to 
an empty formalism, and the science of morals to the preaching of duty for 
duty’s sake. From this point of view, no immanent doctrine of duties is 
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possible; of course, material may be brought in from outside and particular 
duties may be arrived at accordingly, but...no transition is possible to the 
specification of particular duties.” 
For Hegel, true freedom occurs only when we recognize that our freedom is not a 
freedom of indeterminacy but a freedom as a particular individual, an individual who is 
understood as occupying a particular social position. We are raised within a particular 
social atmosphere and our own identity  and interests are reliant upon the particularities of 
that social atmosphere. Accordingly, the material through which we determine our duties 
and goals is drawn from that atmosphere. To abstract away from this material is to 
abstract away from all material that could establish our duties. An ethical theory that 
arises from the idea of the will as pure indeterminacy will be empty and formal, but an 
ethical theory that arises from the idea of a will as embedded in a social position will 
have the material through which to recognize the fullness of ethical life.100  
 Now, there are many  related and overlapping aspects to Hegel’s criticism, and I 
do not mean to address them here in full. Much of the literature hangs on Hegel’s internal 
criticism of Kant that the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) cannot warrant any moral 
judgment on its own. Much has been written about whether this criticism shows a 
mistake in Kant’s reasoning, but my concern is with Hegel’s point  as an external 
criticism. Is Hegel right to think that  any account of ethics is inadequate if it ignores the 
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particularities of our social atmosphere? The FUL might not be empty, but Hegelians will 
still argue that  Kantian theory is flawed because it ignores the importance of our being 
socially embedded. Most  specifically, Hegelians can argue that no Kantian view 
adequately represents individual freedom. The individual will is not a pure abstraction of 
indeterminacy  but a particular will embedded in a social environment. For a particular 
will to truly be free, it needs not will any arbitrary ends but will the ends that are 
identified as its own particular ends. 
 A similar external criticism is used by many of the contemporary Communitarian 
thinkers, but they  need not be tied to Hegel’s own metaphysical and methodological 
commitments. These thinkers have focused specifically on the ways in which the self is 
socially embedded without taking the detour through the conditions for freedom or the 
claim that the FUL is empty. 
 For Hegel and Kant, the contrast between them is well-represented in their 
differing conceptions of freedom, but the contrast between communitarians and liberals is 
not as clear. As Will Kymlicka points out,101 the contemporary Liberal does not deny that 
the self is socially embedded. Instead, liberals only deny that there is no single socially 
determined feature of ourselves that is not open to possible revision. The woman raised in 
a misogynistic society  might see herself as lesser than the men around her, but she has the 
capacity to critically engage with that view and change her self-conception overtime. 
Alternatively, a religious person might fundamentally identify  himself with his religion 
195 
101  Kymlicka, Will. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2002), 
208-282.
and remain orientated around it  throughout his life, but he could revise his commitments. 
His commitment is made more significant by  the fact that he could change it and does 
not.
 So, all sides in the contemporary dispute can recognize that selves are socially 
embedded, so that  cannot  be where the dispute really lies. Even Kantians can recognize 
that the self is socially-embedded and merely maintain the freedom consists in rational 
willing rather than self realization. What, then, grounds the conflict between 
communitarian and liberal views?
 I want to suggest that these two perspectives differ in their identification of the 
source of ethical ends and principles. Both sides might  recognize that  the self is socially 
embedded but they  significantly  differ in interpreting how this matters for morality  and 
ethics. For the Communitarian, what determines the content of ethics and morality  are the 
particularities of our social structure and culture. Rather than distinguishing themselves 
by appeal to the claim that the self is socially  embedded, I suggest  that they distinguish 
themselves by the claim that the content of ethical life is dependent upon the particular 
practices of a society. In short, Communitarians claim that ethical life is substantially 
practice-dependent.
 The Hegelian agrees with this Communitarian commitment, though Hegel 
understands there to be a rational development of ethical life through time. For him, the 
content of ethical life is practice-dependent, but the practices of our society can be 
explained by  the rational development of human freedom. Despite this difference, the 
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Hegelian and Communitarian are in agreement that the content of ethical life and 
morality is predominantly practice-dependent and local.
 
4.3.2 The Reconciliatory Response
To say that the two sides are divided by  the extent to which they identify the content of 
ethical life as practice-dependent or practice-independent undoubtedly seems too rough; 
it ignores the nuance on the two sides. However, a rough contrast can nonetheless be 
helpful and track a real difference. The contrast can help  highlight a better view by seeing 
the inadequacies of these two contrary  positions. We should not think that the sole source 
of our ethical ends and principles is our local particularity, and we should not think that 
the sole source is an independent ethical perspective. The former would ignore any 
objective grounding for the importance of socially  determined concerns, and the later 
would ignore the richness of ethical life provided within a community. 
 To transcend the inadequacies of either view, we need only  combine them. We can 
recognize that the source of some ethical ends and principles is the social structure, and 
the source of other ethical ends and principles is an independent ethical perspective. In 
short, we should recognize that there are practice-dependent values and practice-
independent values. We can accept a kind of limited conventionalism. Any adequate 
ethical theory need recognize both. I think that most Hegelians, Communitarians, 
Kantians and Liberals recognize this. Limited conventionalism provides a form for this 
reconciliation.
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 The way in which to recognize both aspects of ethical life is to recognize that the 
contingencies of our social practices have a profound effect on ethical life, but the non-
contingent aspects of ethics and morality  do as well. While many of our values, virtues, 
relationships and obligations will be explained by  particular features of our social 
context, others will not be. For instance, it is due to conventional aspects of our 
professional structure that we have the kind of relationships with co-workers that we 
have. It is because of our particular form of government that we have the political 
obligations we have. Yet, one might think that  we should not deceive others regardless of 
the particularities of society. Or, one might think that knowledge is always valuable. 
Which aspects are explained by which is not easily decided, and different theories will 
explain different aspects. What matters is that we can recognize contingent features of 
our social context as determining some aspects of ethical life just as we can recognize 
non-contingent aspects as well. 
 Most importantly for my  concern, practice-independent principles or values will 
have a central role in evaluating our social context itself. Even if the content of ethical 
life was predominantly  determined by contingent social practices, practice-independent 
values would have a role in assessing those practices. To support the communitarian 
aspect of his view, F.H. Bradley appeals to a quotation from Hegel that  is actually  more 
aligned with my conclusions than Bradley there recognizes. The full quotation comes 
from §153 of The Philosophy of Right; 
“to be moral is to live in accordance with  the moral tradition of one’s 
country; and in respect to education, the one true answer is that  which a 
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Pythagorean gave to him who asked what was the best education for his 
son, If you make him the citizen of a people with good institutions”
In this we can recognize that living a good life means living the life of a member of 
particular society, and the particularities of a people determine the specifics of how one 
should live. Even when Hegel recognizes that our ethical life is partly  determined by  our 
social context, he recognizes that it is important to have good institutions. To determine 
which institutions are good, I maintain that we need some practice-independent 
perspective. So, practice-independent values are important  not only as part of the content 
of ethical life, but in assessing those practices that determine the content of ethical life.
 Hegel is likely referring to an actual Pythagorean in the above passage, but his 
additional comments show that he also had Rousseau in mind. Rousseau did not dispute 
the ways in which a social context had a profound and pervasive influence on a people’s 
aims, relationships and values but he was not fully communitarian in his outlook. Instead, 
he reached towards features of human nature that were independent of any particular 
social context as part of a social critique. Likewise, even while Bradley  argues that 
ethical life consists partly in fulfilling one’s “stations and its duties,” he can recognize 
that it  is only  the stations and duties of a good society that we should honor. Here, the 
good society is one that  is justified by appeal to values that are independent of that 
society. For Rousseau, that  was human nature. For Hegel, it was human freedom. In this 
way, the quotation that Bradley  used to support his view comes closer to that which I 
argue for. I merely emphasize that we need a way of determining what counts as a “good” 
institution, and that is done by appeal to practice-independent values.
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 From this perspective, we can agree with Hegelians that an account of ethics that 
is fully reliant on a formal conception of the self would be inadequate for ethical life. We 
can recognize that much of the substance of our values, virtues, relationships, self-
conception and obligations come from the particularities of our social context. Yet, this 
recognition does not lead us to think that there is no practice-independent ethical values, 
instead those practice-independent values are merely insufficient. Hegel was right to 
suppose that a practice-independent perspective would be insufficient but a practice-
independent perspective is still necessary  for a full grounding of ethical life. In particular, 
practice-independent principles are appropriate for evaluating our social structure, which 
grounds the particularities of our form of ethical life. 
 It is with this view in mind that we can see how a concern with the basic structure 
of society  can respect  both the practice-dependent and practice-independent  aspects of 
ethical life. First, it  respects the practice-dependent parts of ethical life by  recognizing the 
profound and pervasive influence of the basic structure. We recognize that our values, 
virtues, self-conception, relationships and obligations change. Second, it respects the 
practice-independent parts of ethical life by both holding the basic structure up to 
appraisal by practice-independent values and by  recognizing that not all of our values, 
virtues, self-conception, relationships and obligations are practice-dependent. 
 It is in this way that a morally justified basic structure acts as a mooring for 
ethical life. In living with others, our particular form of life will be influenced by  the 
contingencies of our culture and history. Like a boat  atop the water, we will be moved in 
one direction or the other by the winds and tides. A form of ethical life that is evaluated 
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only by it’s local and practice-dependent values is adrift, but a society with a justified 
basic structure is bound to solid ground. We will still move with the winds and tides of 
culture and history, but our drift will have limits. Ethical life will always be sensitive to 
the particular practices we live within, but living within a justified basic structure keeps 
us tethered to the solid ground that our practice-independent values provide.
4.4 What is Still to come
In the remaining two chapters, I want to address two potential criticisms of my argument. 
I have chosen to address these two objection specifically  because each draws on deeper 
convictions that might lead to a philosophical impasse. By discussing these objections, I 
hope to bring these deeper convictions to the surface and explicitly address them. The 
objection of Chapter 5 appeals foundational commitments regarding the role of moral 
principles, and the objection of Chapter 6 appeals to convictions about justice as an ideal.
 As I argued in 4.1, it is no problem if a moral theory  rejects limited 
conventionalism. While there will then be a conflict between that  moral theory and my 
conclusions, we then need to settle whether that moral theory or one that accepts limited 
conventionalism is the best  moral theory. What is a problem is an argument that shows a 
fundamental problem with limited conventionalism. In Chapter 4, I introduce an 
argument that tries to show this. This argument seeks to show that all justifications must 
appeal directly to first principles that are fully general across moral subjects. I call such a 
view a commitment to “generalism.” If generalism is right, then limited conventionalism 
is wrong. Limited conventionalism requires that some justifications appeal to an 
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institutional context and thus indirectly to first principles. Insofar as generalism supposes 
that all valid justifications appeal directly to first principles, those who are committed to 
limited conventionalism are mistaken. Accordingly, I argue against a commitment to 
generalism in Chapter 5. 
 From the introduction, I have contrasted my argument for a focus on the basic 
structure with an argument that appeals to a particular conception of justice. One might 
try to show the identity, moral indispensability, and moral distinctiveness of the basic 
structure by arguing that justice is uniquely related to the basic structure. Such an 
argument uses the indispensability and distinctiveness of justice to ground the 
indispensability and distinctiveness of the basic structure. I did not argue against this 
approach except to suggest that we are unlikely to settle our disagreement by appeal to a 
conception of justice alone. We need to argue to--and not from--a conception of justice.
 By contrast, the objections that I am concerned with in Chapter 6 start from a 
particular conception of justice. First, one might claim that my  approach necessarily 
misrepresents the nature of justice. Insofar as we take the principles that apply to the 
basic structure as principles of justice, we then represent justice as consisting of that 
principle. If the demands of justice are wider than this, we misrepresent justice by  taking 
its total demands to be those that are specific to the basic structure. Second, one might 
claim that we can only determine how the basic structure should be if we first determine 
what justice requires. Accordingly, this objection supposes that I have confused the order 
of evaluation.  In Chapter 6, I will respond to these two objections. 
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Excursus: Rawls, Hegel and the basic structure as subject
As a final note, I want  to better support the argument of §4.3.2 through an interpretation 
of Rawls’s own reason for taking the basic structure as subject. There is good reason to 
suppose that Rawls saw his focus on the basic structure as providing a response to 
Hegel’s criticism of liberalism much as I suggest such a focus can reconcile the local and 
universalizing impulses in moral theory. In discussing Hegel in his Lectures on the 
History of Moral Philosophy, Rawls writes, 
A second criticism of liberalism is that it fails to see, what Hegel certainly 
saw, the deep social rootedness of people within an established framework 
of their political and social institutions. In this we do learn from him, as it 
is one of his great contributions. But I don’t  think that a liberalism of 
freedom is at fault here. A Theory of Justice follows Hegel in this respect 
when it  takes the basic structure of society as the first  subject of justice. 
People start as rooted in society and the first principles of justice they 
select are to apply to the basic structure.
In this passage, Rawls recognizes that Hegel is correct to focus on the social-rootedness 
of persons, and argues that his own theory  does this as well. Specifically, it does so by 
developing principles for the basic structure of society.
 What is clear from this passage is that Rawls thinks treating the basic structure as 
subject properly recognizes the social rootedness of persons, but  what is less clear is why 
he thinks this. His additional remarks in the lecture do not help, but he does spend more 
time on this issue in an unpublished lecture titled, “The Contingencies of Social 
Dependence.”102  In a revealing passage, Rawls starts with the fact of social rootedness. 
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He argues that our conception of ourselves, our aims, our relationships and our values are 
all influenced by our social context. Following this, Rawls concedes the typical 
communitarian point that these aspects of our personality are not chosen, but he them 
explains why this does not undermine liberalism. For Rawls, our freedom is a capacity to 
survey and revise our ends, which does not require radical self-determination. He goes on 
to argue that--given the fact of social rootedness--any adequate conception of social 
justice must establish the social conditions within which that conception of justice is 
acceptable to citizens. It is for this reason, he argues, that we should take the basic 
structure as the first subject. In advocating principles for the basic structure, we recognize 
the importance that our social context plays in shaping our character and self-conception. 
Insofar as a conception of justice is feasible only when the basic structure supports a 
social milieu in which persons accept that conception, we ought be primarily  concerned 
with developing principles for the basic structure to support that social milieu.103
 What Rawls does not make explicit--but follows from this argument--is that the 
fact of social rootedness makes it appropriate to use the abstract (Kantian) conception of 
the person to develop principles for the basic structure. Yes, the Kantian conception of the 
person is abstract and does not represent determinate individuals in all their particularity. 
However, given that the contingencies of the basic structure profoundly effect the 
particularity  of persons, it would be inappropriate to determine how the basic structure 
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ought to be on the basis of the particular interests and values of persons within a 
determinate social context. As Rawls writes in 1977, to allow the determinate interests of 
individuals to effect the principles of justice would be “to allow the disparate and deep 
contingent effects of the social system to influence the principles adopted.”104  In order to 
develop principles that are free of an idealogical justification, their determination ought 
reach beyond the particularities of the social structure they are to be applied within. For 
this to occur, we must  represent persons in the original position abstractly. Insofar as we 
recognize persons as free and equal persons with the two moral powers, then we model 
them only  as free and equal persons with the two moral powers. While the moral 
construction does not recognize persons as determinate individuals, the profound and 
pervasive effects of the basic structure so affect the content of our identities that it would 
be inappropriate to use a less abstract conception of the self. 
 The final step  of the analysis is to point out that what is inappropriate for 
determining principles for the basic structure is not inappropriate for determining 
principles for other subjects. The fact that Rawls appeals to a Kantian conception of the 
person for assessing the basic structure does not commit him to appealing to this abstract 
conception for all ethical questions. In determining principles that apply within a 
particular social structure, it will be more appropriate to appeal to the particularities 
within that social structure. The principles for interpersonal interaction, for example, will 
need to be sensitive to the particular ideals, virtues, relationships and conventional 
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obligations in that society. In specifying his “four-stage sequence” for applying the 
principles of justice, Rawls makes this clear. While we start from principles in an original 
position under a thick veil of ignorance, the following stages include more and more 
information about the particular society  that the principles apply to. In this way, the 
particularity  of a social context bears more and more importance as the stages of the 
sequence proceed. 
 This all gives Rawls the tools to address the Hegelian criticism because he can 
cede the Hegelian’s point without effecting his own theory. It  might very  well be the case 
that the Kantian conception of the person would not be adequate for addressing all the 
concerns of ethical life. In our personal life, we would need a moral theory that respects 
our particularity; it needs recognize our social place and individual character. Since 
Rawls does not claim that his version of Kantian Constructivism appeals to the Kantian 
conception of the person for addressing all these concerns, he need not show that the 
Kantian conception of the person is fully sufficient. For Rawls, the principles we ought 
follow are determined by  a construction that treats persons as free and equal. If we 
integrate his comments from “The Contingencies of Social Dependence,” we see that  the 
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construction treats persons as free, equal and determinate.105 We are not noumenal beings 
but social creatures within a particular social world. In developing principles for the basic 
structure, what it means to develop principles that express our nature as free, equal and 
determinate persons is that the construction abstract from our particularities. In other 
cases, principles can only  express our nature as free, equal and determinate persons by 
representing us in our particularity. When our particular ideals, virtues, relationships and 
obligations bear on the choice, then ignoring our particularity would not treat us as 
determinate persons.
 If this is all correct, then we ought treat the principles that apply to the basic 
structure of society  differently from other moral subjects. The principles that apply to the 
basic structure ought not be specific to the particularities within a social context, whereas 
many other principles ought be. The difference between these principles is not explained 
by a difference between individual and institutional principles, but between principles 
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what they are or become (cf. General Observation to Religion Book I). This is one (but 
only one) way to see perhaps why he thinks of us as  noumenal beings etc. But any such 
view seems likely to Fall into Fantasy. So what to do? Hence adopt notion of the P[ersons 
in the ]O[riginal ]P[osition]’s as representing determinate persons and trying to work this 
notion into a K[ant]ian view while at the same time avoid K[ant]’s difficulties. cf. contra 
Williams: “Persons, Character and Morality” in ed. A. Rorty: Identities of Persons (1976)
While the Williams article that Rawls mentions does not identify itself as arguing a Hegelian point, it fits 
well with the empty formalism objection. Moreover, Rawls seems content to suppose that Hegel’s internal 
criticism of Kant is on the mark insofar as he supposes the the FUL requires that Rawls introduce the 
notion of “true human needs” into the Kantian theory in order for the procedure to result in appropriate 
content. See Lectures in the History of Moral Philosophy, ed. Barbara Herman (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 2000), 173-176. 
that influence the particularities of a social context and principles that apply within those 
particularities. As Rawls writes in Theory of Justice, 
“That principles for institutions are chosen first shows the social nature of 
the virtue of justice, its intimate connection with social practices so often 
noted by  idealists. When Bradley says that  the individual is a bare 
abstraction, he can be interpreted to say, without too much distortion, that 
a persons’ obligations and duties presuppose a moral conception of 
institutions and therefore that the content of just institutions must be 
defined before the requirements for individuals can be set out.”  
In this passage, we see Rawls emphasizing the relationship between the primacy of the 
basic structure, the Hegelian criticism of a Kantian conception of the person, and the way 
in which social institutions shape our obligations and duties. Rawls recognizes the “social 
nature of the virtue of justice” by first developing principles that apply  to the basic 
structure. 
 Now, one need not be a Rawlsian to appreciate the distinction that Rawls is 
making between principles that apply to the basic structure and principles that apply to 
other subjects.  This is a distinction that any moral theory  can recognize the importance 
of, and it is the distinction that I think is important to take away from Rawls’s argument. 
Any moral theory  has reason to recognize the difference between moral judgments within 
the structure of ethical life and judgments of the structure of ethical life, so any  moral 
theory  has reason to treat the basic structure differently. We can hardly imagine making 
personal moral decisions without thinking about our social context. The particular values, 
virtues, relations and obligations that characterize our social context as central for 
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understanding morality and ethics. In distinguishing the basic structure from other moral 
subjects, we respect this aspect of morality. The basic structure of society has profound 
and pervasive effects on the structure of ethical life, so it ought be treated differently than 
those moral subjects that are relevant within ethical life. Both within and without 
Rawlsian theory, this gives us reason to distinguish principles that apply to the basic 
structure from principles that apply to other subjects--and this justification relies neither 
on creating space for self interest nor a pluralist division of moral labor. 
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Chapter 5
Against Generalism 
The fallacy in these versions of the same idea is perhaps the most pervasive of all 
fallacies in philosophy. So common is it  that  one questions whether it  might  not  be 
called the philosophical fallacy. It  consists in  the supposition  that  whatever is found 
true under certain circumstances may forthwith be asserted universally or without 
limits and conditions. Because a thirsty man gets satisfaction in drinking water, bliss 
consists in being drowned”
     -John Dewey, Human Nature and Social Action, p. 175
As mentioned in the last chapter, my  argument relies on a commitment to limited 
conventionalism, and not all moral theories will accept this commitment. So, not all 
moral theories will accept my arguments. That, in itself, is not problem. What would be a 
problem is an argument that  showed that limited conventionalism must be false. If 
someone could disprove limited conventionalism, then much of my argument would be 
disproved along with it. 
 In this chapter, I want to focus on a possible argument that claims to disprove 
limited conventionalism. The argument seeks to show that a particular perspective 
towards justification must  be correct, and then to show that limited conventionalism 
conflicts with that perspective towards justification. I identify this perspective as a 
commitment to “generalism.” According to generalism, any adequate justification appeals 
directly  to first principles that are applied generally across all moral problems. The 
arguments that I am concerned with in this chapter seek to show that generalism must be 
true. They seek to show that any justification must appeal directly to fully general first 
principles. 
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 Generalism conflicts with limited conventionalism because it leaves no room for 
institutional context. Limited conventionalism claims that we should often look towards 
the particular practices and systems we act within to justify a particular judgement. It is 
because our practices affect the content of ethical life that we need to differentiate the 
principles that apply  within a moral context from those that do not. First principles might 
aid our understanding of ethical life, they might direct our reforms of the social world, 
and they might settle some particular conflicts, but they do not settle all moral and ethical 
conflicts on their own.  In this way, limited conventionalism and generalism are opposed. 
If an argument shows that we should be committed to generalism, then we should not be 
committed to limited conventionalism.
 The name, “generalism” refers to a family  of foundationalist moral theories, but it 
does not  refer to all foundationalist  theories. Act-utilitarianism is one view that is 
committed to generalism; it explains legitimate justifications as appealing only and 
directly  to the fundamental principle that we should promote happiness. There are also 
non-consequentialist versions of generalism. Such theories explain all legitimate 
justifications as appealing to fundamental values like autonomy, equality, and 
happiness.106  Not all versions of foundationalism, however, are committed to generalism. 
As mentioned in §4.2.1, a moral theory  might recognize the Principle of Fair Play as a 
fundamental principle and thereby recognize legitimate justifications as those that appeal 
to the particular rules of social institutions (and only  indirectly appeal to the foundational 
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106 Oftentimes, G.A. Cohen seems to adopt such a pluralist foundationalism, but it is not clear whether he 
would allow for indirect appeals to foundational values like those required by limited conventionalism. 
Principle of Fair Play). Or, one might understand respect  for autonomy  as requiring that 
we respect the particularities of persons as determined by  their social environment. We 
might even recognize a consequentialist  form of conventionalism if it meets the right 
conditions. Any of these views might be foundationalist but they would not be committed 
to generalism. 
 In being concerned with arguments for generalism, I am specifically concerned 
with those who are committed to the view that “institutional context cannot matter for 
individual principles because all judgments are justified directly by first principles.” In 
addressing generalism, I both address the consequentialist and non-consequentialists 
versions. I mean to combat the view that  all legitimate justifications must appeal directly 
to fully general principles--whatever form those principles take. 
 My argument will proceed in four sections. In the first, I want to emphasize the 
significance of a commitment to generalism by  showing how it motivates Liam Murphy’s 
objections to Rawlsian theory. I will first reconstruct Murphy’s argument from 
“Institutions and the Demands of Justice” to show how it ultimately relies on a 
commitment to generalism.107  With this set-up complete, §4.2 is concerned with a 
historically significant argument used by J.S. Mill and Henry Sidgwick in favor of there 
being one fully  general principle that can directly  settle all moral conflicts. §4.3 then 
introduces three other arguments, each of which seeks to show that there must be a 
plurality  of fully general first principles. I argue that each of these four arguments fails to 
show that legitimate justifications must appeal directly  to first principles. With this 
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defensive portion of my argument complete, I will transition to offense in §4.4. There, I 
argue that the particularities of the social world are centrally  important to who we are and 
our relationships with others. Generalism fails as a moral theory because it fails to 
recognize the moral significant of our social particularity.
 Overall, this chapter should show why there is no reason to be committed to 
generalism, and it will thereby show why  any argument that assumes generalism is 
question-begging. While few recognize it explicitly, a commitment to generalism is 
predominant in ethical theory. In many ways, it mimics the model of physics; we seek to 
find general ethical laws that justify  the whole of our diverse ethical convictions. Given 
the aims of ethical theory, it makes sense to look for such general principles because they 
provide a clear way to simplify our ethical understanding. Given our sociology, this 
model makes sense because of the close ties between philosophy, logic and science. Yet, 
the goal of this chapter is to show why we should not be committed to generalism. We do 
not need to treat ethics like physics. 
5.1 Liam Murphy and Generalism
In “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” Liam Murphy  criticizes the Rawlsian method of 
political philosophy  for separating individual and institutional principles.108  Murphy’s 
concern is not that Rawlsians advocate guiding principles that apply  to institutions and not 
individual conduct but that  they advocate fundamental principles that apply  to institutions 
and not to individual conduct. He claims that his view, 
“is of course compatible with the existence of specifically political principles 
of a non-fundamental kind, such as the principle that taxation should be 
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108 Murphy, “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” 251.
levied according to taxpayers' “ability  to pay.” What [I reject] is any  defense 
of such a principle by  appeal to a fundamental one that does not  also apply 
directly to people's conduct. It  should therefore be clear that  monism does not 
have the absurd implication that all morally defensible legal principles are 
ipso facto valid moral principles.109
Murphy does not explain exactly  what a “fundamental” principle is, but  it seems that he 
means a principle that has a foundational role in our moral, political and ethical justifications. 
While it is an interpretive jump, I will assume that  a “fundamental principle” is a principle 
that is not  justified by  any further principles. In this way, Murphy argues that our 
foundational principles--those from which all justifications proceed--must apply generally 
across both institutions and individuals. For him “any  plausible fundamental normative 
principles for the evaluation of legal and other institutions” must also apply to “the realm of 
personal conduct.”110
 For ease of exposition Murphy distinguishes two views. “Dualism” is the belief 
that “the two practical problems of institutional design and personal conduct require, at 
the fundamental level, two different kinds of practical principles.”111  Alternatively, 
“Monism” is defined as the denial of dualism. Using these terms, he wants to argue 
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109 Murphy, “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” 254. While I will take Murphy at his word that his 
view does not have this “absurd implication,” he does not explain why it does not. I would be curious about 
how such an argument can be made that does not imply a difference between individual and institutional 
principles at the fundamental level. Are they different principles only as guiding principles?
110 More specifically, he identifies monism as the rejection “that there could be a plausible fundamental 
normative principle for the evaluation of legal and other institutions that does not apply in the realm of 
personal conduct.” While this is not the same as the commitment I articulate above, I believe that Murphy 
is committed to such a view of monism. 
111 ibid., 254.
against dualism and thereby on behalf of monism.112  However, there are two problems 
with this argument, which I address in §4.1.1 and §4.1.2 respectively. First, Murphy 
implicitly  uses a foundationalist  model of justification that Rawlsians should reject. 
Second, Murphy wrongly imputes a position to Rawlsians about what our individual 
obligations are.
5.1.1. Fundamental principles?
One of the deeper challenges facing Murphy’s argument is that he appeals only  to an 
intuitive sense of what “fundamental” normative principles are. The ways in which he 
uses the phrase seem to suggest that fundamental principles are of foremost moral 
importance and that they have some methodological primacy. While one needs to make 
an interpretive leap to understand Murphy here, it  seems that fundamental principles are 
moral principles that are not justified by any other--more fundamental--principles. 
 The problem with this view is that it  cannot be squared with the Rawlsian view of 
justification that Murphy argues against. Rawls does not justify principles by appealing to 
more fundamental principles, instead he appeals to a broader sense of reflective 
equilibrium. Whereas fundamental principles make sense within a foundationalist model 
of justification, it is not  clear what role they play in a more holist model. One might think 
that the two principles of justice are fundamental principles that are applied to determine 
215 
112 These names can be misleading for two reasons, so it important to first clear up what he means. First, 
Murphy does not mean to associate his monism with the more typical use of the phrase that is committed to 
only one ultimate value or principle. For Murphy’s version of “monism,” there might be many different 
principles or values so long as they each apply to both institutional design and individual conduct. In this 
way, pluralism is consistent with Murphy’s monism, though a pluralism of scope-restricted values is not. 
Second, there is nothing about “dualism” that commits it to only two practical problems with different 
kinds of practical principles. In this way, dualism might distinguish fundamental practical principles in 
more ways than merely individual conduct and institutional design.
what institutions we ought to have, yet Rawls does not even accept that. Instead, the two 
principles are applied through a “four-stage sequence” in which the principles that are 
developed in the original position are then interpreted by representative citizens who 
know more about their society  than do those behind a veil of ignorance.113  Subsequently, 
the particular laws that we should have are determined by representative citizens that 
interpret both the two principles of justice and the constitution developed. There is no 
strait-forward application of more fundamental principles in this broader story. 
 Given this complication, it is unclear exactly  how one should interpret Murphy’s 
arguments. If we take Murphy’s definition of dualism on its face, Rawls is not a dualist. 
Murphy defines dualism as the view that “the two practical problems of institutional 
design and personal conduct require, at the fundamental level, two different kinds of 
practical principles.” Yet, since Rawls does not think that these problems require 
fundamental principles at all, he would not  be a dualist.114  Of course, it is clear that 
Murphy is trying to argue against Rawls, so this might  seem like a nitpicky issue. 
However, it  is unclear how Murphy could make his point at all without appealing to the 
idea of “fundamental principles.” If Murphy dropped the phrase “fundamental” from the 
definition, then dualism would immediately be recognized as innocuous. After all, 
Murphy does explicitly  recognize “the existence of specifically political principles of a 
nonfundamental kind.”115
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113 Rawls, Theory of Justice, §31.
114 Taking Murphy strictly, he defines monism as the negation of dualism, and Rawls would then be a 
monist.
115 Murphy, “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” 254.
5.1.2. Non-Ideal Circumstances
Suppose that Murphy can overcome this difficulty, and he can articulate a view of 
fundamental principles that is consistent with Rawls’s project and does not rely on a 
foundationalist model of justification. Nonetheless, his argument against the Rawlsian 
method is still problematic. He seeks to show that any fundamental institutional principle 
must also apply to individual conduct. This argument relies on a supposed problem that 
Rawlsians face in dealing with injustice in our actual world. As Murphy writes, 
“It seems to me that any political theory  that accepts Rawls's bifurcation 
of the normative realm into one set of principles for institutions and 
another for people will yield an implausible account of what people should 
do in non-ideal circumstances. Thus there is a general reason to reject 
dualism.”116
The problem with Murphy’s argument, however, is that a mere commitment to dualism 
does not itself lead to an implausible account for non-ideal circumstances. In order to 
claim that dualism leads to an implausible account, Murphy wrongly  attributes an 
additional commitment to dualists. This additional commitment does not follow from 
dualism alone, so Murphy’s argument relies on a non-sequitur. To see why, we can 
formalize Murphy’s argument into three simple steps.
1) A moral theory should not have implausible implications for non-ideal theory
2) Dualism has implausible implications for non-ideal theory
3) Thus, we ought to reject dualism
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In this argument, I completely  agree with (1) but disagree with (2), so I reject Murphy’s 
conclusion, (3). It  is surely true that some versions of Dualism might have implausible 
implications, but it is not the case that a commitment to Dualism itself has such 
implausible implications.
   The support that Murphy gives for (2) is that dualism would mandate that 
individuals in non-ideal circumstances can only promote justice by revising institutions 
rather than addressing social problems directly. This, he argues, leads to implausible 
implications; 
“The case to focus on is of course a nonideal situation where it is not true 
that the best way  for people to alleviate inequality or promote well-being 
is to promote just institutions. For here monism tells people to do what 
they  can to bring about an improvement directly. If injustice is about 
inequality, people should do what they  can to reduce it. If they can have a 
great impact on inequality  by  aiming directly at its reduction than they 
would if they directed their energies to institutional reform, this is what 
they  should do. Dualism tells a different story: even if the individual could 
do more to reduce inequality, alleviate suffering, or whatever, by direct 
action, this is not what justice requires her to do. Justice requires her to 
promote just institutions even if she is sure that the aim of the just 
institutions she is promoting would be better served if she herself pursued 
that aim directly. How could this be right?”117
To again formalize Murphy’s argument, we can identify the following steps;
a) Dualism requires persons to advance justice by promoting just 
institutions
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b) Just institutions are justified (at least in part) by accomplishing certain 
aims
c) In non-ideal theory, those certain aims will sometimes be better 
advanced by direct action than through institutions
d) Thus, in non-ideal theory, dualism would be self-frustrating
e) A theory that is self-frustrating is implausible
f) Thus, dualism has implausible implications for non-ideal theory.
The most important problem with this argument is that  (a) is either false or does not lead 
to the conclusion. To see what I mean, there are two ways of reading (a). First, we might 
read it as:
(a1) Dualism strictly requires persons to advance justice only by 
promoting just institutions
This reading would imply that there is no other appropriate way by which to advance 
justice than by promoting just institutions. Second, we might read (a) as: 
(a2) Dualism loosely requires persons to advance justice by promoting just 
institutions along with other means , 
In this case, there are other permissible ways of advancing justice beyond promoting just 
institutions, though promoting just institutions is one permissible way. While (a1) would 
require that persons advance justice only  by  promoting just institutions, (a2) would not. 
Instead (a2) makes the promotion of just institutions a part of the requirement of justice. 
 Now, while Murphy seems to have (a1) in mind, it is false. A person might very 
well be a dualist and that person might be committed to only advancing justice through 
institutions, but that does not mean that a commitment to dualism requires that  justice can 
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be advanced only  by institutional means. It is false because it  supposes that  a 
commitment to dualism implies some specific principle for individuals. Yet, the 
commitment to dualism is silent on such issues.  dualism itself is merely the distinction 
between principles for institutions and principles for individuals, it does not say  anything 
about the content of the principles for individuals. Since (a) is a principle of individual 
conduct, whether or not promoting just institutions is strictly required is determined by 
the principles of individual conduct and not by a commitment to Dualism alone. Thus, 
(a1) is false.
 On the other hand, (a2) might be true just in case dualism would be implausible 
without it.118  Yet, even if one must accept (a2), it does not warrant (d) because it might 
allow people to advance justice by  also promoting certain aims directly. Since Dualism 
allows us to distinguish principles for individual conduct from principles for institutions, 
it might be that individuals should not promote just institutions whenever they could 
promote other more worthy moral ends. Thus, the argument to show that a commitment 
to dualism leads to implausible implications does not succeed because (a1) is false and 
the conclusion would not follow from (a2). Since Murphy cannot show that dualism leads 
220 
118 Earlier in the article, Murphy gives an argument that might be interpreted as an argument for (a1), but it 
only warrants (a2) if it succeeds at all. Murphy argues that it is a necessary commitment of dualism that 
individuals have responsibility to advance just institutions. He writes, 
“Justice may be a virtue of institutions, and we may thus be able to say that particular 
institutions are in themselves just or unjust, but people must be subject to some kind of 
requirement to support those institutions, for they cannot become virtuous and remain so all on 
their accord.” (Murphy, 270).
Yet, even if people must be subject to “some kind of requirement to support these institutions” this does not 
mean that they are subject to the strong requirement of (a1), which requires that people promote just 
institutions even to the exclusion of other morally worthy goals. Even if persons have an obligation to 
promote just institutions--as Rawls does require--this says nothing about them having to do so even when 
they might rather promote other morally worthy ends. Thus, Murphy needs (a1) for his argument to 
succeed, but only can possibly get (a2).
to implausible implications, he cannot show that we ought to reject dualism. Murphy 
mistakes a commitment to dualism with a commitment about what individuals ought to 
do in non-ideal theory. Yet, since dualism involves no commitment to the content of 
individual duties in ideal or non-ideal theory, his arguments fail. 
 Overall, Murphy’s argument fails because he confuses a commitment to dualism 
with a substantive view about the content of individual obligations. He supposes that 
what distinguishes principles for institutions from principles for individuals implies 
something about what our individual obligations are. There is no doubt that someone who 
is committed to dualism might have implausible commitments about individual duties, 
but a commitment to dualism does not entail such commitments. 
5.1.3 Murphy’s Defensive Arguments
Perhaps the most impressive aspect of Murphy’s essay is the arguments he uses against 
the various  theorists who, up  to that point, had argued on behalf of separating individual 
principles from institutional principles. Against Nagel’s division of moral labor, he claims 
that such a perspective might aid us in building institutions that best  promote justice, but 
it does not give us a reason to distinguish principles for institutions from principles for 
individuals at any  fundamental level.119 Against Thomas Pogge, he claims that the idea of 
causing harm to those involved in our institutions is insufficient for distinguishing our 
concern with institutions.120  Against Dworkin, he argues that a division between the 
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claims on a political community and the claims on individuals is too stark.121  Even if 
Murphy errs in the ways expressed in §4.1.1 and §4.1.2, these arguments  against  Nagel, 
Pogge, and Dworkin might seem to maintain their force.
 Yet, Murphy’s arguments themselves suffer from two mistakes that limit their 
effect. First, the argument against Dworkin supposes that dualism implies views about 
how individuals should act, which §4.1.2 has shown would not  be implied by dualism 
alone. Second, his arguments against Nagel and Pogge rely  merely on shifting the burden 
of proof. He claims that these views are not sufficient to justify a fundamental distinction 
between institutional and individual principles. Yet, given the failures of his own 
argument outlined above, he does not offer any adequate argument to show that all 
fundamental principles must apply to both institutions and individuals. It is only  if we 
suppose that Murphy has the default view that the claim that any argument is insufficient 
proves the conclusion of that argument wrong. Without an argument for his default 
position, Murphy does not give us any reason to deny that institutional principles and 
individual principles are morally distinct. 
 The arguments of the previous chapters remain untouched by  Murphy’s 
arguments. My claim is that  the principles that apply to the basic structure should be 
morally distinct because the principles that apply to it should be insensitive to moral 
context, whereas principles for individual action and many  other institutions should be 
sensitive. This claim does not rely on any  claims about differences in demands on moral 
agents, as (Murphy’s reconstruction of) Nagel’s argument does. It does not rely on any 
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views about the unique ways in which we cause harm to persons through institutions, as 
Pogge’s argument does. Likewise, it  does not rely  on views about the unique moral 
relationship  between members of a political community, as Dworkin’s does. In this way, 
the arguments I give are resistant to all of Murphy’s defensive arguments. 
5.1.4 The Underlying Motivation
There remains one larger point behind Murphy’s argument even after we recognize the 
problematic presupposition involved in appealing to fundamental principles,  after we 
show that Murphy’s argument against dualism fails, and even after we see the problems 
in his arguments against Nagel, Pogge, and Dworkin. Murphy  also makes an intuitive 
claim that motivated his argument against separating individual and institutional 
principles. Put simply, whatever we are concerned about with institutions, we should also 
be concerned about for individual action. For instance, the fact that equality  seems 
relevant for both assessing institutions and individual conduct seems to give us reason to 
treat both institutions and individual conduct as applications of a more general principle 
that expresses the importance of equality. Whatever the faults of his explicit argument, 
this core motivation might still stand. Does the fact that we care about some of the same 
things for institutions and for individual conduct  rightly  dissolve the distinction between 
individual principles and institutional principles? 
 This motivating point only reveals Murphy’s implicit  commitment  to, what I have 
called, generalism. For his arguments to succeed, Murphy needs it to be the case that the 
concerns we have about our institutions are the same as those about our individual action. 
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This would only be a challenge to my argument if fully  general first principles directly 
settled all moral and ethical conflicts. In appealing to “fundamental principles,” Murphy 
is implicitly  referring to a generalist model of morality in which conflicts are settled by 
first principles.  Murphy’s arguments would only bear out if he had a view like that of the 
act-utilitarians wherein our first principles directly applied to all moral concerns. 
 Without  an argument for generalism, Murphy’s claims amount to mere burden-
shifting. He means to show that previous arguments for the separation between 
institutional and individual principles fail. It is no surprise that those who are committed 
to a form of generalism will not find those previous arguments adequate. Murphy gives 
no more reason to accept generalism than to reject generalism. In this chapter, I mean to 
highlight the importance of this commitment to generalism and to directly address it. 
 Given the predominance of a commitment to generalism, it  is no surprise that 
many have seen Murphy’s argument as important, but I mean to undercut the convictions 
that ground generalism. To do so, I now what to look at the major arguments in favor of 
Generalism and then show why each is inadequate. Doing this will show why an 
argument from generalism against those who do not accept it can only be question-
begging. 
5.2. Sidgwick’s argument for Generalism
Through this chapter, I aim to combat that view that fully general first principles are the 
ground for all legitimate justifications. By  blocking this view, I defend limited 
conventionalism and thereby defend the primacy of the the basic structure as a distinct 
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subject. In §4.2, I will be concerned specifically with an argument that seeks to show that 
there must be one fully general first principle that settles all moral conflict. 
 This argument is most famous from Chapter 5 of J.S. Mill’s Utilitarianism122 but 
is most developed in Henry Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics.123 There, Sidgwick argued for 
utilitarianism from the intuitive idea that any  moral conflict  can be definitively settled. 
He argued that this intuition could only be correct if there were a single overarching 
moral principle capable of settling all conflicts. How else could any moral conflict be 
definitively decidable if there were not  an overarching principle that had authority  over 
any conflict? If there were such a principle, then its requirements would always 
determine how one ought to act in all instances. This reasoning establishes an agenda for 
moral philosophy that many still accept: to identify the single fundamental principle that 
settles all possible conflicts. For both Sidgwick and many today, the argument for 
utilitarianism is that promoting the greatest happiness seems to be the most appropriate 
principle that could play this role. Even those who deny utilitarianism, however, might 
still be tempted to identify such a fundamental principle. One might, for example, 
advocate the Kantian principle to preserve and promote autonomy in all instances.124 
 To be more precise, the argument goes as follows. If all moral conflicts are able to 
be definitively settled, then there must be one choice that it is right to make for any two 
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Mill argues that the Principle of Utility is the only sensible way to order our divergent judgements about the 
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123 Sidgwick, Henry. Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis; IN; Hackett Publishing Company), 418-422.
124 While Sidgwick argues against such a Kantian view as the fundamental principles, contemporary 
Kantians can offer responses that overcome his arguments. 
mutually  exclusive choices. The next step  is to suppose that for one choice to be right, 
there must be some principle that can articulate what it  is right to choose explicitly. Now, 
suppose that principle X determines what is right in the choice between α and β, and 
principle Y determines what is ethical between γ and δ. Now, imagine that there is some 
possible conflict where principle X justifies doing ε while principle Y justifies doing θ, 
where ε and θ are mutually  exclusive choices. For our choice amongst ε and θ to be right, 
we must now appeal to some principle Z to ethically choose between what is warranted 
by X and what is warranted by Y. This same process continues as there might now be 
conflicts between principles Z and and some principle W, and it continues until there is a 
single fully general principle. Once we determine that single fully general principle, we 
can appeal to that principle to definitively settle all moral conflicts. If that principles 
settles all conflicts, than we need only ever appeal to that  principles to determine what to 
do. 
5.2.1 Response from irreconcilable pluralism
One way  to respond to Sidgwick would be to claim that not all moral conflicts can be 
definitively settled. One might suppose that  we live amongst competing values and that we 
can do no better than to strike a balance between them in our judgments. Such a view might 
recognize that the considerations relevant within our particular moral contexts are amongst 
these competing values. With this view, there is no reason to suppose that there must  be some 
final principle that settles all moral conflicts. We might  develop principles that balance values 
relevant for our institutions and we might develop principles that balance values relevant for 
individual actions, but  we do not  need to suppose that there is anything beyond our 
competing values that unifies them.
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 I take it that whether one believes in irresolvable value conflicts is one of the 
major dividing lines between contemporary  ethical theorists. For some, the project  of 
ethics is to determine the structure of ethics that resolves these conflicts, and for others 
the project  is to start from the fact of irresolvable conflict. For figures such as Isaiah 
Berlin, Michael Walzer and Bernard Williams, to start an argument from the assumption 
that there must always be a rational way  to resolve a moral conflict is to construct a bad 
argument. As Williams writes, 
“It is my view, as it  is Berlin’s, that  value-conflict is not necessarily 
pathological at all, but  something necessarily involved in human values, 
and to be taken as central by an adequate understanding of them. I also 
think, though Berlin may not, that where conflict needs to be overcome, 
this ‘need’ is not of a purely logical character, nor a requirement of pure 
rationality, but rather a kind of social or personal need, the pressure of 
which will be felt in some historical circumstances rather than others.”125
Here, Williams emphasizes value conflict is an inherent part of our lives, one that should 
not be explained away or avoided. Importantly, the fact that not all conflicts in value are 
rationally reconcilable does not mean that no conflicts of value are rationally 
reconcilable.126 Reflection, understanding and revision of our values might go some way 
towards resolving these conflicts, and ethical philosophy might have an important role in 
doing this.127  Yet, one makes a mistake if one assumes that all conflicts must be 
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resolvable. For those who follow a perspective like Williams, the argument from the 
demands of practical reason to generalism does not even get off the ground.
5.2.2 Response from Constructivism 
While this kind of intuitionism is one plausible response to Sidgwick, those on the other side 
of the dividing line than Williams will find it inadequate. If one believes that  our moral 
conflicts can be definitively  settled, then we need to appeal to something beyond a balance of 
intuition. John Rawls recognized this, and he drew a response to Sidgwick’s arguments from 
a constructivist interpretation of Kant’s moral philosophy. In his lectures on Kantian 
Constructivism, Rawls writes,
“Sidgwick overlooked [the possibility of constructivism] because of a second 
limitation: he failed to recognize that Kant’s doctrine...is a distinctive method 
of ethics...Since Kant’s view is the leading historical example of a 
constructivist  doctrine, the result once again is that constructivism finds no 
place in Methods [of Ethics].”128 
The fact that constructivism finds no place in Sidgwick’s argument is significant  because the 
method of constructivism provides a way to definitively settle moral conflicts, and this 
method does not  rely  on a single fundamental principle. Instead, the principles that settle 
moral conflict are determined by  an appropriate constructive procedure.129 It is not a more 
fundamental principle that justifies our institutional and individual principles but the pedigree 
of their constructive procedure. 
 It  is by appeal to a constructivist method that one can address Sidgwick’s argument 
and justify the possibility  that principles can be distinct at a deep level. According to 
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Sidgwick’s argument, our various principles are all justified by  a substantive first principle. 
Once we recognize this, we see the variety  of principles we might use merely  as a variety of 
principles that guide us in satisfying the first  principle. The picture is quite different 
according to constructivist  reasoning. According to this view, our principles are justified by 
whether an appropriate procedure would result in those principles.130  If a principle is so 
justified, it  maintains its own authority as a principle. It’s authority is not merely  that it 
guides us towards satisfying a more fundamental principle. After all, the procedure is 
constructed to result in principles that have such authority. These principles are constructed 
as fundamental principles, and we should not look past them towards anything more 
fundamental. After all, they are not justified as satisfying some deeper principle but from the 
pedigree of their procedure. In this way, a commitment to constructivism can justify a 
plurality of fundamental principles, so long as each would result from an appropriate 
procedure. 
 This point  might be better seen by comparing three different  constructivist views. 
First, in Rawls’s version of Kantian Constructivism, fundamental principles are justified as 
those that express our nature as free and equal moral persons. In determining the principles of 
justice, we accept  the principles that  persons would agree to under specified conditions 
because those principles respect our nature as free and equal. The principles resulting from 
such procedures are not merely  applications of a first principle to a particular context but are 
themselves constructed as first  principles. Second, T.M. Scanlon’s contractualism warrants 
those principles that no one could reasonably reject. If we come to recognize that a moral 
principle could not be reasonably rejected, then we accept  it as one of many fundamental 
principles. We do accept these principles as applications of a first principle or as guides for 
how to act in ways that no one could reasonably  reject. Third, those who read Kant as a 
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constructivist  can explain our principles as those that can be willed as universal law. Only 
those maxims that align with these principles will be free of empirical determination, so only 
those actions in accordance with such principles are truly  autonomous. In each of these three 
cases, the constructivist  procedure results in a plurality of fundamental principles rather than 
applications of a first principles or mere guiding principles. 
 Once we appreciate this aspect  of constructivism, we can see why  Sidgwick’s 
argument is mistaken. We can recognize that  moral conflicts can be definitively  settled 
without an appeal to a single first principle. Rather than any one fundamental value--such as 
the greatest happiness or maximal coextensive autonomy--constructivists recognize a 
plurality of principles that fit with one another and settle any moral conflict.
5.2.3 Responses from Conceptions of Rationality
Finally, we could recognize the possibility  of other moral theories that  accept neither 
constructivism nor that moral conflicts cannot be definitively settled. Implicit  in 
Sidgwick’s argument is a typical claim that a decision between two options can be 
rational only  if there is a single scale on which they can be compared. Another response 
to Sidgwick’s argument can deny that this is a condition of rational choice.
 Once example of such a theory is offered by Elizabeth Anderson in Value in 
Ethics and Economics. There, Anderson argues against the view that there is a single 
overarching standard of value. She identifies the appeal of this view in that it  can satisfy 
two demands of practical reason,  that “reason can settle all question about what to 
choose” and “that reason requires the global maximization of value.”131  If there is only 
one standard of value, then these two demands can be settled by reference to that one 
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value; Reason settles all questions by appeal to maximizing that single value. In this way, 
she recognizes the appeal of a single standard of value as similar to the intuition behind 
Sidgwick’s argument, it allows us to settle any possible value conflict. 
 Anderson argues against this view by rejecting the notion that the values of states-
of-affairs can be globally compared, opting for more contextual guidance in decision-
making. Practical reason can still settle all questions about what  to choose (as it needs to), 
but we do not need to suppose that it  does so by reference to some global value. Instead, 
it only  needs to settle specific questions within determinate contexts, which it can do by 
being responsive to relevant contextual features. In this way, Anderson gives an example 
of a third way  in which all moral conflicts can be settled that does not appeal to 
constructivism. Specifically, she relies on the determinate values that  are relevant within 
a context to settle what to do. 
 Similarly, Henry Richardson offers another example of how practical reason can 
settle value conflicts. In Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, he argues for a kind of 
reflective equilibrium that supports our principles.132  When we recognize that any two 
principles conflict, we should revise one or both principles. We might revise them in any 
number of ways, but we see the conflict as reason why our principles are in need of 
revision. We do not search for a single foundational principle that resolves all conflict but 
instead revise our principles for coherence amongst themselves.
 So, the most daunting argument against the claims of Chapter 3 is Sidgwick’s 
view that, if all moral conflicts can be definitively  settled, then there must be a first 
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principle that is capable of settling any conflict. In response, I have first shown that many 
will deny Sidgwick’s starting premise that all conflicts can be settled. Second, I have 
shown that even those who do not deny  this starting premise can explain how conflicts 
are definitively settled without appeal to first principles. Constructivism provides a way 
of settling conflict by  appeal to the principles that are licensed by an appropriate 
procedure. Also, nothing blocks more alternative conceptions of rationality like those of 
Anderson’s and Richardson’s, both of which show the problems with Sidgwick’s 
assumption about rationality. Together, these arguments show why we do not need to 
accept a single fully general first principle. 
5.3 Other Arguments for Generalism
Even those who do not think that all moral conflicts can be definitively  settled might still 
think that any judgement must be justified by appeal to fully general first principles. For 
some, this does not mean that there is a single first principle; there are many. In this 
section, I treat three arguments that seem to support the idea that there must be first 
principles from which all judgments are justified. The first argues from simplicity, the 
second from unity and the third from our attempts to explain our various moral 
judgments. In each case, I show that the arguments are inadequate to ground generalism. 
5.3.1  Scientific Simplicity
First, one important advantage to broad explanations in science is that they  allow us to 
easily understand and apply those explanations. As Quine wrote, “Simplicity  also 
engenders good working conditions for the continued activity of the creative imagination; 
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for, the simpler a theory, the more easily  we can keep relevant considerations in mind.”133 
This might be one reason why both laws of nature and ethical principles should be 
sufficiently broad. By articulating fully broad principles that  relate to all domain-specific 
principles, we have “good working conditions” for solving our ethical problems.  
 Yet, this is only  a point about the advantageousness of simple theories, and does 
not give reason for us to suppose that the simple theory is more correct or reasonable. If 
Newtonian mechanics is simpler or easier to understand than Quantum Mechanics, that is 
no reason to believe that Newtonian Mechanics is true. While we surely  have reason to 
prefer simple and broad explanations, there is little reason to suppose that all explanations 
must be simple and broad. Rather, the most important question is whether our 
explanations adequately  explain, regardless of whether they are complex and narrow or 
simple and broad. We might  think that the simplicity of Kepler’s models defeated 
Copernicus’s use of epicycles, but the simplicity  would not count in Kepler’s favor unless 
its predictions were also more accurate.
 The tendency to suppose fully general ethical principles probably developed from 
the general appreciation of the scientist’s ability to provide simple and broad explanations 
for our observations of the world.  Yet, on what basis can one defend this tendency in 
ethics? Why would we suppose that ethical questions are best answered by broad and 
simple principles rather than restricted or complicated principles? Since the values in life 
are so diverse and multifaceted, why would our ethical principles be any less complex 
than ethical life itself? Surely, if one asks the question, “what  is the foundation for all 
233 
133 Word and Object (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 1960), 20. 
ethics,” one invites an answer that is maximally  broad, but the tendency to ask that 
question assumes a view under which it can be answered. While it is possible that  the 
best way to treat all these ethical subjects is to find some maximally broad principle, it 
does not need to be the only way. Without some other argument for their similarity, we 
should not assume that the model for physics is appropriate for ethics.
 Overall, we should recognize that a simple explanation of any complex 
phenomenon is bound to be wrong. Human life is complex, so ethical theory should be 
hesitant about simplicity. Think of all the different pursuits that persons engage in and all 
the different relationships we have. Think of all the different tradeoffs we might face and 
all the persons we might become.  Think of all the different responsibilities that might 
direct us, opportunities that might open to us, and understandings that might close to us 
when we pick one path in life over another. Now think of all the lives we could have led 
had our social world or material conditions been different. Human life is astoundingly 
complex in its subtleties and possibilities. With so many  ways of engaging with the world 
and only a single life within which to do so, we should recognize the complexities of 
ethics.
 In science, a simple theory can be elegant but fail to explain the evidence. It  
would be nice if all matter were composed of four elements but, when we use such a 
theory  in the world, the world pushes back. When we use our elegant and simple theories 
for ethics however, the world does not push back. Instead, we just  see the world in terms 
of that simpler theory; we see our actions as means to happiness or choices as instances 
of autonomy. What tells against  simplicity in science does not do so in ethics, so we need 
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to be extra careful of our own theoretical preference for simplicity in the case of ethical 
theory.
5.3.2 The Unity of Ethics
Second, one might argue in favor a broad principles on the basis that they  would explain 
the unity  of our practical judgments. Typically, we think that our ethical judgements 
should form a coherent whole and an appeal to fully broad principles or values would 
explain that unity. Regardless of the role that such unity plays in resolving conflict, we 
might take it to be a basic condition of ethics that all values form some kind of unity. It is 
because general principles express a unity amongst our various commitments, that our 
commitment to ethical unity  would lead us to think that broad principles have a greater 
authority. 
 Yet, a commitment to broad first principles is not the only way to explain a unity 
amongst our ethical commitments. Even if we recognize the importance of some unity in 
ethical judgements--which many might not recognize--we do not need to suppose that 
general principles are part of that unity.  For example, Elizabeth Anderson explains the 
unity  of judgments as arising from the active constitution of our identities and ideals. She 
says, “When a person’s psychological states are rationally justified, or come tolerably 
close, they bear expressive relations to one another that give them an internal coherence 
and unity.”134  Alternatively, as we saw in 4.2.2, Rawls understand the unity  of 
constructivism as consisting in an appropriate sequence of subject. For him, “The 
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underlying unity  is provided by the idea that free and equal moral persons are to construct 
reasonable and helpful guidelines for moral reflection in view of their need for such 
organizing principles and their corresponding subjects are presumed to have.”135  The 
important thing to notice is that both Rawls and Anderson provide alternative ideas of 
what makes unity  possible in ethics without general first principles. Both appeal to more 
contextual judgments but Anderson unifies these judgments by appeal to the unity of self 
while Rawls does so by a practical procedure. While fully general principles may provide 
one way of unifying our ethical commitments, general principles are not necessary for 
such unity. 
 An argument from unity has recently been used by Ronald Dworkin in Justice for 
Hedgehogs, and it might seem like his argument could be used on behalf of fully general 
first principles. After all, Dworkin appeals to an ideal of dignity--the constituent parts of 
which are respect towards others and responsibility for oneself--as defining the unity of 
all value.136  Yet, we need to be careful to separate the whole of Dworkin’s positive 
proposal from his specific argument for unity.137  This specific argument arises from 
Dworkin’s understanding of morality and ethics as independent of the scientific world of 
brute facts. As he says in the introduction, “Value judgments are true, when they are true, 
not in virtue of any matching but in view of the substantive case that can be made for 
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them.”138  Since our values depend upon the cases that will be made for them, our 
justification will depend on other values. It is from this that Dworkin now supposes that 
an ideal--fully responsible--agent’s values would be fully  complementary and mutually 
supporting. The core idea is that our arguments for our values depend on our other values, 
so a fully worked out conception of value must bring our values into a broader unity.139 
Since there is no realm of value independent of our argument for our values, we cannot 
say that the fully harmonized conception of value gets anything wrong. It can only fail to 
make the case for itself. 
 While I find Dworkin’s argument about the independence of morality  and ethics 
quite appealing and tend to agree that the vindication of a value judgment depends only 
how it is supported by other values, I do not see how this argument could be used in favor 
of fully general first  principles--or even in favor of the unity  of value. The reason why it 
could not favor fully  general first principles is because that would prejudge the final 
interpretation of how our values hang together. Why would we think that our values must 
ultimately  support one another through fully general first principles? Whether we ought 
to accept such principles depends on whether our acceptance of them is supported by  our 
other values. Even if his arguments show that value judgments cannot conflict, there are 
other ways of resolving conflicts than by appeal to fully general first principles--as the 
arguments against Sidgwick show. Even if Dworkin’s argument gets us unity, it does not 
237 
138 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 11. 
139 “The moral realm is the realm of argument, not brute, raw fact. Then it is not implausible--on the 
contrary--to suppose that there are no conflicts but only mutual support in that realm. Or, what comes to the 
same thing, that any conflicts we find intractable show not disunity but a more fundamental unity of value 
that produces these conflicts as substantive results.” Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 11.
get us unity through first principles. That comes only through the more arduous task of 
showing what understanding of morality and ethics is best. 
 A second problem goes closer to the core of Dworkin’s project. He argues from 
(a) the idea that value judgments depend on their supportability by other value 
judgements, to (b) the mutual supportability of value judgments for a fully responsible 
moral agent, 140 to (c) the fact that values do not conflict, to (d) the unity of value. For the 
sake of argument, I will assume that (c) and (d) are mutually interchangeable; I assume 
that the unity of value is nothing more than the fact that values do not conflict. If they  do 
differ, then I see no argument that would get from (c) to (d). This is worth pointing out 
because it emphasizes the way in which “unity,” for Dworkin, is nothing more than a lack 
of conflict. With this point aside, my bigger concern is with the move from (b) to (c); I 
see little reason to suppose that the mutual supportability of values supposes the lack of 
conflict between values. We can--and Dworkin does--imagine a scheme of values 
whereby there is no principled way to settle conflicts. There is nothing that rules out this 
possibility, and Dworkin even acknowledges this when he writes, 
“There is another possibility. It might be that  for some reason the best 
interpretation of our values requires that  they conflict: they serve our 
underlying moral responsibilities best if we conceive of them in such a 
way that from time to time we must compromise one to serve another. 
Values don’t conflict just  because they do, but because they work best for 
us when we conceptualize them so that they do. That is a conceivable 
view, and perhaps someone might make it  seem plausible...It would 
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provide an interpretation that reconciles values in a different  way: by 
showing conflict as deeper collaboration.”141
In this passage, Dworkin recognizes a possible view that would block the move from (b) 
to (c). If we see conflict between values as the best way  to show the mutual supportability 
of our values, then we do not get to the fact that values do not conflict. This is an odd 
passage because Dworkin does not explain why this view would be implausible and he 
does not say  why this interpretation of values would be a “deeper collaboration.” To what 
end would our values then be collaborating? We can only suppose that they are working 
together if we assume the unity  of value, but  that is the very  thing that this view blocks 
the argument towards. 
 My suggestion is that our commitment to the mutual supportability  of values does 
not license a commitment to the lack of conflict in values. Accordingly, Dworkin lacks an 
argument for value unity. It  is of course true that  his full view presents a picture of of 
ethics that  is unified, and his picture might end up being the very best. However, his 
arguments do not show that we should accept the unity of value unless we accept his 
whole view. 
 As a final point in favor of my argument, I want to point out the incongruity  
between the unity that Dworkin supposes is in ethics and the disunity that  he supposes in 
interpretation. In order to make sense of interpretation in all its guises, Dworkin gives a 
disunified conception of interpretation. What makes for a good interpretation depends on 
the particular genre within which the interpretation is given. What makes for an 
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interpretation of the law substantially differs from an interpretation of Hamlet. In each 
case, what makes for interpretation depends on the values implicit in the practices of that 
genre.142 In this story, Dworkin gives a disunified conception of interpretation in order to 
best interpret it. What  would block the same kind of disunified conception from being the 
best interpretation of our values?
5.3.3 The “Why?” question
While broad first principles are not necessary for unity across ethics, these principles do 
seem to satisfy  a different need for explanation. Suppose we could show a consistent set 
of range-limited principles that adequately  captured our moral convictions and gave us 
guidance in our decisions. Still we would wonder why these principles were adequate, 
and why they were adequate for their particular ranges. This would seemingly require 
some general principle that could explain why a principle is fit for a particular range. 
Henry Sidgwick presses this intuition in Methods of Ethics when he writes, 
Even granting that these rules can be so defined as perfectly  to fit together 
and cover the whole field of human conduct, without coming into conflict 
and without leaving any  practical questions unanswered,--still the 
resulting code seems an accidental aggregate of precepts, which stands in 
need of rational synthesis. In short, without being disposed to deny that 
conduct commonly  judged to be right is so, we may yet require some 
deeper explanation of why it is so. From this demands springs the third 
species or phase of Intuitionism, which...to get one or more principles 
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more absolutely  and and undeniably  true and evident, from which the 
current rules may be deduced.”143
In this quotation, Sidgwick emphasizes that it is not the need to avoid practical conflict 
alone that leads us towards first principles from which judgments can be deduced, but 
also the need to answer why the principles we accept are the right principles. It might 
seem like fully general first principles can adequately answer this why question. 
 In his book, Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, Henry Richardson focuses on 
Sidgwick’s claim, trying to understand exactly why Sidgwick aims to find fully  general 
first principles in order to put ethics on a rational basis. To be more particular, Richardson 
imagines two principles of limited scope that do not conflict and asks why  Sidgwick 
would demand that  these two principles be explained by a broader first principle. As an 
example, he uses the two principles “benevolence towards one’s friends, implacable 
justice to strangers” because there is no conflict  in what the principles require. 
Richardson points out  that Sidgwick seems to suppose that an adequate answer to the 
“why?” question must provide a reason that  “(a) is of wider scope than the two 
subordinated principles because it concerns itself with what should happen on both sides 
of the scope restriction (in our example, with both friends and strangers), and (b) can 
soundly or appropriately  override each of these two subordinated principles.”144  In this 
way, Richardson views the Sidgwick model as proposing a kind of “judicial” model of 
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practical reasoning wherein “Principles of superior validity thus sit  in judgment over 
lesser principles, overruling them when necessary and settling their boundaries.”145
 Richardson’s arguments against Sidgwick are primarily  challenges to this judicial 
model of practical reasoning. After all, his ultimate concern is to understand the structure 
of practical reason, so Sidgwick’s claims about practical reason are his primary concern. 
He makes two separate points against  this model, both of which are important to see for 
us to reject broad first  principles as answering the why question. First, Richardson points 
out that  we are rarely as confident with our general and broad principles as we are about 
our beliefs about particulars.146  So, why  would we think that we would get an more 
authoritative verdict by  appealing to the broader principle we are less confident in? 
Second, Richardson argues that it involves a problematic dissociation to the self. If one 
set of our values pulls in one way, and a different set of our values pulls in another way, 
then in settling the issue by appeal to a superior authority, we distance ourselves from the 
values that pull us. As Richardson puts it,
“It would be an oddly dissociated person who generally felt a distance 
from his competing desires and commitments as a judge is supposed to be 
from parties who come before her...How can you decide a case fairly when 
you are sleeping with both the plaintiff and the defendant?”147
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The basic idea in this criticism is that thinking of fully general principles as fully 
authoritative in practical conflicts would not adequately  recognize the particular cares we 
have that give rise to the conflict.148 Deliberation, for Richardson, is more about finding a 
way to adequately respect both sides of the conflict, to “meet in the middle,”149  than it is 
to look towards principles outside of the concerns themselves. Both these reasons seem to 
suggest that the judicial model is not an appropriate understanding of our practical 
reasoning. 
 If the judicial understanding is not a proper understanding of practical reasoning, 
then what reason do we have to think that a fully  general principle would answer the why 
question of ethics any better than principles that are not fully  general. If we had some 
proof of a moral theory that consisted of first principles, which grounded all other 
principles, then we would have reason to think that such first  principles justified all 
others. Yet, it would be the proof of this moral theory that  answered our why question and 
not that fact that they are general principles. Any such proof of this moral theory could 
not rely on the claim that  first principles better explain all our other principles--as 
Sidgwick’s argument does. Yet, barring such proof, we cannot suppose that the best 
answer to our why question would necessarily  involve general first  principles. One might 
appeal to simplicity or unity to make that argument, but I have already shown why we 
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have no reason to suppose that  ethical life is simple or that  general principles are the only 
way to get ethical unity. 
 So, without an appeal to simplicity, unity, the structure of practical reason or a 
proof of valid first  principles, the argument that first principles explain our moral 
principles best is ungrounded. We have no reason to think that  first principles would 
better answer the why question than would an account that did not rely on any such 
principles. 
5.3.4 Defending Against Generalism
Without  an argument from simplicity, unity, or explanation, it is not clear how one can 
ground the claim that broader principles have greater authority. So, it is not clear why 
someone who is not committed to the greater authority of broad principles can be 
convinced of it. We are left with a distinction between those committed to a theoretical 
intuition, and those not committed to it. 
 I know of no ways by  which this difference can be settled than by showing that 
one moral theory does better for what we want a moral theory to do than another. Until I 
am shown a reason why a moral theory  that involves broad first  principles does better 
than any that  do not, then I see no reason to be committed to such a view. However, I do 
think there are prima facie reasons why  a moral theory that relies on general first 
principles to directly  settle all moral conflicts would do worse than moral theories that do 
not. Explaining these prima facie reasons is the goal of the next section.
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5.4 Objection to Generalism
I’ve defined generalism as the view that fully  general first principles directly  settle all 
moral and ethical conflicts. The most common form of generalism is act-utilitarianism, 
but we can likewise identify certain forms of Kantianism or value pluralism as also 
committed to generalism. My remarks in §4.2 and §4.3 are meant to block various 
arguments that might seem to show that one must be committed to generalism, but  I have 
not given any reason to reject a commitment to generalism. The goal of this section is to 
give one brief reason why I think such a commitment is morally problematic. 
 One alternative to generalism--and the alternative that I am concerned with 
defending in this dissertation--is the view that our social context affects the moral 
principles that appropriately regulate our actions. If persons generally recognize a 
practice of property  that can be sufficiently  justified, then persons have an obligation to 
follow the rules of property. If persons generally recognize a legal system, then persons 
have an obligation to follow the law. If flaunting certain norms would express disrespect, 
then persons ought to follow those norms. It is true that a generalist can often explain 
why we should respect property, obey a law, or follow etiquette in any particular instance 
by arguing that some fully general principle applied to the circumstances would show that 
we should do that which respects property, obeys a law, or follows etiquette. They might 
even say that, given the facts, it  will generally be the case that we should do these things, 
so “respect property,” “follow the law,” and “follow etiquette” will be good heuristics for 
guiding our action. However, the generalist cannot make sense of our having an 
obligation to respect property, follow the law, or follow etiquette. Doing so would mean 
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that not all legitimate justifications appeal directly  to first principles. In such a case, we 
would need to appeal to the rules of our social practices as legitimately determining how 
we should act. Our moral conflicts would be settled by the particularities of our social 
context. Such a view would no longer be generalist. 
 To focus on one example, one could either explain the obligation to respect 
property  as either (a) a natural obligation, (b) not really an obligation, or (c) a practice-
dependent obligation. If (a), then one must claim that property, in all its specificity, is a 
natural obligation. Even if one is willing to bite this bullet for property, there is a wider 
range of obligations that seem conventional, which one would also need to explain as a 
natural duty. For example, if one recognizes a citizen’s obligation to vote, this would 
need to be justified as a natural duty as well. If (b), then one claims that it  is only the case 
that we often should respect property  claims, and not that we truly have an obligation to 
do so. This is the act-utilitarian route. I have claimed that the best option was (c), which 
requires that we recognize our obligation to respect property as contingent; they  rely on 
the general recognition of norms of property. When such a system is adequately justified, 
we have reason to respect property. 
 Here, I want to expand on this argument and better explain why I think option (c) 
is the best way to think about obligations like property. As I also indicated in the last two 
chapters, there are many more aspects of social life beyond obligation that I think are 
dependent on the particularities of a social structure. The virtues that we aspire to, the 
values that direct our activities, and relationships that  we care about are also given their 
particular form within a social context. So, my argument is meant not only to defend 
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practice-dependent obligations, like property, but practice-dependent values, virtues, and 
relationships. 
 The first  step of my argument is to point  out the ways in which contingent 
features of our social world are important to us. Many of our goals only make sense as 
goals within a particular society; for example, the goal to get tenure or to write a 
particular book. How we think of our selves is also tied to the social roles we occupy or 
our particular hobbies; to see oneself as American, or as an academic, or as someone who 
likes to sail or paint. Moreover, many of the norms that we have internalized are 
conventional. We can recognize that a morally seamless life, in which our aims our 
integrated with appropriate moral constraints, is an ideal. Yet, this ideal only occurs when 
we have internalized moral constraints into our daily  behavior, and this will often mean 
integrating conventional constraints--such as our respect for property. Once internalized 
in this way, these norms are important to who we are and how we live. In all the various 
ways that we plan our life, we plan it against a background of social expectations. We 
rely  on the fact  that there are authorities, such as judges, that  decide conflicts. That we 
feel obligated to such an authority  may be contingent, but it is nonetheless an important 
part of how we plan our lives. In many more ways than I can go into here, the 
contingencies of our social life specify what matters to us.  
 The second step of the argument is to insist that the right view of morality must 
respect what is important to us and--more importantly--what is important to others. 
Beginning in the 1980s, there was a swath of philosophical articles and books that 
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stressed the ways in which morality should not be over-demanding.150  Samuel Scheffler 
expressed this point as arguing that morality should be human; it should fit with the kinds 
of creatures that we are.151  A morality that did not respect what was important to us and 
important to others would be burdensome to us, but it would also be inhuman in other 
ways. We are social creatures, who build our lives with others according to conventional 
rules and contingent norms, and morality ought to be sensitive to the ways in which our 
lives are socially embedded. How we understand ourselves, our lives and our 
relationships with others are influenced by the contingencies of society. A morality that 
was not sensitive to these contingencies would not be a human morality. This is apparent 
from a first person perspective because we would not want to be bound by  a morality that 
did not  fit with the lives we lead, but it  is even more apparent in how we should live with 
others. We do not want to treat others according to moral norms that do not respect what 
is important to them.152 
 With these two points established, the problem with the generalist view is that it 
does not respect what is important to us and others because it does not respect the 
contingent features of our moral context. According to this view, how we ought to choose 
is directly determined by fundamental principles that hold across all social contexts. The 
generalist might recognize particularities of our society as social facts that bear on the 
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application of general principles, but it does not treat the practices of society as having 
any significance for us. Once we see who we are and what we care about as crucially 
linked to the particularities of our social structure, this makes generalist morality  quite 
alienating. The fundamental principle of the generalist are imposed upon us and our 
society rather than being a manifestation of who we are. 
 By contrast, a theory that recognizes contingency in ethical life can properly 
respect the way  that particularities of the social structure are important to us. If our claims 
to property and to other conventional rights are important to us, a conception of morality 
that puts our property  claims and conventional rights on a firm foundation respects what 
is important to us. I have throughout argued for a view of morality that is sensitive to our 
social context, partly because such a view of morality better expresses who we are. 
 The obvious objection to this view is that it seems too relativistic. To admit this 
kind of contingency in ethical life might seem to say that all of ethics and morality is 
contingent. To say  that  are social structure establishes certain values, virtues, 
relationships and obligations might seem to say that all there is to ethics is a particular 
social structure. 
 If the only  way to develop such a view were to accept relativism, then I would 
recognize that this would be an objection to the view. I recognize that relativism is 
inadequate as a moral theory. Yet, saying that ethical life is sensitive to the particularities 
of our society is not to say  that it is fully  determined by the particularities of our society. 
A view of ethical and moral life that is sensitive to our moral context does not deny that 
there are many obligations, values, virtues are relationships that are directly  justified by 
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absolute principles. For example, it might be immoral in any society to deceive or 
murder. It also does not deny that there are certain obligations, values, virtues and 
relationships that are justified by absolute principles but need to be specified within a 
particular social context. For example, Barbara Herman has argued that the imperfect 
duty of beneficence is specified into particular moral requirements only in a society.153 
Others might think that there is a natural right to property, but that right is specified 
within particular social communities. In either case, the absolute principles that surpass 
any particular community are still an important element of ethical life. 
 The broader point of this dissertation is to show why the view developed here is 
not relativist in yet another sense. The particular practices that explain much of the 
contingency  in ethical life are themselves open to assessment. The fact that  they establish 
certain obligations, values, virtues or relationships does not make those practices any 
more prima facie justified. It remains the case that our assessment of these institutions 
will often be sensitive to the moral context those institutions are set within--as argued in 
§3.2.2. Yet, our assessment of the basic structure institutions does not occur within any 
moral context. They  are the institutions that the vast  majority of our practices occur 
within, so they establish a moral context rather than being situated within one. 
Accordingly, the proper way to assess the basic structure institutions is by  values that are 
outside of moral context. We ought to assess these institutions by appeal to absolute 
moral principles that are independent of social particularity. From there, we can assess 
the various institutions within a moral context that is justified by absolute moral 
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principles. It is in this way that the basic structure acts as a mooring for ethical life. As 
argued in Chapter 4, the particularities of our society and culture will swash the content 
of ethical life one way or another, but our ethical life stays tethered to non-relativist 
moral ground so long as our basic structure is justified by absolute principles,
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Chapter 6
The Concept of Justice 
“Plainly we cannot  grapple adequately with the issue if we see it as one concerning 
the proprieties of linguistic usage. For what  really is at  stake is the comparative merit 
of a wider or narrower concept...If we are to make a reasoned choice between these 
concepts, it  must be because one is superior to the other in the way in which it will 
assist  our theoretical inquires, or advance and clarify our moral deliberations, or 
both.”                            
      -H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 209 
With the work of the past  four chapters complete, we can now return to the topic of 
justice. I have defended the claim that “the basic structure has primacy as a distinct  moral 
subject,” but the more typical Rawlsian claim is that “the basic structure is the primary 
subject of justice.”154  I choose to make the former claim because the value of taking the 
basic structure as subject transcends any  particular view about justice. Our political and 
moral theory should recognize the primacy of the basic structure regardless of our 
particular understanding of justice as an ideal. 
 Most objections to the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure come from 
alternative articulations of justice that show why the basic structure is not the primary 
subject of justice. Unfortunately, these arguments are unlikely to resolve any conflicts. 
More often than not, one’s views about justice are fitted to our broader moral and 
theoretical commitments. We do not share significant agreement over what justice is such 
that appeals to justice could settle our disagreements. Arguments about the nature of 
justice might provide helpful contrasts between moral views, but they are unlikely  to 
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settle the deep disagreements that typically divide philosophers. So, I have sought to 
construct an argument that appeals to notions that are less contentious than a conception 
of justice. In particular, I have tried to show that those who accept a limited form of 
moral conventionalism should recognize the primacy of the basic structure as a distinct 
moral subject.
 Yet, I cannot merely  ignore those arguments that start from a conception of 
justice. While I do not think that arguments about the nature of justice are the best way to 
vindicate the primacy of the basic structure, others think that arguments about the nature 
of justice are the best way  to defeat the primacy of the basic structure. I need to address 
claims about the nature of justice insofar as they are an objection to the view I defend. 
That is the central task of this chapter. 
 In particular, I am concerned with two objections that begin with a claim about 
justice. According to the first, we misrepresent justice by focusing on the basic structure 
of society. Suppose we recognize that the basic structure should be just, and we set out to 
determine moral principles that apply to the basic structure. We are then likely to 
conceive of the principles we come to accept as principles of justice. This, in turn, is 
likely to skew our perspective towards justice more generally. We will think that the 
moral demands on the basic structure indicate the moral demands of justice tout court. 
Thereby we run the risk of misrepresenting justice by associating the broader ideal with 
its limited application to the basic structure. As an example, suppose that justice requires 
equality  of treatment, and we determine that a just basic structure equalizes each person’s 
opportunities for securing social goods. It would misrepresent justice if we took it to 
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require equality of opportunities for social goods. We would be representing the demands 
of justice as more limited than they really are. More generally, if justice requires X and 
this requires that a basic structure meet condition Y, it would be wrong to understand 
justice as Y. We would misunderstand an application of justice as justice itself. In this 
way, one’s focus on the basic structure might be objectionable because it misrepresents 
justice. 
 The second objection claims that we must determine what justice requires in order 
to determine the correct principles for the basic structure. While I have argued that the 
basic structure has primacy as a moral subject, one might claim that  articulating an ideal 
of justice has greater primacy. After all, such an ideal is necessary to properly understand 
how the basic structure could be just. Accordingly, we should primarily  be focused on 
articulating what justice requires and not on how the basic structure should be organized. 
 If these objections relied on a particular conception of justice, then they  would not 
be that problematic. The objections would then only be offering a contrast between 
conceptions of justice. What makes these objections more forceful is that  they seek to 
identify standards that any conceptions of justice must meet. They do not start from such 
premises as “justice consists in equality” or “justice consists in respect for natural rights.” 
Instead, they appeal to the way that justice figures into our practical reasoning and moral 
debate. The first objection supposes that any adequate conception of justice is broader 
than the demands it places on the basic structure. The second objection supposes that any 
adequate conception of justice has justificatory primacy. In this way, the arguments start 
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from conditions on the concept of justice. These two objections start from premises about 
how the idea of justice fits within our moral deliberation and debate. 
 Since the objections start from claims about the concept of justice, my response 
offers a perspective towards how we should think about the concept of justice. I do not 
argue against any conception but against the concept of justice that  these objections 
appeal to. To do so, I will contrast two ways that the ideal of justice figures in our 
deliberation and debate. A concept of justice might be “unified” or “disunified.”
 If one conceives of the concept of justice as “unified,” then one supposes that  the 
demands of justice can be articulated as a single moral demand across the various objects 
that might be considered just or unjust. We could, in theory, identify a single property that 
all just institutions, persons, actions, dispositions and societies have. In this way, a unified 
concept of justice is Platonic in that it identifies justice as having a particular essence 
instantiated in each just thing. By contrast, a “disunified” concept of justice holds that the 
demands of justice differ from one subject to the next. What makes for a just law is 
different than what makes for a just person, and what makes for a just basic structure can 
be different from what makes for a just action. In this way, a disunified concept of justice 
is like a deontologist’s concept of rightness; what is “right” is determined by a principle 
that applies in that circumstance rather than by a single principle that applies across all 
circumstances. Likewise, what is “just” is determined by a principle that applies to that 
subject and not by a single principle that applies across all subjects. 
 In response to the two objections, I argue for a disunified concept of justice over a 
unified concept. Instead of thinking that “a particular is just if it instantiates a unified and 
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general ideal,” we should think that “a particular is just if it satisfies a principle of justice 
that applies to it.” Beyond the formal property of satisfying a principle of justice, I argue 
that there does not need to be a single property  that makes all just things just.155  To 
determine whether something is just, we need not look for a single, unified and fully 
general principle of justice. Instead, we look to see whether that object satisfies a 
principle of justice.
 If one accepts a disunified concept of justice, then neither of the two above 
objections is a problem. First, focusing on the basic structure would not misrepresent 
justice. Determining how the basic structure should be does not influence how we should 
think about justice more generally because we can recognize that the principles of justice 
for the basic structure might be distinct from a principle of justice for other subjects. In 
determining how the basic structure should be, we could be seen as determining an 
appropriate principle of justice for the basic structure without making claims about justice 
as a whole. Second, we would not  need to first  articulate the demands of justice in order 
to determine how the basic structure should be because there is no single demand of 
justice for all subjects. We do not obviously  reason from a prior and broad ideal to the 
instances of that ideal. 
 My primary concern is in responding to these two objection, but a disunified 
conception of justice also allows me to better explain why the basic structure could be 
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“the primary subject of justice.” It  might seem odd to make this claim once we accept a 
disunified concept. After all, if something is just when it satisfies a principle of justice, 
then why would one subject of justice be more primary than another? However, I argue 
that it is the primacy of the basic structure as a moral subject  that makes the basic 
structure the primary  subject of justice. The particularities of our basic structure have 
profound and pervasive effect on our moral context, and this makes it a primary  concern. 
In this way, the arguments of the past four chapters combine with a disunified conception 
of justice to show why the basic structure might be properly understood as the primary 
subject of justice. 
 The argument of this chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I motivate the 
importance of the argument in §6.1 by showing the ways in which G.A. Cohen’s most 
developed criticism of Rawls relies on a unified concept of justice. Over the years, Cohen 
has made a lineage of arguments against Rawls, and they end with an argument that the 
Rawlsian focus on the basic structure is arbitrary  from the perspective of justice. Those 
who are not interested in seeing how Cohen’s argument developed between 1992 and 
2009 can skip  ahead to §6.1.3. There, I show how Cohen’s most developed arguments 
rely  on a unified concept of justice. By arguing on behalf of a disunified concept, this 
chapter addresses the most developed form of Cohen’s argument. 
 In §6.2, I give two arguments against a unified concept of justice. My first 
argument seeks to show how a disunified concept can better capture the argument 
between those who offer alternative conceptions of justice because it allows for both 
unified and disunified conceptions of justice. My second argument seeks to show that a 
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disunified concept is more aligned with the way in which we treat justice as having a kind 
of “preeminence.” The fact that something is often means that it is as it should be, and a 
disunified concept can more easily fit with this feature of justice. I end my argument in 
§6.3 by responding to an important  objection. My response to this objection allows me to 
explain how the basic structure might be rightfully identified as the primary subject of 
justice. 
 I do not doubt that there is a strong intuitive pull towards thinking about justice as 
a single unified ethical demand. Much about our use of the idea pulls us to articulate a 
single sense of justice that explains why  all things are just. What I mean to show here is 
the problem with thinking that justice must be a single moral demand. There is nothing 
conceptually necessary about treating justice as a unified and general moral demand, and 
I think we can give a better conception of justice that is not unified and general.
6.1 The Development and Force of Cohen’s Critique of Rawls: A Review
The lineage of arguments represented in Cohen’s 2009 book began with his 1992 Tanner 
Lectures titled “Incentives, Equality and Community.”156  In these Tanner Lectures, Cohen 
took issue with an intuitive motivation for Rawls’s difference principle. The difference 
principle justifies inequalities when they are to the advantage of the worst off, and such 
justified inequalities are typically thought possible only  because persons work harder 
when incentivized to do so, thereby yielding benefits for all. Yet, Cohen points out, this 
only occurs when the incentivized hold their hard work hostage for the incentive; the 
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worst off could be even better off if the incentivized were willing to work hard without 
the incentive. Cohen emphasizes that if persons really accepted the difference principle, 
then they  would not demand such incentives. In this way, Cohen argued that mutual 
acceptance of Rawls’s difference principle requires a much more egalitarian society  than 
most recognize; it requires a society of persons who work to the advantage of the worst 
off without requiring incentives to do so.
 This line of argument was sharpened in a 1995 article where Cohen argues against 
Brian Barry’s argument for the difference principle.157  Barry’s argument comes in two 
steps; we start from a prima facie commitment to the justice of equality, and then 
recognize that each is made better off in a society structured by the difference principle. 
Accordingly, even the worst off prefer a society structured according to the difference 
principle rather than equality. Yet, echoing his earlier argument, Cohen replies that a 
society organized in accordance with the difference principle is preferable only because 
the well-situated choose to act unjustly. If equality is prima facie just, then those who 
demand incentives to work towards the improvement of the worst off are working against 
equality, and thus against justice. Accordingly, Barry’s argument “accedes to injustice in 
its account of what justice is.” Yet, even if Cohen’s argument stands against Barry’s view, 
it does not stand against Rawls’s. Rawls does not recognize equality  as a prima facie just 
starting point, and Rawlsians should not do so. Accordingly, this 1995 article plays a 
minor role in Cohen’s substantive argument against Rawls. 
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 Cohen’s more important argument was published in 1997 and titled “Where the 
Action is: On the Site of Distributive Justice.” There, Cohen is centrally concerned with 
responding to a Rawlsian objection to his original 1992 argument. The conclusion of the 
original argument was that acceptance of the difference principle should lead members of 
society to refuse those incentives offered to make the worse off better off. Yet, the 
Rawlsian can respond that the difference principle applies only to the basic structure of 
society, and so its acceptance would not have any  impact on personal decisions. To 
extend the difference principle to individual choices would be like supposing that if one 
accepts that (a) governments should not favor a particular religion, they should accept 
that (b) individuals should not favor any  particular religion. In this way, the Rawlsian 
appeals to the distinction between principles for individuals and principles for 
institutions.
  What has made Cohen the primary  interlocutor in the arguments of this 
dissertation is how he responds to this distinction between individual and institutional 
principles. He offers a number of different responses that I have addressed at various 
points in my arguments. 
6.1.1 The first argument: profound and pervasive effects
In “Where the Action is: On the Site of Distributive Justice,”158  Cohen argues that any 
principle that applies only to the basic structure is problematic because there was no way 
in which the Rawlsian could adequately distinguish the basic structure from individual 
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choices. He writes, “a major fault line in the Rawlsian architectonic not  only wrecks the 
basic structure objection but also produces a dilemma for Rawls’s view of the subject of 
justice....The fault  line exposes itself when we ask the apparently simple question: what 
(exactly) is the basic structure?” Cohen recognizes two ways of answering this question; 
the basic structure is understood as the coercive structure or it is not. If defined as the 
coercive structure, it conflicts with the Rawlsian aim of assessing those aspects of society 
that have profound effects because more than the coercive structure has such effects. If it 
is not defined as the coercive structure, then it must necessarily involve personal choices, 
which would make the difference principle apply  to personal choices. Given this 
dilemma, the basic structure cannot be distinguished as subject. Since it cannot be 
distinguished as subject, the Rawlsian cannot reply  that the difference principle applies 
only to the basic structure. Thus, if the  difference principle is an appropriate principle of 
justice, it must be applied to individual choices.
 After the publication of Cohen’s 1997 article, the Rawlsian responses to Cohen’s 
criticism proliferate and Cohen’s arguments against these responses proliferate in return. 
The three above-mentioned articles form the first three chapters of Cohen’s 2009 book, 
and the remaining chapters of the book develop the argument further. We do wrong, 
however, to think that Rescuing Justice and Equality is merely a clarification and 
extension of the views expressed in “Where the Action is.” In fact, there is a significant 
alteration of his argument stated in an 2008 appendix to the 1997 article and corroborated 
by an important change in the text. In 1997, the second horn of the dilemma is based on 
the claim that there is no way to distinguish the basic structure from individual choices, 
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but the 2008 appendix admits that there is a way to distinguish structure from individual 
choice. He writes, 
“Actions are, in general, no part of the basic structure, because a structure, 
in the present sense of the term, is a set of rules, and actions are not 
members of sets of rules. So the relevant customary  actions...are 
nevertheless not themselves a set of rules. My point is not that daily 
behavior, including ‘individual market behavior,’ is part of the basic 
structure but that it is so closely related to what must on pain of 
arbitrariness be included in the basic structure, to wit, the informal 
structure demanded by  justice, that it too, that is, daily  behavior, comes 
under the same principles of justice that judge structure properties of 
justice.”159
Read alongside the 1997 article, this is an odd passage. In 1997, the second horn of 
Cohen’s dilemma relies on the claim that there is no adequate way of distinguishing the 
basic structure from personal choice. Yet, in the above passage, Cohen admits that there is 
a way of doing this because “a structure...is a set of rules and actions are not members of 
sets of rules.” In this way, he seems to undermine his argument from 1997.
 However, this is no issue for Cohen because he has a new argument. In 2008, the 
claim is that the informal structure of society must “on pain of arbitrariness” be included 
in the basic structure. Yet, if the distinction between the basic structure and personal 
choices is a real one--as he admits in the passage--then why  would distinguishing the two 
be arbitrary? Cohen here relies on another implicit  argument to show that the distinction 
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between the basic structure and personal choice might be possible but is nonetheless 
ethically arbitrary. The distinction could be made, but it could not be justified. 
 Why would this distinction be ethically arbitrary? Cohen gives two different 
answers in Rescuing Justice and Equality. The first answer is contained in a 2008 change 
to the text of “Where the Action is.” There, Cohen argues the distinction is ethically 
arbitrary because any reason to be concerned with the basic structure is likewise a reason 
to be concerned with personal choices. In a passage added in 2008, he writes, 
“Structure and choice remain distinguishable, but not from the point of 
view of the applicability to them of principles of justice (at any rate when, 
as it  is ex hypothesi the case here, they are thought to apply  because of the 
fateful consequences of that to which they apply: you cannot bring the 
informal norm into the compass of justice for that  reason without also 
bringing within its compass the action that gives the norm substance and 
that account for much, if not most, of the effect).”160
For Cohen, if our reason to be concerned with the basic structure is the profound effects 
they  have on our life, we must also be concerned with personal choices because they have 
similar effects. The distinction would be ethically arbitrary because our grounds for 
concern with one also grounds a concern with the other. Readers will notice that in 
making this argument in 2008, his treatment of the second horn of his dilemma is now the 
same as his treatment of the first horn. Whether the basic structure is defined coercively 
or not, distinguishing the basic structure from personal choice is ethically arbitrary 
because both have profound effects. Accordingly, Cohen’s 2008 argument is that  Rawls 
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cannot justify a focus on the basic structure from an appeal to profound effects. There is 
no longer any dilemma for Rawls, but this single argument. 
 Yet, this argument relies on a mistaken reading of Rawls, and Cohen’s concern 
with profound effects is only a distraction. Appeal to profound effects was not meant to 
explain why Rawls focuses on the basic structure rather than other aspects of society. It 
was instead meant to explain why the organization of the basic structure is of such ethical 
importance. In comparing this concern with the basic structure to other ethical concerns, 
the basic structure is of such high importance because it  has profound and pervasive 
effects. In short, the appeal to profound and pervasive effects is not meant to answer the 
question “what  distinguishes the basic structure from other ethical concerns?” but to 
instead answer “why is the concern with a basic structure primary amongst ethical 
concerns otherwise distinguished.”161  The organization of the basic structure has 
profound and pervasive effects, so it is ethically important that we address it. The 
informal structure of society also has profound and pervasive effects, so it is ethically 
important that we address it as well. Yet, the fact that both the informal structure and 
basic structure are ethically important is no reason to address them together as a single 
subject.
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161 In short, the often cited sentence, “the basic structure is the primary subject of justice because its effects 
are so profound and present from the start,” should be read with the emphasis on “primary.” Rawls, Theory 
of Justice, 7. The appeal to “profound” effects is made five times in the Rawls corpus, at Theory of Justice, 
7, 96; Collected Papers, 258, 265; and Justice as Fairness, 55. In each of these instances, the notion is 
mentioned in motivating the importance of the basic structure as an ethical concern, and not as a reason to 
distinguish it from other subjects. In Political Liberalism, at 278-281, a similar idea is mentioned, but only 
to show why an agreement about the organization of the basic structure is fundamentally different from 
agreements made within a basic structure 
6.1.2 Cohen’s second argument: the scope of justice
Since Rawls does not appeal to the “profundity of effects” criterion162 to distinguish his 
concern with the basic structure, Cohen’s first argument to show that this distinction is 
ethical arbitrary does not succeed. However, Cohen has a second argument. This second 
argument is contained neither in the 1997 article nor in the 2008 edits, but it runs through 
the remaining chapters of Rescuing Justice and Equality. According to this second 
argument, the reason why we should not distinguish the basic structure is because doing 
so is arbitrary from the perspective of justice. To make this point, Cohen turns his 
attention to clarifying the nature of justice. Once we see what kind of requirement justice 
must be, we can see why it is arbitrary  to distinguish structure and choice from the 
perspective of justice. 
 To show what kind of requirement justice must be, Cohen appeals to a theory of 
justification.163  He argues that all justification proceeds by appeal to more fundamental 
ethical principles. While the justification of any  particular act, judgment or principle 
might go in many stages--appealing to still more fundamental principles at each stage--
this process bottoms out at fundamental normative principles. These fundamental 
normative principles express our core ethical commitments, which are often implicit and 
cannot themselves be justified. 
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162 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, 136.
163 Before arguing about the concept of justice, however, he first sharpens his view about the content of 
justice. In Chapter 4, he tries to show that the appropriate standard for distributive justice is not the 
difference principle, but equality. In Chapter 5, he answers an objection that requiring persons to be 
concerned with equality would unfairly restrict either freedom of occupation or the value of self-realization. 
These two chapters together fill in Cohen’s substantive view; Justice does not require that the basic 
structure be organized in accordance with the two principle of justice, it requires equality. It requires 
equality in structuring an economy and in person’s individual choices.
 Cohen uses this model of justification in two related arguments. First, in Chapter 
6,  “The Facts,” Cohen argues against those theorists who ground a conception of justice 
on certain facts. The basic argument is that any principle that  is based on certain facts can 
only be justified if a more fundamental principle shows those facts to be morally relevant. 
For example, the utilitarian might support a moral principle that we ought to protect 
religious freedom, and she might argue for this moral principle based on the fact that 
doing so would promote happiness. Yet, this fact  is only relevant because of her 
acceptance of the more fundamental principle that we ought to do that which promotes 
happiness. Since facts are only relevant because more fundamental principles make them 
so, the most fundamental principles cannot be based on facts. In short, fundamental 
ethical principles must be fact-free. 
 The second argument where Cohen uses his model of justification is against 
constructivism about justice in Chapter 7. In this chapter, Cohen argues that 
constructivism mistakes “rules of regulation” for fundamental normative principles. He 
defines rules of regulation as rules we adopt to order our choices, and this distinguishes 
them from fundamental principles because rules of regulation are chosen whereas 
fundamental normative principles are unchosen. Cohen argues one determines “how the 
basic structure ought to be organized” by  choosing a rule of regulation that addresses this 
question. Since we choose such a rule of regulation, we will need to justify  that choice. 
To do this, we need to (eventually) appeal to a fundamental normative principle. 
Moreover, if we think that rule that applies to the basic structure is a principle “of 
justice,” then we must appeal to a fundamental normative principle “of justice.” 
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 Accordingly, Cohen concludes that even Rawlsian constructivists must be 
committed to fundamental principles of justice. In order to justify a rule of regulation for 
the basic structure, the Rawlsian needs to implicitly use a fundamental principle of 
justice. Bringing Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 together, Cohen claims that all Rawlsian 
constructivists must ultimately be committed to a fundamental and fact-free principle of 
justice. Rawls’s two principles of justice are merely  rules of regulation, which need to be 
ultimately justified by such a fundamental principle of justice. 
 This argument allows Cohen to identify why the Rawlsian focus on the basic 
structure is arbitrary from the perspective of justice. Justice is the expression of a 
fundamental normative commitment, and as such, it is general across all things that  might 
be just. If we justify a global norm, constitution, economic scheme, law, social norm or 
individual action as being just, we make ultimate appeal to the same fundamental 
principle of justice. Yet, given that this fundamental principle is fully general across all 
these subjects, it is arbitrary to focus merely on the basic structure. Accordingly, the 
Rawlsian focus on the basic structure is ethically  arbitrary. Even if the basic structure can 
be distinguished from daily behavior, it should not be.
 Yet, the Rawlsian should not be any more worried by this second argument for 
ethical arbitrariness than she should be worried by  the first.  In this second argument, 
Cohen tries to show that  the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure is arbitrary on the basis 
of his model of justification, but every Rawlsian should deny Cohen’s model of 
justification. Put simply, Cohen is a foundationalist  but Rawls is a holist. Cohen supposes 
that all justification must ultimately appeal to fundamental normative principles, but 
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Rawls argues that all justification ultimately appeals to a reflective equilibrium. 
Accordingly, moral principles are not justified by more fundamental normative principles 
for Rawls, they are justified by their fit  with our considered convictions. Thus, Rawlsians 
do not need to ultimately appeal to fact-free principles (though, they can) and they do not 
need to appeal to any fundamental principle of justice. Instead, they  appeal to a broad 
range of considered convictions, both about generalities and particulars. For Cohen’s 
argument against Rawls to succeed, he would thus need to invalidate reflective 
equilibrium as a model of justification and show the necessity of his own 
foundationalism. Without doing so, his criticism gets no grip against Rawlsians. 
 Just as Rawls’s model of justification shows that Cohen’s arguments are 
insufficient against the Rawlsian view, so does Cohen’s model of justification show 
certain Rawlsian arguments to be insufficient against his own view. In explaining justice 
as a particular fundamental principle, Cohen is not committed to the priority of justice. 
For him, being just is merely one consideration that counts in favor of some option, and 
other considerations will often be more significant. If justice requires one choice over 
another, it is not necessarily  the case that we ought to choose what justice requires. 
Likewise, the fact that one institution would be more just than another does not 
necessarily mean that we ought to establish the more just institution. Instead, Cohen 
views justice as one competing fundamental value amongst others. We might sometimes 
rightly act in accordance with justice, and sometimes rightly  act against it. As he says in 
Chapter 6, “Justice is not the only value that calls for (appropriately  balanced) 
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implementation: other principles, sometimes competing with justice, must also be 
variously pursued and honored.”164
 This commitment protects Cohen from any  argument that claims that his view of 
justice does not take some important value into consideration. After all, he can merely 
distinguish that other important value as expressed by a different fundamental principles 
than justice. For instance, some might respond that  Cohen’s conception of justice is odd 
because it  would lead to “leveling-down.” According to Cohen, the society  in which each 
has equal welfare is more just than a society  in which all have higher welfare but some 
have much more than others. Yet, Cohen can respond and say that the more unequal 
society is indeed less just  but might still be preferable. In that case, we are merely 
sacrificing justice for welfare, and that might be okay.165  A second example of this 
response occurs in Chapter 8, “The Publicity Argument.” There, he treats an objection 
from Andrew Williams that requiring individuals to promote equality does not satisfy the 
demands of publicity. To this Cohen can merely  deny that publicity  is a requirement on 
justice, though it might be a concern grounded by a different fundamental principle. In a 
third instance, others might argue that Cohen’s conception of justice is problematic 
because it ignores the importance of personal projects.166  If justice requires each 
individual to pursue equality  in their personal choices, then persons would not have the 
opportunity to pursue those projects important  to themselves Yet, Cohen can again 
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164 Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, 272.
165 ibid., 319-320
166 For such arguments, Tan, “Justice and Personal Pursuits” The Journal of Philosophy (2004): 331-362.
respond that persons can pursue personal projects, but they  are merely sacrificing justice 
to do so. While doing so might be unjust, it might not be wrongful. Sometimes, we 
should sacrifice justice for personal pursuits. Since Cohen does not suppose that we 
should always do the most just course of action or that we ought to live in the most just 
society, these kinds of arguments would not force Cohen to give up his view. For some, 
this commitment might cut against Cohen’s view, but it is not argument against Cohen, 
given the role he assigns justice in his model of justification. It seems that we have 
reached a stalemate.
6.1.3 The broader argument
However, even if Cohen’s arguments in Chapter 6-7 of Rescuing Justice and Equality do 
not succeed in invalidating the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure, they still make an 
important point. To see why, we can deconstruct the form of Cohen’s argument, which 
goes in two basic steps. The first step  is establishing that justice must be a unified ethical 
requirement that is general across all contexts. By referring to justice as a unified ethical 
requirement, I mean that something can rightly  be considered just only  when it is related 
to a single conception of justice, which is the same across all contexts. For contrast, 
justice would be “non-unified” if there were some object for which the properties that 
warranted calling that object “just” were wholly different from the properties that 
warranted calling some different object “just.”167  By referring to justice as general across 
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167 In more formal terms, justice is “disunified” if there is an X such that X is just if and only if it has 
property P, and there is Y such that Y is just if and only if it has properties Q, and property P is not identical 
with property Q. Justice is “unified” if for every X and every Y, if X and Y are just, then there is a property 
P such that both X and Y have property P. 
all contexts, I mean that this unified requirement is relevant across a broad range of 
subjects; institutions, laws, choices, dispositions, etc. Cohen’s theory  of justification is 
meant to show why justice must be unified and general; it must be so in order to be a 
fundamental normative principle. 
 The second step of the argument is to show that, since justice is a unified and 
general ethical requirement, the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure is arbitrarily 
restrictive. Rawls’s two principles of justice are not unified and general, so they  cannot be 
principles of justice. Accordingly, the basic argument can be expressed as follows:
1) Justice is a unified ethical requirement that is general across all contexts
2) The Rawlsian focus is restricted to the justice of the basic structure
3) Thus, the Rawlsian focus ignores the requirements of justice in all other 
contexts
4) Thus, the Rawlsian focus is ethically arbitrary from the perspective of justice. 
In short, the Rawlsian goes wrong because she mistakes the nature of justice. Since 
justice is, by its nature, unified and general, any principle that artificially  restricts the 
authority of justice is arbitrary from the perspective of justice.
 Now, I have claimed that this argument is unsuccessful because Cohen has not 
adequately argued for (1); he has not shown that justice must be a unified ethical 
requirement general across all contexts. To prove (1), Cohen appeals to a theory of 
justification, but Rawlsians should reject this theory. Accordingly, Rawlsians can and 
ought to reject (1), and thus they ought to reject Cohen’s conclusion. 
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 However, even if Cohen has not proved (1), persons might otherwise be 
committed to it; they might think that justice must consist in a unified and general moral 
requirement. In this way, they might treat the concept of justice as unified; for a 
conception to be a conception of justice it  must offer a unified and general requirement. 
Someone so committed will accept (1), and someone who is not so committed will reject 
(1). Even though Cohen does not prove that  we should have a unified concept of justice, 
his argument still shows why those who are committed to a unified concept should view 
the Rawlsian perspective as problematic. 
 In short, while Cohen does not show the Rawlsian position to be incoherent, he 
does show an inconsistency between the commitment to a unified concept of justice and 
the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure. Rawlsians do not need to be committed to 
thinking of justice as a fundamental, general and unified ethical value, but those who are 
committed to such a conception of justice might find the Rawlsian view problematic.
 One of the reasons why Plato’s dialogues are so intriguing is that they record the 
views of an interlocutor as they are sharpened over the course of conversation. As various 
issues are cleared away, we are often left with the core commitments of the interlocutor 
laid bare. The most invaluable aspect of Rescuing Justice and Equality is that we can 
likewise see how Cohen’s own views are sharpened over the course of a 17 year 
conversation. While the Rawlsian interlocutor is always offstage, his presence is felt as 
Cohen responds to objection after objection. I here mean to suggest that as years have 
cleared away  various issues, we are now left with Cohen’s own core commitment laid 
bare. What began as an extension of the difference principle to individual choices, 
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eventually became an argument about the nature of justice. Cohen’s core commitment is a 
view of justice as a unified and general ethical requirement. For Cohen, Rawls’s theory 
goes wrong because it does not treat justice as it is. Accordingly, the next topic that would 
continue the conversation is whether we ought to treat justice as a fundamental, general 
and unified ethical value. 
 I argue that we cannot assume that the concept  of justice is unified. Even if we 
ultimately  accept a unified conception of justice, we cannot argue that any adequate 
conception of justice must present a unified and general ideal. Accordingly, Cohen’s 
argument that just must consist in an unified ideal goes wrong. Whether we should accept 
a unified conception of justice depends on whether it is the best conception of justice, and 
not on any conceptual necessity.
6.2 The Argument against a Unified Concept of Justice
It is difficult to know what could settle a dispute between whether the concept of justice 
is unified or disunified. If we argue about a natural fact, we look for evidence in the 
world to settle the debate. We cannot, however, look towards evidence in the world to 
determine the nature of justice. One might say that we look to the patterns of how persons 
use the phrase, “justice,” and then look towards what their implicit beliefs about what its 
content is. Yet, such an analysis would (at most) tell us what people think about justice, 
and we recognize that persons can be wrong about this. If most in a country  use justice in 
such a way that implies that  the death penalty  is just, we would not take that to mean that 
the death penalty was just. Instead, in appealing to the idea of justice we appeal to an idea 
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that could correct what people believe. In the same way that persons might be wrong 
about what is or is not just, persons could also be wrong about whether the concept of 
justice is or is not unified. 
 As I understand the issue, the best way to settle a debate about whether justice is 
unified or disunified is by determining which way of thinking about justice better 
explains the role that justice plays in our practical reasoning. Justice has a particular role 
in our deliberation and moral debate, and the right concept of justice should fit that role. 
In other words, the terms of the argument should be practical. We vindicate one way of 
thinking about justice by  showing that it fits best with the role the idea plays in practical 
reasoning and debate.
 One clear feature of how justice is used in debate is that people disagree about 
what justice requires. Even a single individual might be “of two minds” on what justice 
requires. In order to accurately represent  the concept of justice, then, we need to 
recognize that the idea is not used to refer to any particular requirement(s). Luck 
Egalitarians, Civic Republicans, Libertarians, Contractualists, and Marxists all employ 
the same concept of justice--lest  we see them as merely talking past one another--but they 
differ in what they think the requirements of justice are.
 For this reason, it is always helpful to distinguish the concept of justice from a 
conception of justice. We can think of a conception as an articulation of what justice 
requires. Egalitarians, Republicans, Libertarians, Contractualists, and Marxists all employ 
different conceptions of justice. By contrast, a concept of justice is that which these 
groups disagree about when they offer different conceptions of justice. The difficulty is 
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giving a characterization of the concept of justice that (a) does not dissolve into a 
conception of justice and (b) still respects the ways in which justice is distinct from 
rightness, goodness, merit, and other normative concepts. 
 In the introduction, I introduced two objections to the argument of this 
dissertation. First, one might object that developing principle for the basic structure leads 
us to misrepresent  justice. Insofar as we think of the principles for the basic structure as 
principles of justice, we risk understanding justice as consisting in the requirements on 
the basic structure if we first develop principles for the basic structure. Second, one might 
suppose that articulating a conception of justice has primacy over developing principles 
for the basic structure. Only if we apply a conception of justice to the basic structure 
could the principles that apply to it be principles of justice. In §6.1, I argued that Cohen’s 
most developed criticism seeks to show that Rawls’s focus on the basic structure is 
arbitrary from the perspective of justice. We should notice that none of these arguments 
seems to come from a particular conception of justice. Instead, they come from claims 
about what justice must necessarily  be like. Yet, these claims of necessity  are not claims 
of physical or logical necessity, they are claims of conceptual necessity. They  are about 
what justice is for all those who advocate different conceptions of justice. 
 The specific claim about justice that  these arguments advance is that  justice 
consists in a single unified and general requirement across context. In this way, they 
advance a “unified concept of justice.” If justice is not unified, then developing principles 
of justice for the basic structure would not have definitive implications for justice more 
broadly. If justice is not unified, then developing a general conception of justice would 
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not tell us what would make a basic structure just. If justice is not unified, then 
developing principles for a particular subject would not be arbitrary from the perspective 
of justice. So, in order to respond to these three arguments, I want to argue against  a 
unified conception of justice. I want to argue conceptual necessity does not require that 
all conceptions of justice be unified. 
 As an alternative to a unified concept, I offer a disunified concept. A unified 
concept of justice maintains that “a particular is just if any only if it relates to a single 
unified and general requirement.” By contrast, a disunified concept  maintains that “a 
particular is just if and only if it satisfies a principle of justice.” Given this definition, it  is 
important to ask what makes a principle of justice a principle of justice, and I return to 
that issue in §6.3. Before that, I want to argue on behalf of a disunified concept of justice 
over a unified concept. This will allow me to address the two objections and Cohen’s 
criticism.
 My argument on behalf of a disunified concept of justice moves in two stages. In 
§6.2.1, I argue that a disunified concept of justice can better explain the field of 
disagreement about justice. Even those who favor a unified conception of justice can 
recognize disunified conceptions as rival conceptions of justice. However, a unified 
concept of justice fails to recognize disunified conceptions of justice as conceptions of 
justice. By contrast, a disunified concept of justice can recognize unified conceptions as 
conceptions of justice. Therefore, a disunified concept can better account for 
disagreement between rival conceptions. In  §6.2.2, I argue on behalf of a disunified 
conception of justice. This bolsters the important of the first  argument by better 
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indicating why  we should recognize a disunified concept, but is also favors a disunified 
conception more generally.  After making these arguments, I briefly survey one possible 
objection from the recent work of Ronald Dworkin. 
6.2.1 A disunified concept better sets the space of disagreement
My first argument points out that it is meaningful for someone to wonder whether the 
requirements of justice are unified and general across context. If we accept a unified 
concept of justice, however, we cannot make sense of this as meaningful. If we suppose 
that justice consists of a unified and general requirement, then someone who wonders 
whether justice consists of a unified and general requirement must be making some kind 
of mistake. We would say that they are not wondering about justice. By contrast, a 
disunified concept of justice does not impose such a requirement. Instead, it supposes that 
a particular is just whenever it satisfies a principle of justice. Given the vagueness of 
what “a principle of justice” might consist in, someone could not wonder whether justice 
consists in satisfying some principle of justice in the same way. For this reason, a 
disunified concept of justice better captures the space of possible disagreements about 
justice. 
 To some, this argument might seem reminiscent of Moore’s “Open Question 
Argument,” which has been thoroughly  scrutinized. This argument was used to better 
emphasize the way in which we cannot  define goodness by identifying it with a property 
that all good things have. Even if something is good whenever (and only whenever) it is 
pleasurable, we cannot  define goodness with the pleasurable. This is shown in how, 
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whenever goodness is defined in terms of some property P, we can always meaningfully 
ask, “are P things really good?” In this way, it is always an open question whether 
something is good. It cannot be settled by definitions alone. 
 The typical challenge to the Open Question Argument is that it only expresses the 
paradox of analysis. However, those who criticize the argument in this way  interpret it as 
meant to do more than the arguments aims to do. We can recognize that the question, “is 
water really H2O?” is a meaningful question, but this does not mean that we cannot 
define water as H2O. The difference between the water case and the goodness case is that 
the person who claims that water is H2O does not merely offer it as a definition; they can 
also show why what we are looking for when we identify  something as water is the same 
as that which we identify by H2O. The meaningfulness of the question does not show that 
water and H2O are not the same, it  merely shows that  more beyond mere definition needs 
to be said. The chemist who defines  water as H2O can say  more in defense of this claim, 
but the hedonist who defines goodness as pleasure cannot. Moore’s open question 
argument merely  points out that whoever defines goodness as “the pleasurable,” “the 
natural,” or “the unified” must do more than stipulate a definition. The open question 
argument helps us to recognize that a definition is not enough, but it does not show that 
an analysis is impossible.
 A much better way to express the point that Moore gestures towards is through the 
distinction between concepts and conceptions. We can understand Moore’s target as 
offering a particular conception of goodness. For example, the hedonist offers a 
conception goodness as the pleasurable, but this hedonist goes wrong whenever they 
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mistake their conception of goodness for the concept of goodness. A hedonist cannot say, 
“goodness consists in the pleasurable, that is merely a fact of definition,” because the 
voluntarist does not think that goodness consists in pleasure. The voluntarist responds, 
“goodness consists in fulfilling god’s will, that is a fact of definition.” If both stick to 
their words, then they would merely be talking past one another. In order to makes sense 
of their debate, we differentiate the concept of goodness from the conception. The 
hedonist might define their conception of goodness as “goodness consists in the 
pleasurable” and the voluntarist might define their conception of goodness as “goodness 
consists in fulfilling god’s will.” Yet, they  should recognize that either would be 
inadequate as the concept  of the goodness. Instead, the concept need be defined in such a 
way that does not predetermine a particular conception. In order to make sense of how 
the word is used, a one cannot define goodness in terms of a conception. That is why  we 
find the question, “are P things really good?” to always be an open question. Our concept 
of goodness is distinct from any articulation of good things provided by a conception. 
 Returning now to my argument, I want to point out that--what I have called--a 
unified concept of justice comes closer to being a conception of justice than a concept of 
justice. Of course, the unified concept is not itself a conception because it is consistent 
with different conceptions. Someone who thinks “justice always consists in promoting 
equality” and someone who thinks “justice always consists in promoting autonomy” both 
identify justice with a unified and general requirement, but they  offer different 
requirements. So, it  would be wrong to suppose that a unified concept of justice is really 
a concept. It is better to see the unified “concept” of justice as picking out a class of 
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conceptions rather than the concept of justice. Conceptual necessity  does not requires that 
justice consist in a unified and general demand. Instead, it is merely the case that there is 
a class of conceptions that posit a unified and general demand. 
 The fact that we can meaningfully ask, “does justice really consist in a single 
unified and general moral requirement?” shows that  someone cannot merely stipulate that 
the concept of justice is unified. Someone can reasonably think that justice consists of a 
unified requirement just as they can think that goodness is the pleasurable. They cannot, 
however, stipulate the meaning of justice so as to exclude conceptions of justice that are 
not unified.  
 When we have fully  accepted the concept/conception distinction, we can 
recognize that one not only accepts either a unified or disunified concept of justice, they 
might also accept either unified or disunified conceptions. Oddly enough, one could 
simultaneously  recognize the concept of justice as disunified while accepting a unified 
conception. Recall that a disunified concept of justice identifies any particular as just if it 
satisfies a principle of justice. If someone were to argue that the only  relevant principle of 
justice is that “any  particular should promote autonomy” then they  can accept a 
disunified concept of justice while arguing for a unified conception. The unified 
conception recognizes a unified and general ethical demand--to promote autonomy--as 
the best understanding of justice. However, someone who holds this conception might 
also think that when disputants disagree about conceptions of justice, they disagree about 
what the appropriate principles of justice are. They can recognize that someone who 
offers a disunified conception of justice is still offering a conception of justice.
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 By contrast, I see no way in which someone can accept a unified concept of 
justice while accepting a disunified conception. If someone understands disputes about 
justice as disputes about which unified and general demand represents the demands of 
justice, then they will not recognize someone who advocates a disunified conception as 
offering a conception of justice. Since their conception of justice does not consist in a 
unified and general demand, it  is not consistent with the concept of justice. Thus, there 
are only  three positions one might hold; (a) recognizing a disunified concept and 
disunified conception, (b) recognizing a disunified concept and unified conception, and 
(c) recognizing a unified concept and a unified conception. 
 For this reason, the argument I use against a unified conception of justice does not 
extend to an argument against a disunified conception. Let us imagine that someone asks, 
“does justice really consist  in satisfying a principle of justice?” If this is a meaningful 
question then it shows a problem for the disunified concept as much as my argument 
shows a problem for the unified concept. Yet, is this question meaningful? The idea of a 
“principle of justice” is so open and vague that I doubt it  rules out any conception of 
justice. 
 For these reasons, the disunified concept of justice is better able to make sense of 
the space of disagreement about justice. If one accepts a unified concept of justice, then 
they  cannot  make sense of a disunified conception as a conception of justice. By contrast, 
someone who accepts a disunified concept of justice can make sense of both unified and 
disunified conceptions. In this way, a disunified concept of justice better represents the 
role that justice plays in our reasoning and debate. 
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6.2.2 One reason for a disunified conception
The second stage of my  argument aims to give one reason why we should accept a 
disunified conception of justice. This argument plays two roles. First, it  supports the first 
argument by  showing why it is important that the field of disagreements about justice be 
able to include disunified conceptions of justice. Second, it gives us reason to think that 
any conception of justice that posits a unified and general moral requirement goes wrong. 
I don’t  think this argument proves that a disunified conception of justice is the best  one, 
but it meant to counterbalance the intuitive pull that unified conceptions might have.  
 The core claim of the second argument is that how a particular ought to be is often 
settled when we identify what would make it  “just.” Likewise, if a particular is “unjust” 
then we recognize that it should not be that way. In these cases, we do not treat justice 
merely as a consideration that is balanced amongst others in making final judgements. 
Instead, justice determines how particulars should be. In this way, justice has a kind of 
“preeminence,” it authoritatively settles how something should be. Typically, we think 
that “if a law is unjust, it should be overturned,” “if an institution is just, it should be 
respected” “if an action is just, it should be performed,” and “if a society is unjust, we 
must act to change it.” If these statements are typical of how justice figures into our 
deliberation and debate, then justice has a kind of preeminence. 
 Now, a disunified conception is better able to explain the preeminence of justice 
than a unified conception is. This is because a disunified conception has greater 
flexibility to pick out how different particulars should be. It can identify one standard for 
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how institutions should be and another standard for how actions should be. In order to 
simultaneously  maintain (a) a unified conception of justice, and (b) the preeminence of 
justice, we would need to be committed to (c) a single moral demand that determines how 
a broad range of things should be. My point is not that someone cannot be committed to 
(c), but that it is a very contentious commitment with high costs.168  By contrast, a 
disunified conception of justice identifies a particular as just when it satisfies a principle 
of justice. Since different principles of justice can be sensitive to different considerations 
in different contexts, a disunified concept has a kind of moral flexibility. It  can identify 
different considerations as settling how different particulars should be. If justice is 
disunified, it does not  rigidly identify some single demand as settling how all particulars 
should be. Instead, it is sensitive to differences between cases.
 To see this point, let’s start from a toy  example of a disunified conception of 
justice. According to this conception, (a) a basic structure is just when it’s institutions 
protect basic rights, which includes equal political rights, (b) laws are just when they are 
the result of a democratic process within a just basic structure, (c) actions are just when 
are in accordance with just laws or promote just laws, and (d) dispositions are just when 
they  lead persons to act justly. Now someone who supports a unified concept of justice 
would deny that these four principles, (a)-(d), express a conception of justice. Since they 
do not offer a unified and general demand that all just particulars instantiate, this 
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justice from rightness.
disunified conception is not a conception of justice. Someone who maintains a disunified 
concept of justice, however, can recognize this toy conception as a conception of justice.
 With this toy example in hand, we can see the way in which a disunified concept 
of justice has greater flexibility. With such a view, we can see why the fact that a basic 
structure, law, action, or disposition is just can imply that it is as it should be.169  In each 
case, the principle of justice that applies to that particular is suited to the kind of thing--
basic structure, law, act, or disposition--that it is. Compare this to a more unified 
conception of justice. If justice consists in promoting equality, for example, we might see 
why a social structure that is just is as it should be. However, we might doubt that  actions 
that promote equality are always the actions we should take.170  Likewise, if justice 
consists in respecting certain natural rights, then we might see why actions should always 
be just. However, it is less clear that this conception would be adequate for determining 
how a social structure should be. After all, there are institutional questions that are not 
settled by respect for rights alone. In each of these cases, a unified conception does not 
provide the flexibility that allows for justice to be preeminent.  
 In summary, a unified concept of justice faces two problems. First, a unified 
concept is less able to make sense of all our disagreement about justice because persons 
might disagree about whether justice is unified. Second, a unified concept is less able to 
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169 It is an important point to recognize that my argument does not require that justice is preeminent for all 
moral questions. It might be the case that there are some issues for which we do not think that whether 
something is just settles the issue. All that matters is that there are some issues for which justice is 
preeminent, and even those who do not think it always settles the issue can recognize that it sometimes 
does.
170 The force of this objection can be well represented in the development of Cohen’s own argument. In 
arguing for justice as a unified and general ideal, Cohen abandons the primacy of justice (as discussed in 
§6.1.2)
respect the preeminence of justice. A disunified conception, however, has the flexibility 
to make sense of how any particular that is identified as just is as it should be. This 
second arguments gives us one reason to resist the intuitive pull of a unified conception 
of justice, and thereby shows the advantage of a concept of justice that  allows for both 
unified and disunified conceptions. 
6.2.3 Justice as an interpretive concept
In this section, I want to treat one possible defense of a unified concept of justice. This 
argument does not come from Cohen’s own views, but from the recent argument of 
Ronald Dworkin. While I do not think that Cohen would be entitled to use these 
arguments, they might be available to someone else who would want to defend the 
unified concept of justice and then use it to object to the views I defend. 
 The defense that I have in mind argues that justice is an interpretive concept. 
Dworkin distinguishes “interpretive concepts” from both “natural-kind concepts” and 
“criterial concepts,” and shows how moral concepts like justice are best understood as 
interpretive concepts rather than natural-kind or criterial concepts.171  A natural-kind 
concept is something that has a fixed identity  in nature. If one thought that justice was a 
natural property instantiated in just things that we must come to identify  and articulate, 
then justice would be a natural kind concept. Since we do not think that any  natural 
discovery  will settle what justice requires, justice is not a natural kind concept. Criterial 
concepts are those defined by criteria used to identify something. If one thought that 
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justice was a criterial concept, then we would share a concept of justice only if we agreed 
about which things in the world are just. Since both socialists and libertarians seem to 
share the concept of justice, justice cannot  be criterial. Instead, justice is an interpretive 
concept. Interpretive concepts are identified by the practices we use them in--often 
because of the overlapping paradigms to which we apply them--and we interpret what is 
the best way  to understand that concept as it figures in these practices. We, as a linguistic 
community, use the concept of justice in various ways, and we differ on how best to 
interpret the idea as it figures in these practices. 
 Applied to the current argument, one might make two claims from this 
understanding of the concept of justice. First, one might claim that treating justice as an 
interpretive concept can make sense of the role that  justice plays in practical reasoning. 
Second, one might claim that  recognizing justice an interpretive concepts shows why it 
must be unified. I agree with--or, at least, will grant--the first argument, but I disagree 
with the second. Even if justice is an interpretive concept, that gives us no reason to see it 
as necessarily unified. 
 In regards to the first  argument, I recognize treating justice as an interpretive 
concept does not face the objections to a unified concept in §6.2.1 and §6.2.2. In fact, 
many of the same reasons that I deny a unified concept of justice are the same as 
Dworkin’s reasons for denying that justice is either a criterial or natural-kind concept. If 
justice is a natural-kind concept, we cannot make sense of the Open Question Argument. 
Once we have identified what justice is in the world, we would not be able to ask whether 
what we identified as just was really just. If justice were a criterial concept, then persons 
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would be talking past one another in arguing about justice. If justice is an interpretive 
concept, however, we can recognize that  we treat justice as preeminent for some 
concerns. Any interpretation of justice would then have to explain why it  is preeminant 
for those concerns, and also why it is not preeminant for others. Likewise, since our 
practices often treat judgments of justice as the terminus of practical reasoning, the 
interpretation of justice must do the same. Dworkin’s articulation of interpretive concepts 
resolves much of the problems I have articulated above. 
 Nonetheless, accepting that justice is an interpretive concept does not give us any 
reason to suppose that justice is unified. Once we recognize it as an interpretive concept, 
the question is what the best interpretation of it is. Whether justice is unified or disunified 
then depends on which interpretation is best. The mere fact that  justice is interpretive 
does not mean that it is unified because there is nothing that  compels us to interpret 
justice as unified.172 Given the range of objects that we consider just and unjust, and the 
range of moral concerns that are relevant for these judgements, it seems to me that the 
best interpretation would need to be disunified, but a complete argument would be 
needed to show this definitively. 
 I will grant that a person who both (a) sees justice as an interpretive concept, and 
(b) interprets justice as unified is able to overcome the objections offered in §6.2.1. Yet, 
this is only because they offer a unified conception of justice rather than a unified 
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why justice must be unified. However, his unity of value comes at a high-level. This unity only needs to 
show that our values do not conflicts when all our values are fully supported by one another. This does not 
mean that we need to articulate justice as unified but only that however we articulate justice must 
ultimately support how we articulate our other values. Moreover, it is unclear why Dworkin thinks all 
values must be unified--as I point out in §5.3.2
concept. So long as they recognize the possibility  that a conception of justice might be 
disunified, they  do not support  a unified concept. Instead, they support a unified 
conception as the best interpretation of the concept. Such a view does not misrepresent 
how justice figures in practical reasoning. 
 Once someone grants that justice is an interpretive concept, they  cannot block the 
possibility of a disunified conception of justice. Whether justice is unified or disunified 
then depends on the best arguments we can give in favor of one conception or the other. 
We need to show that a unified conception better interprets the practices in which we use 
justice or that a disunified conception does so. What is important  for my argument is that 
one can no longer appeal to a unified concept of justice to block a disunified conception. 
Neither conception has prima facie authority but are instead rival interpretations of 
justice.
6.2.4 How a disunified concept addresses the two objections
At the beginning of this chapter, I introduced two objections that one might make against 
focusing on the basic structure from a concern with justice. First, one might argue that 
focusing on the basic structure would misrepresent the nature of justice. Second, one 
might argue that we can only determine how the basic structure ought to be by 
determining what justice requires. Both these objections are defeated once we accept a 
disunified concept of justice.
 The overall reason why  these objections are defeated is because we recognize that 
whether the basic structure is just is the same as whether it is as it ought  to be. In arguing 
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that the basic structure ought to be organized in one way rather than another, we are 
arguing about what would make it just. In arguing about the justice of the basic structure, 
we are arguing about how the basic structure ought to be. In arguing about the injustice of 
actions, we are arguing about what actions ought not to be done. So, to focus on the 
question of how the basic structure ought to be or which actions are unjust, we are neither 
misrepresenting the nature of justice nor ignoring a proper order of explanation. 
 First, we do not misrepresent the nature of justice by focusing on a principle for 
the basic structure of society  because we do not claim to be offering any general 
conception of justice at all in doing so. If one determines what makes a basic structure 
just, that does not itself determine anything about  what makes something else just. To 
figure out  whether a particular law, action or disposition of character is just, we need to 
determine what the appropriate principle of justice for that  law, action, or disposition of 
character is. We do not suppose that the same thing that makes the basic structure just 
makes all things just, so we do not misrepresent  justice generally by focusing solely on 
the basic structure.  
 Second, we do not need to first  determine what justice generally requires to 
determine how the basic structure ought to be. Instead, we determine whether a basic 
structure is just  by determining the appropriate principle of justice for the basic structure; 
we determine how the basic structure ought to be. This will require that we look at the 
particularities of the basic structure and how it fits within ethical life. It  is not a 
requirement of practical rationality or the order of value that we first determine a unified 
concept of justice and then apply it to the basic structure.
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6.2.5 Where the argument stands
With my  major arguments in favor a disunified concept of justice complete, I want to 
summarize where I think my broader arguments stands. I have not shown that the correct 
conception of justice must be disunified. Instead, I have merely argued against the view 
that the correct conception of justice must be unified. In so doing, I have argued against a 
unified concept of justice and for a disunified concept. However, one might still argue 
that the best  conception of justice--understood as a disunified concept--is unified. That is 
fine. I only mean to argue against those arguments that presume a unified concept of 
justice. The two objections surveyed in the introduction and Cohen’s fully developed 
criticism only get their force if we assume a unified concept of justice, and I mean to 
show why these arguments are wrong to do this. A conception of justice might be 
disunified. 
 All this leaves open the question, “what is the best conception of justice?” I think 
that it  should leave this question open. I do not doubt that persons with a particular 
conception of justice might disagree with my view on the basis of that conception of 
justice. In such cases, we have a contrast between views. Whether the view I advocate or 
a rival is best will depend on a more holistic comparison between the advantages of both 
views and how they fit with ethical and theoretical commitments. 
 I only mean to block those arguments that show my argument must be wrong 
regardless of which conception of justice one accepts. I think that the argument should be 
about what conception of justice we should accept, and I hope that this dissertation 
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contributes to that argument. I believe that my arguments show why the basic structure 
has primacy as a moral subject  even when we do not presume a particular conception of 
justice, and I believe that this favors those conceptions of justice that are consistent with 
treating the basic structure as a primary moral subject. 
6.3 A New Objection and the Primary Subject of Justice
I have explained a disunified concept of justice as committed to the idea that an object is 
appropriately identified as just when it satisfies a principle of justice. Yet, this only  opens 
the question, “what makes a principle of justice a principle of justice.” In order for a 
principle to be identified as a principle of justice, there needs to be something that ties 
together all the principles of justice as principles of justice.173  The defender of a unified 
concept of justice will say that this issue shows why my articulation of a disunified 
concept only  pushes the problem back another level. We will need some substantive unity 
to explain what distinguishes certain principles as principles of justice. 174
 Now, I recognize that I need some way of bringing the various principles of 
justice together, but I deny that  we need a unified concept of justice to do this. Instead, 
we only need to explain what makes principles of justice distinct  and unified as 
principles. This does not require us to represent  justice as a single unified demand. So 
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173 This need is most apparent in distinguishing what is just from what is right. Both might be understood as 
that which satisfies a moral principle, but what differentiates what is just is that it satisfies a principle of 
justice. 
174 I suspect that Cohen would object in this way because it resembles his own argument against the 
Rawlsian view. As mentioned above, Cohen appeals to the idea that a unified concept of justice is needed to 
explain why all the just things are just (Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, 291). Similarly, one might 
argue that the various principles of justice associated with a disunified concept of justice are only principles 
of justice if they apply a fundamental principle of justice, and that will need to be unified.
long as the various principles of justice have some feature in common, they can be 
identified as principles of justice. 
 In this section, I want to offer one candidate for a way to tie the principles of 
justice together without appeal to a unified moral demand. A full argument in defense of 
my suggestion would require a different project, so I leave it only  as a suggestion for 
now. If my suggestion is plausible, then it  shows how we can make sense of the basic 
structure as the primary subject of justice. If my  suggestion is not plausible, then my 
argument serves merely  as an example for how another account might work. To 
overcome the objection, it only needs to be the case that there is some way to bring the 
principles of justice together that does not rely on a unified moral demand. 
6.3.1 A proposal: principles of justice as specifying claims 
While a complete argument would need to better support any judgment of this type, I 
suggest that principles of justice are moral principles that deal specifically  with valid 
claims we on our broader community. What makes a principle of justice a principle of 
justice, is that it relates to these claims. 
 According to this view, principles of justice might specify  the claims members of 
society have or they  might specify  what claims persons should have. We might call the 
violation of rights unjust because it violates claims that persons have, and we might call a 
society that does not secure healthcare for all as unjust  because it should do so. It is in 
this sense that justice can both be a requirement and an ideal. It is a requirement in 
identifying what persons have claims on, and it is an ideal in establishing the best systems 
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of claims that persons could have. It is in this sense that justice can have both a natural 
component, as when we believe that persons have natural rights, and an artificial 
component, as when we think rights arise from conventional practices. It also 
differentiates the demands of justice from the morally supervenient because persons do 
not have claims on you to act in morally supervenient ways.175 
 In offering this unifying feature of justice, I follow Mill’s articulation of justice in 
Book V of Utilitarianism. There he sketches a social history  of the idea and its 
development through the modern period. At the conclusion of this history he writes, 
“Whether the injustice consists in depriving a person of a possession, or in 
breaking faith with him, or in treating him worse than he deserves, or 
worse than other people who have no greater claims--in each case the 
supposition implies two things: a wrong done, and some assignable person 
who is wronged. Injustice may also be done by  treating a person better 
than others; but the wrong in this case is to his competitors, who are also 
assignable persons. It seems to be that this feature in the case--a right in 
some person, correlative to the moral obligation--constitutes the specific 
difference between justice and generosity of beneficence. Justice implies 
something which it is not only right to do, and wrong not to do, but which 
some individual person can claim from us as his moral right. No one has a 
right to our generosity or beneficence because we are not morally  bound to 
practice those virtues toward any given individual.”176
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175 Likewise, what makes a principle of justice within this view differentiates justice from the promotion of 
the good because the promotion of good is a first-personal moral ideal whereas valid claims deal with a 
more second-personal stance.
176 Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, IN; Hackett Publishing, 2001), 50.
In this passage, Mill specifically  identifies justice as distinct from utility, and explains it 
by the idea of a valid claim that one has on another. Of course, Mill soon uses this notion 
of justice in order to show that we need the principle of utility because the claims that 
persons have often conflict and we need some principle by which to settle these conflicts. 
Yet, nothing compels us to accept Mill’s idea that our disputed claims need to be resolved 
by some fully  general first principle such as the principle of utility. I addressed that 
argument in Chapter 5. Rawls also conceives of the problem of justice in a similar way in 
his early writing. In “A Decision Procedure for Ethics,” Rawls writes;
“the problem of justice arises whenever it is the reasonably foreseeable 
consequence of the satisfaction of two ore more claims of two or more 
persons that those claims, if given title, will interfere and conflict with one 
another.”177
In this passage, the particular problem of justice is understood in ways that are similar to 
Mill’s understanding. In the later article, “Justice as Fairness,” Rawls specifically 
recognizes that his two principles of justice are not  principles that  settle all questions of 
justice, but are only “typical of a family of principles normally associated with the 
concept of justice.”178  Later in the essay, he gives an articulation of how the members of 
this family are related to one another,  “It is typical of cases of justice to involve persons 
who are pressing on one another their claim, between which a fair balance or equilibrium 
must be found.”179 In these passages, the idea of a claim is crucial for justice. A particular 
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conception of justice will settle persons’ claims in some specific way. My suggestion 
follows Mill and Rawls’s early work in understanding the various principles of justice as 
those moral principles that specify claims and settle disputes.
 One objection to this articulation is that we have all sorts of claims that are not 
related to justice in any  way. I have a valid claim that you bring me to the store if you 
promised to, but you do not commit an injustice if you do not fulfill your promise. In 
cases like this, not every valid claim relates to justice, so this articulation of what makes a 
principle a principle of justice is inadequate. 
 To answer this objection, we only  need to specify that the principles of justice are 
not related to all claims that we have, but claims we have on our broader community. 
When we have a right, for example, it is a claim we have on persons generally. When 
someone commits an injustice, it  is a wrong done to the larger community rather than to a 
particular person. So, the suggestion is that principles of justice relate to those claims we 
have on persons in our community generally. This overcomes the promising objection, 
because that is a claim against a particular person rather than on the members of a 
community generally. 
 Of course, this is only a first approximation of what unites the principles of 
justice, and it will undoubtedly need to be tweaked. Since my present goal is not to 
defend a complete account of what differentiates justice, I only offer this suggestion as a 
plausible idea to show how such an articulation may be possible and how it can aid in 
answering the present objection. I should stress that this understanding of the unifying 
idea of justice answers no substantive questions about justice. Specifically, it does not 
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determine what valid claims we have or what institutions we ought to have. To answer 
those questions we require a complete conception of justice. 
 The challenge that I mean to address in this section is to show what ties the 
various principles of justice together as principles of justice. Someone who advocates a 
unified concept of justice might suppose that the only way  to identify a principle as a 
principle of justice is to suppose that it  relates to a single unified moral demand. By 
identifying the principles of justice as those related to valid claims, I have instead tied 
together the various principles of justice in a more formal way. By  explaining the link 
between principles of justice with such a formal feature, I show why we do not need to 
rely  on any unified concept of justice. What is most important for answering the objection 
is to show how a formal link between the principles of justice would be possible. Other 
formal links--that justice deals with distributions of advantages or with laws, for 
example--might also answer this objection. 
6.3.2 The primary subject of justice
Beyond answering the objection, the idea that principles of justice are related to valid 
claims can show us why the basic structure of society would be the “primary subject of 
justice,” as Rawls famously labeled it. To see why it would be a subject “of justice,” we 
only need to look back at  how the basic structure was identified in Ch. 1. Recall that the 
basic structure is the system of social institutions that together establish our rights, 
obligations, and powers as members of society. In this way, these institutions establish the 
basic claims we have on one another as members of society. Since the institutions of the 
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basic structure establish claims we have as members of society, the principles that apply 
to the basic structure can rightly be identified as principles of justice. It is not because the 
principles themselves represent a single unified conception of justice, but because they 
relate to our claims on the broader community  that they can be considered principles of 
justice.
 To see why the basic structure would be the “primary” subject of justice, we only 
need  to recall the argument of Chapter 3. Recall all the ways in which both institutions 
and individual actions need to be understood within the moral context established by the 
basic structure. When we articulate principles of justice that do not apply to the basic 
structure, we need to recognize that the principles should be sensitive to the moral 
context established by  the basic structure. Some claims that we have will be due to 
institutions that are not part of the basic structure, but which institutions we ought to have 
need to be sensitive to the moral context established by the basic structure. When claims 
are not specified by institutions, those claims still need to be sensitive to the moral 
context established by  the basic structure. In this way, the various principles of justice can 
only be fully specified within a particular basic structure. 
 It is for this reason that the basic structure would be the “primary subject of 
justice.” In order to adequately  develop other principles of justice, we need to have a 
sense of the moral context those principles will apply in. The basic structure forms the 
moral context within which these principles of justice can be rightly determined, but the 
principles for the basic structure should not be specific to a moral context. Thus, they 
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have a kind of primacy amongst the principles of justice. The basic structure would be the 
primary subject of justice for the same reason why it has primacy as a moral subject.
6.4 The Priority of the Practical
The full argument of this dissertation, beginning with the introduction and ending here, 
might seem to involve a subtle trick. I began by saying that my arguments would not 
come from any claims about the nature of justice. In the introduction, I said that I did not 
defend the claim that “the basic structure is the primary  subject of justice” but instead 
that “the basic structure is a centrally important ethical subject.” Yet, even if I have not 
appealed to any  claims about the nature of justice, my arguments do bear on our views 
about the nature of justice. What seems like a trick is that I have an argument for why the 
basic structure is “the first subject of justice,” but the argument is a pragmatic one. Rather 
than arising from a conception of justice, it  shows the primacy of the basic structure as a 
moral subject, and then claims that this gives reason for us to regard it  as the primary 
subject of justice.
 I do not claim that the basic structure is a centrally important ethical subject 
because justice is uniquely related to it. Instead, I claim that we should understand justice 
as uniquely related to the basic structure because it  is a centrally important ethical 
subject. My argument for the primacy of the basic structure was made in the first four 
chapters, and it did not appeal to any broader conception of justice. Instead, it relied on a 
view of social institutions, their assessment, and the assessment of actions within those 
institutions. Instead of arguing from justice, I argued from a conception of the normative 
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structure of social practices. This all shows the importance of determining how the basic 
structure ought to be organized, and I believe it is appropriate to understand this as the 
primary subject of justice because of its importance. 
 The core question at hand is an odd one; how should we understand our moral 
concepts like justice? Those who argue that the basic structure is not the primary subject 
of justice, take a stance not only on what is just and unjust  but on how we should use the 
idea of justice. Yet, how should we settle a debate between persons who disagree about 
how we use the idea? I suggest that we should understand justice by  the role it plays in 
our practical reasoning. Of course, there is no settled agreement on what role this is, but I 
have suggested it often plays the role of identifying a terminus of practical judgement. 
When we judge something just, we often seem to judge that it is as it  should be rather 
than judging that it is good in only one respect. This is what, in part, blocks the claims 
that justice is--by necessity--a unified ethical demand. 
 Yet, even if I am wrong and there is not this, or any, pattern of use, then we can 
still ask the question of how we should use the concept of justice. Here, I believe that the 
central importance of the basic structure is key. If we agree that the basic structure is a 
centrally important subject for ethics, then we have reason to think that the basic structure 
is a central concern of justice. Insofar as we use the idea to discuss one of the most 
important aspects of ethical life, it would be appropriate to use the idea of justice to 
discuss one of the most important questions. In this way, it is the argument for the 
importance of the basic structure that shows why it would be a primary subject of justice 
and not any claim about the nature of justice per se. In this way, it  is more of a pragmatic 
299 
argument about justice. How we use the idea should be tied to what moral problems we 
need to solve. 
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Afterword: Social and Moral Complexity 
Rarely is good philosophy merely about proving a conclusion. More often, it  is about a 
broader perspective to take towards a range of issues. For the best understanding of the 
world, we need more than truths. We need to know the best ways to articulate truths, how 
to connect them, and which are most significant.  More than any particular conclusion, I 
want this dissertation to show a particular perspective towards the social structure and 
ethical life. I have tried to construct this perspective by addressing a number of different 
issues, arguing for particular conclusions and contrasting my view with alternatives. I 
hope that the broader perspective I want to get across has already been revealed across 
the various arguments, but I want to make this broader perspective more apparent in this 
final note. 
 There are a few motivating ideas that underlie much of this argument. One of the 
most important is an appreciation for social complexity. We act within a network of 
intertwined practices. When practices are stable, they get built upon with additional 
practices, adding to the complexity  and making any change more difficult and disruptive. 
One of the most amazing features of human life is how we navigate and manipulate these 
practices with ease. Yet, the fact that we live within this web of practices without much 
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difficulty can also blind us to them. 180  When theory tries to make an understanding of 
our actions explicit, however, it goes wrong if it fails to recognize the complex of 
practices that we implicitly  act within. Any accurate understanding of our actions and 
values needs to see them as within a moral context established by our practices.
 It is in the theorist’s search for a simple way of understanding morality and ethics 
that we come to ignore the complexities that our practices give rise to. We try  to look past 
and through these practices to identify  a moral foundation. Doing this is not problematic 
in itself, but becomes problematic if we do not recognize the ways in which any such 
foundation only matters to us within the practices of our social world. First, any such 
foundation would be too abstract; it  would need to be made real to us through our ways 
of living. Second, any such foundation would be alienating if it were not  tied into our 
social life. If morality and ethics is to be important to us, it  must be important to the 
people we are as members of our particular social world with our particular characters. 
Our practices are bound to skew the correct moral understanding in some ways, but the 
correct understanding must  still be shown to us through our ways of living together. The 
account of ethics that matters for us must be tied to our practices. 
 If we appreciate the importance of contingent practices in specifying the content 
of our ethical life and we appreciate social complexity, we can also appreciate both (a) 
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fish turns to the other and asks, “what the hell is water?” My point is that social practices are our water; no 
adequate account of our ethical life can neglect the role that practices play even if it is so easy for us to 
ignore them. This point has been much insisted by figures from Hume to Wittgenstein and beyond, but “the 
most obvious, important realities are often the ones that are hardest to see and talk about.” (David Foster 
Wallace, Convocation to Kenyon College,  <http://moreintelligentlife.com/story/david-foster-wallace-in-
his-own-words>)
why it is so difficult  to argue that we should be concerned with the basic structure and (b) 
why the basic structure is so important. The argument is difficult because the basic 
structure is just one particular set of social practices in our complex social world. What 
would make it any more deserving of our attention than other practices or the whole of 
society? One cannot merely  distinguish the assessment of practices or institutions from 
the assessment of individual action and then claim that they have vindicated the focus on 
the basic structure. One must give an argument for what makes the basic structure a 
particularly important ethical subject. 
 What I have tried to argue throughout is that what makes the basic structure a 
particularly important  more subject is the way in which it  establishes our obligations, 
rights, and powers as members of society. We can understand what the basic structure is--
it’s identity--as the set  of institutions that together specify  our role as member of society. 
It is because these institutions together form a system that we need to assess the basic 
structure as a single subject; to properly  assess any major social institution we need to 
assess it as part of the basic structure and this means that we need evaluate the basic 
structure as a whole. Finally, it  is the way in which the basic structure establishes an 
institutional context for both practices and individual actions that explains the moral 
distinctiveness of the basic structure. The particularities of the major social institutions 
are relevant for assessing the actions and practices within a society, but these 
particularities are not relevant for assessing the major social institutions themselves. 
 Recall that I understand social cooperation in a particular way. Rather than being 
focused on production or a lack of conflict, I understand it  as the unique cooperative 
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relationship  between members of society. I have argued that this cooperative relationship 
consists in following the rules of our major social institutions. We coordinate with one 
another in mutually  following these rules, and this coordination counts as cooperation 
when it is done with deference (rather than exploitation) towards those we coordinate 
with. This provides a tight link between the terms of social cooperation and the major 
social institutions because it  is by  following the rules of the major institutions that 
persons in society cooperate in the way specific to members of society. 
 When members of society  cooperate in this way--that is, when they follow the 
rules of the major social institutions--they establish obligations, rights, and powers for 
individuals background as members of society. Persons have a level of surety  that others 
will act in accordance with the rules of the major social institutions, so they  can plan on 
the basis of what these rules are. They can rely  on their property claims, on an authority 
to settle conflicts, on protection from threats, on an economic system, on certain 
relationships, and on a form of political power. At a fundamental level, this surety  only 
comes from persons mutually  following the rules of social practices. The basic structure 
consists of the ways in which these major institutions together establish background 
security. Accordingly, social cooperation consists in following the rules of the basic 
structure institutions, and we assess the terms of social cooperation by  assessing the basic 
structure.
 What should be obvious at this stage is that  these ideas together form a kind of 
conceptual circle. I have defined major social institutions, social cooperation, and 
member of society in inter-reliant ways. This is no problem because these ideas are meant 
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to make explicit  an implicit understanding of social practices. Since these practices are 
already up and running, and we find ourselves in the midst of them, it is no problem that 
their explication does not build up  from primary ideas with the theoretical beauty  of 
Leviathan’s Part I. There is no problem with circularity in this reconstruction, so long as 
it accurately reconstructs our practices. 
 This is the core argument that takes us from the complexity of social life to the 
central importance of the basic structure as an ethical subject. Our social practices 
influence much of the content  of ethical life; they establish new obligations, shape our 
values, determine our virtues and set the terms of our relationships. Not only our basic 
structure, but also our social practices generally, have profound and pervasive effects on 
ethical life. However, what makes the basic structure such a centrally  important ethical 
subject is the particular role it  has in social and ethical life. In establishing obligations, 
rights, and powers for individuals as members of society, it  is distinct from the rest of the 
social structure. It sets the moral context for the assessment of individual actions and 
many of our other social practices. Accordingly, if our moral theory  is to appropriately 
appreciate the complexity of the social world, moral theory should treat the basic 
structure as a distinct and centrally important subject. 
 From the perspective of a moral theory that has tried to look past our particular 
practices, I have little doubt that this method will seem odd. If we think that morality is 
fundamentally about first principles directly applied to solve our problems, we will think 
it odd that our practices can generate moral and ethical considerations. If we think of 
justice as a single, unified ethical demand, we will think it  odd to be less concerned with 
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articulating that demand. That is why I used the fourth and fifth chapters to argue against 
these views. Not only do they motivate some of the most discussed objections to a 
Rawlsian focus on the basic structure, they also represent two of the deeper convictions 
that can lead to a philosophical impasse. 
 In both responses, I want to advocate a view of moral theory that appreciates the 
complexity of our social world. First, to rely on fully  general first  principles to settle all 
our moral conflicts ignores the ways in which we are social creatures, living lives bound 
up in our particular practices. The fact that we live together with others according to these 
practices generates new and specific moral and ethical considerations that first principles 
alone cannot adequately respect. Since the major arguments that advocate such principle 
all fail, one cannot assume such a view of moral theory against the view I defend. 
Second, one should not assume that justice must be a single unified ethical idea. To do so 
necessarily limits its importance in our complex world. Any single articulated moral 
demand is unlikely to be sensitive to all the nuances of ethical life, so a view of justice 
that takes that  role is bound to be limited. It relegates justice to one concern among many, 
and an argument about  justice would not settle the difficult questions of what we ought to 
do. Instead, we should recognize that in arguing about justice, we argue about how things 
should be. If there is no easy answer to determining how all things ought to be, then we 
should not represent justice as a single unified ethical demand. 
 Undoubtedly, some of the claims I make in this dissertation will raise new 
questions and concerns. I know, for instance, that much more needs to be said about 
exactly  how our practices influence the content of ethical life. How exactly can we make 
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sense of values, virtues, relationships and obligations being influenced by social practices 
while denying strong forms of ethical relativism? I hope to better address these questions 
in time, but even if I have muddied the waters, I hope they are clear enough to see my 
core point. The focus on the basic structure of society is not justified merely by a 
particular view of the nature of justice. Those who doubt some view of justice do not 
adequately show that we should not be concerned with the basic structure. The basic 
structure is a distinct moral subject  that figures centrally in ethical life. Once we 
recognize that we act within a particular moral context that is partly established by our 
social practices, we should see the basic structure as a centrally important and distinct 
moral subject. 
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